In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1685
PATTI LARDAS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
SLAVKO GRCIC, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 14 C 193 — William T. Hart, Judge.
____________________
2 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
No. 15‐1704
DANNY CHRISTOFALOS,
Debtor‐Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH E. COHEN, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Trustee‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 14 C 6958 — William T. Hart, Judge.
____________________
No. 16‐2913
JOHN LAURENCE KIENLEN,
Creditor‐Appellee,
v.
DANNY CHRISTOFALOS,
Debtor‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 15 C 10832 — William T. Hart, Judge.
____________________
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 3
No. 16‐4210
PATTI LARDAS,
Plaintiff,
and
DANNY CHRISTOFALOS,
Intervenor‐Appellant,
v.
SLAVKO GRCIC, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 14 C 193 — William T. Hart, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and
HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These four related appeals arise
from a long‐running and acrimonious business dispute be‐
tween appellants Patti Lardas and her nephew Danny Chris‐
tofalos on one side and appellees Slavko Grcic and associates
on the other. Appeal Nos. 15‐1685 (Lardas I) and 15‐1704 (Co‐
hen) were consolidated for oral argument, which took place
on October 28, 2015. Appeal No. 16‐4210 (Lardas II) concerns
4 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
the district court’s denial of a motion by Christofalos to re‐
open proceedings in Lardas I, and we treat it as a successive
appeal. Appeal No. 16‐2913 (Kienlen) is also successive to the
earlier consolidated appeals. We can decide Kienlen and Lar‐
das II without further oral argument. The briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal issues, and oral argu‐
ment would not significantly aid our decision‐making pro‐
cess. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). We affirm the judgments
and orders on appeal in Lardas I, Lardas II, and Kienlen, and we
dismiss the appeal in Cohen as moot.
I. Lardas I (No. 15‐1685)
In Lardas I, a diversity jurisdiction action, plaintiff Patti
Lardas brought claims of fraudulent inducement and breach
of contract against defendants Slavko Grcic; his sons, Milovan
and Draza Grcic; Thomas Karacic; and Karacic’s employer, the
Amalgamated Bank of Chicago.1
The crux of Lardas’s controlling amended complaint is
that the Grcics tricked her into participating in a global settle‐
ment agreement pursuant to which, among other things, her
nephew Christofalos was to receive a 99% interest in an entity
called Wauconda Shopping Plaza, LLC (“WSP”), with Slavko
Grcic retaining a 1% interest in the entity as well as a lien on
Christofalos’s interest. According to Lardas, the Grcics
hatched an elaborate scheme—along with Karacic and the
Amalgamated Bank—to force WSP to default on a loan and,
ultimately, to foreclose on Christofalos’s 99% stake and have
the Grcics take control.
1 Christofalos was originally a co‐plaintiff in this action, but the dis‐
trict court dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice. Lardas filed
an amended complaint as the sole plaintiff.
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 5
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Lardas
lacked standing to pursue her claims. Though the defendants
cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the district
court reviewed their motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In so
doing, the court treated the motion as a facial attack on Lar‐
das’s standing, accepting as true the factual allegations in the
amended complaint as well as the contents of the settlement
agreement appended to the complaint. The court took no ad‐
ditional evidence. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Facial challenges require
only that the court look to the complaint and see if the plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.”);
see also Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“[W]hen evaluating a facial challenge to subject matter juris‐
diction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court should use Twombly–Iq‐
bal’s ‘plausibility’ requirement, which is the same standard
used to evaluate facial challenges to claims under Rule
12(b)(6).”). The district court dismissed Lardas’s case without
prejudice, agreeing with the defendants that Lardas lacked
standing to pursue her claims. Lardas v. Drcic [sic], Nos. 14 C
193 & 14 C 6958, 2015 WL 444321, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2015).
Because the district court decided the question of standing
without resolving factual disputes, we review de novo the
court’s judgment of dismissal. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285,
289 (7th Cir. 2016).
To pursue a civil claim in federal court, a plaintiff must
allege and then prove that she has standing—i.e., that she suf‐
fered a concrete and particularized injury‐in‐fact that is trace‐
able to the defendant’s conduct and that is likely to be re‐
dressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–
6 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
81 (2000). Taking Lardas’s allegations at face value, the de‐
fendants schemed to deprive her nephew Christofalos of his
interest in WSP. The problem here is that Lardas had no cur‐
rent or even contingent interest in WSP. In fact, Lardas had
transferred her entire interest in a predecessor entity to Chris‐
tofalos back in 2000. She never held a stake in WSP itself.
