FILED
FEBRUARY 7, 2017
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 33838-0-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
STEVEN RUIZ-SIBAJA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Steven Ruiz Sibaja appeals from an order revoking his special
sexual offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), arguing that the court abused its
discretion. Because the parties agree that one of the two reasons for revocation was
improper and we are uncertain whether the court would have made the same ruling in
consideration of only the valid factor, we reverse and remand for a new revocation
hearing.
FACTS
Mr. Sibaja was given a SSOSA sentence after he pleaded guilty to one count of
first degree child rape. Among the conditions imposed as part of the judgment and
sentence were that he (1) not possess or peruse pornography and (2) not consume alcohol.
No. 33838-0,.111
State v. Ruiz-Sibaja
After more than a year of apparently unavailing treatment, the State moved to revoke the
sentence for violation of the two noted sentencing conditions.
The pornography concern arose after he revealed, during a polygraph examination,
that a 21-year-old woman had sent naked pictures of herself to his phone and he had
received and viewed them. He also revealed that he had consumed wine. At the hearing
he explained that he had consumed small amounts of wine at church and with a friend at
Christmas. He also explained that his friend had sent him pictures of her breasts.
Mr. Sibaja' s treatment providers and the corrections officer all recommended that
the court revoke the SSOSA. In part they questioned how honest Mr. Sibaja was being
with them and expressed concerns that he was not progressing in treatment.
The court granted the motion, concluding that Mr. Sibaja had violated the
pornography and alcohol conditions. The court concluded that it was "just not going to
work so I think revocation is appropriate and I so order." 3 Report of Proceedings at 128.
A written order revoking the SSOSA was entered. Mr. Sibaja timely appealed to this
court.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the court erred in revoking the
SSOSA. Because the parties agree that one of the bases for revocation was
unconstitutionally vague, we remand the matter to the court to once again consider
whether or not to grant the motion.
2
No. 33838-0-111
State v. Ruiz-Sibaja
In general, a SSOSA is a sentencing alternative that permits some sexual offenders
the ability to receive a suspended sentence and undergo treatment if they are amenable to
it. RCW 9.94A.670. The sentencing court imposes conditions of the suspended
sentence, including prohibitions on behavior. RCW 9.94A.670(5)(d). The SSOSA may
be revoked if the offender fails to make satisfactory treatment or violates any conditions
of the suspended sentence. RCW 9.94A.670(10); State v. Dahl, 139 Wn.2d 678, 682-83 ,
990 P.2d 396 (1999). The decision to revoke a suspended sentence is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. State v. Kuhn , 81 Wn.2d 648, 650, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972). Discretion is
abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel.
Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (197_1).
Here, the court expressly found that both violations occurred and revoked the
suspended sentence. Appellant argues, and respondent agrees, that the possession of
pornography condition is unconstitutionally vague. We also agree. State v. Sansone , 127
Wn. App. 630, 639, 111 P.3d 1251 (2005). 1 Both parties thus conclude that the judge
could not consider that violation in revoking the SSOSA. However, respondent contends
that since the alcohol use violation alone would justify the revocation, this court should
simply affirm.
1
Respondent writes that the condition should be changed to "sexually explicit
conduct" as defined in RCW 9.68A.Ol l. Brief ofResp' t at 6. The parties are free to
make that suggestion at the next hearing.
3
No. 33838-0-III
State v. Ruiz-Sibaja
While there certainly was reason to revoke the SSOSA due to the alcohol violation
and repeated reports that the defendant was making limited or no progress in treatment,
the trial court did not rely solely on either of those factors. Instead, the stated reason for
the revocation was due to both of the violations. It does not appear that either violation
alone, or the limited progress in treatment, was seen as a sufficient reason to revoke the
SSOSA. We draw a direct analogy to the court' s imposition of an exceptional sentence
on multiple grounds, some of which are subsequently invalidated on appeal. In that
circumstance, the rule is that resentencing is required unless the trial court gave
indication that it would have imposed the same sentence based solely on a valid factor.
E.g. , State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 512, 859 P.2d 36 (1993).
The revocation order contains no severance clause or other language indicating
that a single factor was sufficient for revocation. Since the invalid factor involved sexual
conduct and the admitted wine consumption was minimal, we cannot say on this record
that the court would have revoked the suspended sentence solely due to the drinking.
Given the nature of the underlying conviction, the pornography violation likely was
accorded significant weight in light of the minimal progress defendant had made in
treatment.
4
No. 33838-0-III
State v. Ruiz-Sibaja
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new revocation hearing. The court
should also strike the pornography condition, and is free to modify that condition as it
deems appropriate.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
5