IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
RODERICK D'ANTHONY WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-1348
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed February 10, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for St. Johns County,
J. Michael Traynor, Judge.
Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, for
Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
WALLIS, J.
Roderick D'Anthony Williams ("Appellant") appeals his sentences for first-degree
murder and kidnapping. We find that one of Appellant's arguments on appeal warrants
discussion. Appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to empanel a jury
to make a factual finding as to whether he actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to
kill the victim. We affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to empanel a jury and
uphold his sentences, but we certify a question to our supreme court as one of great
public importance.
In 2010, the State charged Appellant, then sixteen years old, by grand jury
indictment with first-degree murder (count 1) and kidnapping (count 2) for his role in the
death of James Vincent Brookins (the "victim"), whose body was discovered in the trunk
of an abandoned car in rural St. Johns County. With regard to count 1, the State charged
Appellant with premeditated first-degree murder, but also included theories of felony
murder and accessory to first-degree murder. Ultimately, the verdict form listed only "First
Degree Murder," without differentiating between premeditated and felony murder. The
jury convicted Appellant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years on count 1 and fifty
years' incarceration on count 2.
Appellant directly appealed his convictions and sentences, challenging several
rulings on the admissibility of evidence at trial. While his direct appeal was pending,
Appellant filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) motion to correct his
sentence, reasoning that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), rendered unconstitutional his life sentence for first-
degree murder. Williams v. State, 171 So. 3d 143, 144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Our court
agreed with Appellant, reversing and remanding for resentencing under chapter 2014-
220, Laws of Florida. Id. at 145. Our court elaborated on its instructions upon remand as
follows:
Because the jury did not find that [Appellant] actually
possessed and discharged a firearm during the crime, the
court must make a written finding as to whether [Appellant]
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Based on
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applied the seven-year minimum. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that,
"[b]ecause the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the defendant was
subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The judge, rather than the jury, found brandishing, thus violating petitioner's Sixth
Amendment rights." Id. at 2163–64.
Appellant contends that the trial court similarly erred by failing to empanel a jury to
determine whether he actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
Because the affirmative finding in the case at bar increases both the mandatory-minimum
from zero years to forty years—if the sentencing court determines that life is not an
appropriate sentence—and the time for a sentence review hearing from fifteen years to
twenty-five years, Appellant argues this issue must be determined by the jury by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although Appellant's argument initially appears to have merit, we note that our
supreme court, under circumstances similar to those in this case, did not direct a jury to
make the factual finding as to whether the juvenile defendant actually killed, intended to
kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015). Rather,
the court specifically directed the trial court to make this finding, reasoning that the record
did not "conclusively establish this fact" because "the jury did not find [the defendant] to
have had actual possession of a firearm during the attempted armed robbery." Id. at 963
n.4.
In light of Falcon, we find that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's
motion to empanel a jury. Our supreme court has expressly authorized a trial court to
make the factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill,
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years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for
life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in
accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life
imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds
that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such
person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least
40 years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph
is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance
with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt
to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a
capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital
felony, which was committed before the person attained 18
years of age may be punished by a term of imprisonment for
life or by a term of years equal to life if, after a sentencing
hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s.
921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an
appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of
his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
3. The court shall make a written finding as to whether a
person is eligible for a sentence review hearing under s.
921.1402(2)(a) or (c). Such a finding shall be based upon
whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or
attempted to kill the victim. The court may find that multiple
defendants killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the
victim.
§ 775.082(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016).
In Alleyne, the defendant was convicted of robbery with a firearm. 133 S. Ct. at
2156. The applicable sentencing statute prescribed mandatory-minimum sentences of
five years for carrying a weapon, seven years for brandishing a weapon, and ten years
for discharging a weapon during the commission of a crime of violence. Id. at 2155-56.
The jury found that the defendant used or carried a firearm during his offense, but did not
find that he brandished or discharged the weapon. Id. However, the trial court nonetheless
found that the defendant brandished a weapon during the commission of his offense and
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applied the seven-year minimum. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that,
"[b]ecause the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the defendant was
subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The judge, rather than the jury, found brandishing, thus violating petitioner's Sixth
Amendment rights." Id. at 2163–64.
Appellant contends that the trial court similarly erred by failing to empanel a jury to
determine whether he actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
Because the affirmative finding in the case at bar increases both the mandatory-minimum
from zero years to forty years—if the sentencing court determines that life is not an
appropriate sentence—and the time for a sentence review hearing from fifteen years to
twenty-five years, Appellant argues this issue must be determined by the jury by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although Appellant's argument initially appears to have merit, we note that our
supreme court, under circumstances similar to those in this case, did not direct a jury to
make the factual finding as to whether the juvenile defendant actually killed, intended to
kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015). Rather,
the court specifically directed the trial court to make this finding, reasoning that the record
did not "conclusively establish this fact" because "the jury did not find [the defendant] to
have had actual possession of a firearm during the attempted armed robbery." Id. at 963
n.4.
In light of Falcon, we find that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's
motion to empanel a jury. Our supreme court has expressly authorized a trial court to
make the factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill,
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or intended to kill a victim. See id. at 963. However, because Falcon did not address the
applicability of Alleyne—as it does not appear that either party raised that issue—we
certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public
importance:
DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 133 S. CT. 2151
(2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT
TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION
775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO
WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED,
INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE
VICTIM?
AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
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