Through the settlement agreement, Lardas released any and
all claims (known and unknown) against the Grcics in ex‐
change for their release of any and all claims (known and un‐
known) against her. She does not allege that the Grcics vio‐
lated the terms of that exchange by, for instance, suing her or
otherwise seeking to recover anything from her.
In a post‐judgment motion for reconsideration, which the
district court correctly treated as a motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e), Lardas argued for the first time that
Christofalos was a third‐party beneficiary of her settlement
agreement with the Grcics, such that the alleged scheme to
deprive Christofalos of his interest in WSP in turn deprived
Lardas of the benefit of her bargain. As a procedural matter,
Lardas should have raised this argument during the initial
briefing on defendants’ motion to dismiss. Rule 59(e) does not
entitle a party to advance after judgment a non‐jurisdictional
argument that could have been presented prior to judgment.
See Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 233 F.3d
524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). A Rule 59(e) motion may allow a dis‐
trict judge to exercise discretion to consider such a new argu‐
ment. E.g., Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 683 F.3d 805, 813
(7th Cir. 2012); see also Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651,
658–60 (7th Cir. 2013) (same point for Rule 60(b)). Cases such
as Miller and Mendez show, however, that this is a matter of
judicial discretion, not a party’s entitlement.
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 7
In any event, the new argument is without merit. Chris‐
tofalos was himself a party to the same settlement agree‐
ment—not a third‐party beneficiary—and he paid $600,000
for the LLC membership interest he acquired from Slavko
Grcic. Even if we assume that Christofalos might have had his
own claims against Grcic or others arising from the settlement
agreement (and any such claims would have wound up in his
bankruptcy estate, addressed in the other related appeals),
Lardas has alleged no injury personal to her. Nor has she of‐
fered any plausible reason why she should be able to assert a
claim on behalf of Christofalos. Lardas lacks standing to pur‐
sue the claims she asserts, and the district court correctly dis‐
missed her case. That dismissal is AFFIRMED.
II. Cohen (No. 15‐1704)
Before Grcic and his associates could perfect their sup‐
posed scheme to acquire Christofalos’s interest in WSP, Chris‐
tofalos filed for bankruptcy protection. Cohen represents a
challenge by Christofalos to a bankruptcy court order issued
under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) authorizing the trustee to sell Chris‐
tofalos’s interest in WSP, as well as any interest he might have
in the Lardas litigation and a separate state court case. The
buyers? None other than the Grcics, who paid $15,000 for
these assets in what might have been an attempt to buy peace.
Christofalos’s appeal of the sale order rests on two rather
remarkable premises. He argues first that by listing his stake
in WSP as an exempt asset worth just one dollar, he actually
was putting all interested parties on notice that he sought an
“unlimited exemption” for that property, regardless of what
the property might be worth or what it might potentially sell
for. He argues second that the Grcics paid too much for the
8 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
assets they acquired—the implication being that the bank‐
ruptcy court should have ordered the trustee to drive an eas‐
ier bargain and settle for less money for the estate’s creditors
in the process. The bankruptcy court rejected Christofalos’s
arguments on their merits, and the district court affirmed.
2015 WL 444321, at *3–4.
We do not reach the merits. Christofalos’s challenge to the
trustee’s sale is moot. See DJL Farm LLC v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 813 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2016) (per cu‐
riam) (“[A] case must be dismissed ‘if an event occurs while a
case is pending … that makes it impossible for the court to
grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.’”) (ci‐
tations omitted).2
2
Federal district courts exercise appellate jurisdiction over “final
judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by bankruptcy judges in “cases
and proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Federal circuit courts of appeals in
turn exercise appellate jurisdiction over “final decisions, judgments, or‐
ders, and decrees” entered by district judges in their appellate capacity.
