UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1678
MINA ABDELMASEH ABDELSHAHED KHALIL,
Petitioner,
v.
DANA JAMES BOENTE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 24, 2017 Decided: January 31, 2017
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Saher J. Macarius, Audrey Botros, LAW OFFICE OF SAHER J.
MACARIUS, Framingham, Massachusetts, for Petitioner. Benjamin
C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Linda S.
Wernery, Assistant Director, William C. Minick, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mina Abdelmaseh Abdelshahed Khalil, a native and citizen of
Egypt, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). For the reasons set forth
below, we deny the petition for review.
The Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) vests in the
Attorney General the discretionary power to grant asylum to
aliens who qualify as refugees. Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d
265, 272 (4th Cir. 2011). A refugee is someone “who is unable
or unwilling to return to” his native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
An asylum applicant has the burden of proving that he satisfies
the definition of a refugee to qualify for relief. Djadjou, 662
F.3d at 272. He may satisfy this burden by showing that he was
subjected to past persecution or that he has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1) (2016). If the applicant establishes past
persecution, he has the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of a
well-founded fear of persecution. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 272.
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If the applicant is unable to establish that he was the
victim of past persecution, he must establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution. A well-founded fear of persecution
has a subjective and objective component. Marynenka v. Holder,
592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010). The subjective component
requires the applicant to show a genuine fear of persecution.
The objective component requires the applicant to show with
specific and concrete facts that a reasonable person in like
circumstances would fear persecution. Id.
An applicant faces a heightened burden of proof to qualify
for withholding of removal to a particular country under the INA
because he must show a clear probability of persecution on
account of a protected ground. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 272. If
the applicant cannot demonstrate asylum eligibility, his
application for withholding of removal will necessarily fail as
well. Id.
Because the Board “issued its own opinion without adopting
the IJ’s opinion . . . we review that opinion and not the
opinion of the IJ.” Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 908 (4th
Cir. 2014). We will uphold the Board’s decision unless it is
manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.
Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 273. The standard of review of the
agency’s findings is narrow and deferential. Factual findings
are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Id.
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“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding unless the
evidence was such that any reasonable adjudicator would have
been compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
An adverse credibility determination, as was made in this
case, must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. Djadjou,
662 F.3d at 273. We recognize that omissions, inconsistent
statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable
testimony are appropriate reasons for making an adverse
credibility determination. Id. The existence of only a few
such inconsistencies, omissions, or contradictions can be
sufficient for the agency to make an adverse credibility
determination as to the applicant’s entire testimony regarding
past persecution. Id. at 273-74.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s
adverse credibility finding and that Khalil’s corroborating
evidence was insufficient to support his asylum claim. We also
conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that
Khalil did not show a pattern or practice of persecuting Coptic
Christians. Because Khalil did not establish eligibility for
asylum, he is also ineligible for withholding of removal. Id.
at 272. Because Khalil fails to challenge the Board’s finding
that he waived review of the denial of protection under the CAT,
he has waived review in this court. See Tiscareno-Garcia v.
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Holder, 780 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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