This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1050
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Everett Williams, Jr.,
Appellant.
Filed January 30, 2017
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-33627
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Daniel C. Guerrero, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his motion for a downward departure and imposing the 60-month mandatory
minimum sentence on him for the crime of felon in possession of a firearm. Because Minn.
Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b) (2016), does not give a district court discretion to depart from
the mandatory sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 28, 2015, appellant Everett Williams Jr. was arrested after shooting
and killing his neighbor, R.M., with a handgun. On that day, appellant was not allowed to
possess, either actually or constructively, a firearm because of a prior conviction of assault
with a dangerous weapon. Appellant was charged with one count of second-degree murder.
Appellant gave notice of his intent to assert at trial self-defense, defense of dwelling, and
defense of others. The complaint was amended to add one count of possession of
ammunition or a firearm after being convicted for a crime of violence. The state dismissed
the second-degree-murder charge concluding that it was more likely than not that the
shooting was done in self-defense. Because the state could not prove that charge beyond
a reasonable doubt, it determined that it would be inappropriate to go forward on that
charge. But, because appellant was not eligible to possess the firearm he used when he
shot the victim, the case proceeded on the felon-in-possession of a firearm charge.
After brief arguments regarding necessity as a defense, appellant decided to enter a
straight plea of guilty. He was aware that the state believed the mandatory sentence for
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him, was a minimum of 60 months in prison. The district court found that appellant
voluntarily and intelligently waived his trial rights and admitted facts sufficient to be found
guilty.
At the sentencing hearing appellant moved for a downward sentencing departure
and argued that the district court was not precluded from granting this motion under the
plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b). The district court concluded that it did
not have discretion to depart from the mandatory sentence and sentenced appellant to 60
months in prison.
DECISION
“The interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law, which this court
reviews de novo.” Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. App. 2006). Minn. Stat.
§ 609.11, subd. 8 states:
Motion by prosecutor. (a) Except as otherwise provided
in paragraph[] (b) . . . prior to the time of sentencing, the
prosecutor may file a motion to have the defendant sentenced
without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences
established by this section . . . . When presented with the
motion, or on its own motion, the court may sentence the
defendant without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences
. . . if the court finds substantial and compelling reasons to do
so. . . . (b) The court may not, on its own motion or the
prosecutor’s motion, sentence a defendant without regard to
the mandatory minimum sentences established by this section
if the defendant previously has been convicted of an offense
listed in subdivision 9 in which the defendant used or
possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon.
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(Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that appellant had previously been convicted of an
offense listed in subdivision 9 in which he had used or possessed a firearm or other
dangerous weapon.
Appellant argues that, because Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b), does not expressly
preclude “sentenc[ing] a defendant without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences”
when the motion is made by the defendant, as opposed to the court or the prosecution, the
court can exercise its discretion to depart from the mandatory sentence because the
defendant made the motion for departure. We disagree.
We conclude that State v. Sheppard, is dispositive of the issue. 587 N.W.2d 53
(Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1999). In Sheppard, the defendant
entered a guilty plea to a charge of felon-in-possession and “asked the court to depart from
the mandatory-minimum sentence for felon in possession, arguing that the court should,
and had the authority to, sentence without regard to section 609.11, subd. 8(b), which
denied the prosecutor and court discretion to depart from mandatory-minimum sentences.”
Id. at 54.
[S]ection 609.11, subd. 8(b), is a clear statement of the
intention of the legislature. Our courts have held that due
process of law requires that criminal statutes be sufficiently
clear and definite to warn a person of what conduct is
punishable. We conclude that the legislature has mandated
that courts have no discretion to depart from minimum
sentences under those circumstances described in section
609.11, subd. 8(b).
Id. at 56 (quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Sheppard, the defendant
requested a sentencing departure, just as appellant has; he had previously been sentenced
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to an offense listed under Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 9 (2016), just like appellant; and this
court determined that there was no discretion available to a district court when Minn. Stat.
§ 609.11, subd. 8(b) applies. Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b) has not been amended or
changed by the legislature in any way since our decision in Sheppard.
Because the plain language of the statute and controlling caselaw prohibit any use
of discretion in sentencing when Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b) applies, the district court
did not err in sentencing appellant to 60 months in prison.
Affirmed.
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