§ 158(d)(1); see also Smith v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 845 F.3d 256,
2016 WL 7404760, at *2 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In the bankruptcy context, both
the bankruptcy court decision and the district court decision must be fi‐
nal.”). Christofalos’s appeal in Cohen concerns not a final order of the
bankruptcy court granting or denying a discharge but rather an event dur‐
ing the life of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy—the sale of an asset. While in pre‐
vious cases we have recognized that an order approving or denying sale
of a debtor’s property is immediately appealable, the Supreme Court’s re‐
cent decision in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015),
could be read to create a question about the viability of those prior hold‐
ings. Bullard held that an order declining to approve a proposed Chapter
13 repayment plan is not immediately appealable. The Court concluded
that the relevant “proceeding,” within the meaning of section 158(a), is the
“entire process culminating in confirmation or dismissal.” Id. at 1693. At
oral argument, we asked the parties whether the logic of Bullard extends
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 9
Christofalos opposed the sale of his interest in WSP
through a motion to compel the trustee to abandon that prop‐
erty and through an objection to the trustee’s motion to sell.
The bankruptcy court denied the motion to compel abandon‐
ment and approved the sale over Christofalos’s objection. At
that point, if Christofalos wanted to seek judicial review of the
sale order, he should have moved for a stay pursuant to Fed‐
eral Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(a)(1)(A), thereby pre‐
serving the status quo.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), the reversal on appeal of an au‐
thorized sale “does not affect the validity of a sale … to an
entity that purchased … property in good faith … unless such
authorization and such sale … were stayed pending appeal.”
In light of this safe harbor provision, we have “repeatedly
held that when a party challenges the bankruptcy court’s or‐
der approving the sale of estate property to a good faith pur‐
chaser, it must obtain a stay of that order pending appeal, lest
the sale proceed and the appeal become moot.” In re River
West Plaza‐Chicago, LLC, 664 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2011), quot‐
ing In re CGI Industries, Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994)
(collecting cases).
The safe harbor in section 363(m) does not apply if the sale
was not conducted in good faith. Hower v. Molding Systems En‐
gineering Corp., 445 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2006). But the
good faith requirement is narrow, addressing only the buyer’s
integrity during the course of the sale proceedings. “Typically,
to the approval of discrete asset sales, and we ordered supplemental brief‐
ing on the question. We do not resolve here the extent to which Bullard
may affect the immediate appealability of a sale order because we find
that Christofalos’s challenge is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal
on that well‐trodden ground.
10 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
the misconduct that would destroy a purchaser’s good faith
status … involves fraud, collusion between the purchaser and
other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to take grossly un‐
fair advantage of other bidders.” In re Andy Frain Services, Inc.,
798 F.2d 1113, 1125 (7th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
Christofalos did not request a stay of the sale order. In‐
stead, the sale was consummated, and the Grcics are now ac‐
tively managing the shopping plaza and its tenants. Money
has changed hands, years have passed, and third parties have
acted in reliance on the sale.
Christofalos argues that the Grcics acted in bad faith by
offering $15,000 for an asset he believes to have been under‐
water. Christofalos’s argument is not legally sound, and it
makes no sense on the facts of this case. He cites no case or
other authority for the proposition that a buyer who pays (in
the debtor’s view) too much for an asset acts in bad faith to‐
ward the debtor or other creditors. There may be perfectly
good reasons to pay something for a highly leveraged asset
that is currently worthless. Fair market values rise and fall,
and the purchase allows the buyer to make an investment that
may pay off if the value later rises.
As a factual matter, moreover, even if the shopping plaza
was financially underwater in 2014, that is not the actual asset
the trustee sold: rather, the trustee sold Christofalos’s interest
in WSP, which was apparently encumbered only by the lien
in Slavko Grcic’s favor, and which was part of a package. The
package of assets the trustee sold included three separate as‐
sets of the bankruptcy estate: Christofalos’s interest in WSP
and his interest in two lawsuits against the Grcics. The Grcics
paid $15,000 not only to acquire WSP but also to terminate the
litigation against them. Parties in civil cases often choose to
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 11
pay relatively small sums to settle claims, even claims that
seem far‐fetched or vexatious. We cannot understand how, in
paying $15,000 for two unliquidated claims and an asset that
Christofalos swore was worth only one dollar, the Grcics
could be the parties who might be deemed to have acted in
bad faith. There is no evidence that their conduct in the bank‐
ruptcy proceedings perpetrated a fraud on anyone, amounted
to collusion with the trustee, or caused an unfair disadvantage
to other bidders, of which there were none. See In re Andy
Frain Services, Inc., 798 F.2d at 1125.
In its sale order, the bankruptcy court explicitly found that
the Grcics were “good faith purchasers” and that the sale was
“conducted at arms‐length without fraud, collusion, or undue
influence by the purchasers.” The bankruptcy court reached
these findings after three hearings and the submission of affi‐
davits by the Grcics, the contents of which Christofalos failed
to rebut. These findings are reviewable only for clear error,
Hower, 445 F.3d at 938, and there was no such error here. The
Grcics purchased Christofalos’s interests in WSP and the two
lawsuits in good faith, and Christofalos failed to seek a stay
pending appellate review. His challenge to the trustee sale is
moot, and his appeal is DISMISSED.
III. Kienlen (No. 16‐2913)
In Kienlen, Christofalos challenges the bankruptcy court’s
November 23, 2015 order following an adversary proceeding
brought by J. Laurence Kienlen, a creditor. The bankruptcy
court conducted a trial on the adversary complaint pursuant
to Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and
it made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1). The court entered
judgment in Kienlen’s favor, denying Christofalos’s petition
12 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
for a Chapter 7 discharge. The court based its denial on 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), which authorizes denial of discharge
where the debtor has “knowingly and fraudulently … made
a false oath or account.” See Stamat v. Neary, 635 F.3d 974, 978
(7th Cir. 2011) (to prevail on a § 727(a)(4)(A) claim, an object‐
ing party must establish that “(1) the debtor made a statement
under oath; (2) the statement was false; (3) the debtor knew
the statement was false; (4) the debtor made the statement
with fraudulent intent; and (5) the statement related materi‐
ally to the bankruptcy case”) (citation omitted). The district
court affirmed the denial of discharge. Christofalos v. Kienlen,
No. 15 C 10832, 2016 WL 3268164, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2016).
We review de novo the district court’s judgment; we likewise
review de novo the bankruptcy court’s legal determinations,
but we review its findings of fact for clear error. In re Herman,
737 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2013); Zedan v. Habash, 529 F.3d 398,
403 (7th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
In its order denying discharge, the bankruptcy court ob‐
served that Christofalos made a “host of false statements and
omissions in his schedules and statement of financial affairs.”
For instance, the court found that Christofalos falsely repre‐
sented that he had issued no financial statements to financial
institutions within two years of his petition. Christofalos also
grossly undervalued his real property located in Mundelein,
Illinois. He failed to identify a source of rental income, omit‐
ted a property located in Florida, and falsely asserted that he
had relinquished all interest in another property following his
divorce. He also omitted a vehicle and falsely represented that
he had no contingent and unliquidated claims. The bank‐
ruptcy court found as a matter of fact after trial that Christofa‐
los knew these representations were false and that he made
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 13
them with fraudulent intent. The court explained: “Christofa‐
los could not have cared less whether his schedules and state‐
ment of financial affairs were accurate.”
On appeal, Christofalos quarrels with some of the bank‐
ruptcy court’s factual findings, but without citing record evi‐
dence.3 He nevertheless concedes that he made multiple er‐
rors in his bankruptcy disclosures. To obtain reversal, he con‐
tends that these errors were “completely inconsequential and
immaterial” because they worked neither to his benefit nor to
the detriment of any creditor.
3 Christofalos designated only the adversary pleadings, the transcript
of the bankruptcy court’s November 23, 2015 oral decision, and the bank‐
ruptcy court’s subsequent judgment as the record on appeal in the district
court. He did not designate or otherwise produce any transcripts or exhib‐
its from the trial, either in the district court or in this court. We cannot
entertain claims that factual findings were clearly erroneous when the
party claiming error fails to include in the appellate record the evidence
we would need to evaluate the claim. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1)(A),
(b)(1)(A) (providing that the bankruptcy appellant must designate items
to be included in the record on appeal and must order transcripts of “such
parts of the proceedings … as the appellant considers necessary for the
appeal”); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(b)(5) (“If the appellant intends to
argue on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evi‐
dence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the rec‐
ord a transcript of all relevant testimony and copies of all relevant exhib‐
its.”); cf. In re Dorner, 343 F.3d 910, 912, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2003) (where bank‐
ruptcy clerk failed to transmit record that debtor‐appellant had desig‐
nated, but where appellant failed to supplement record on appeal in cir‐
cuit court and “elected to proceed as if there were no problem,” circuit
court found on skeletal record “no reason to think that the bankruptcy
judge committed a clear error or abused his discretion”); id. at 914–15 (“A
litigant whose position in the court of appeals depends on extra‐record
evidence loses forthwith.”).
14 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
That assertion is not plausible. If Christofalos had suc‐
ceeded in concealing or misrepresenting his assets, he might
well have obtained a discharge while at the same time retain‐
ing property that rightfully belonged to the bankruptcy estate
for the benefit of his creditors. In any case, materiality in the
bankruptcy context has a broad meaning: “a fact is material
‘if it bears a relationship to the debtor’s business transactions
or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business deal‐
ings, or the existence and disposition of the debtor’s prop‐
erty.’” Stamat, 635 F.3d at 982, quoting Retz v. Samson (In re
Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Skavysh v. Katsman
(In re Katsman), 771 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing
that fraud in the bankruptcy context encompasses intent to
deceive, which “need not connote intending to obtain a pecu‐
niary benefit”). The bankruptcy court was not required to find
an affirmative detriment to Christofalos’s creditors (or an af‐
firmative benefit to Christofalos) in concluding that Christofa‐
los made fraudulent statements within the meaning of
§ 727(a)(4)(A). After all, the “successful functioning of the
Bankruptcy Code hinges both upon the bankrupt’s veracity
and his willingness to make a full disclosure.” Stamat, 635 F.3d
at 983 (citation omitted).
Christofalos pleads for clemency, contending that it was
not he but his attorney who could not have “‘cared less’ about
the accuracy of the schedules” and that it would be a “gross
injustice to penalize Christofalos for the incompetence of his
counsel.” The brief making this argument was filed by the
same attorney, Maurice Salem, who accuses himself of incom‐
petence. Whether attorney Salem committed malpractice or
violated the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct is not be‐
fore this court. But Salem himself testified in the adversary
proceeding that he reviewed the schedules and statement of
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 15
financial affairs with his client, paragraph by paragraph. That
evidently unrebutted testimony supports the bankruptcy
court’s conclusion that Christofalos’s misstatements were not
inadvertent but were intentional and fraudulent. The denial
of Christofalos’s petition for a Chapter 7 discharge is
AFFIRMED. Given the gravity of the apparent misconduct
here, we are referring this case to the United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Illinois for further review.
IV. Lardas II (No. 16‐4210)
In Lardas II, Christofalos appeals the denial of his “Motion
to Reopen Case and Assign a Receiver” and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration, both of which he filed in Lardas’s
case in district court while that case remained under advise‐
ment in this court in Appeal No. 15‐1685. Christofalos cited
no authority for his “Motion to Reopen.” Because he is no
longer a plaintiff in his aunt’s case—the district court dis‐
missed the original complaint and Lardas re‐filed as sole
plaintiff—we assume he sought both permissive intervention
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) and then relief
from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). The district
court denied Christofalos’s motions, Lardas v. Grcic, No. 14 C
193, 2016 WL 7367946, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016). Having
reviewed the district court’s decision and Christofalos’s brief,
we summarily affirm.
The relief Christofalos seeks would be unusual under any
circumstances. “Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is
wholly discretionary,” Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Bab‐
bitt, 214 F.3d 941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000), while Rule 60(b) provides
an “extraordinary remedy” for exceptional situations,
Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009) (cita‐
16 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210
tion omitted). Christofalos asserts that he is entitled to inter‐
vene in his aunt’s lawsuit because the bankruptcy trustee
“abandoned” his claim against the Grcics. That assertion is
simply wrong. As noted, the trustee sold Christofalos’s claim,
along with his interest in WSP and another lawsuit, to the
Grcics. We dismiss as moot Christofalos’s challenge to that
sale. Christofalos has no remaining interest in his prior claim.
We also affirm the dismissal of Lardas’s suit for lack of stand‐
ing, so even if Christofalos had some remaining claim, there
is no live case in which he might intervene. The district court
was right to deny Christofalos’s last‐ditch effort to prolong
this multi‐front litigation. The district court’s decision is
AFFIRMED.