Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

The Attorney, General of Texas Dectrber 21, 1984 JIM MAfTOX ttorney General - ,preme Court Bullding Ronorable Jim Mapel Opinion NO. m-257 0. aox 12E48 Crlmiual District Axorney ndstln. TX. 79711-2545 Brasoria County Cowthouse Re: Whether a hospital district 512l47529Ql Angleton, Texas 7’7Ii15 may acquire by lease or purchase vex BlLvS7C1397 ,IeCOpi~r512l4750299 real property outside its bound- aries ‘*4 Jackson. Sulle 700 Dear Mr. Mapel: illas, TX. 7!!202.45C6 _ r4i742gBU You aak whether the Sweeny Hospital District may acquire, by lease or purchase in fee simple. real property located outside its 124 Alberta Ave.. SUltO 160 boundaries when swb property is deemed necessary for the efficient .; Paso. TX. 7900527s3 operation of the hospital district. We conclude that the Sweeny 9151533.S4S4 Hospital District :Lacks the authority to purchase real property located outside itr boundaries to fulfill the district’s purpose of ram. we 700 providing regular aedical and hospital care for its inhabitants. Hc.~sto”. TX. 770023111 - mf2233a88 Grants of powr to hospital district8 and limitations on the exercise of that ;?ower depend upon the constitution and upon each hospital distrlct’li enabling statute. Attorney General Opinion M-171 595 Broadway. Suite 312 ubbock. TX. 79401.2479 (1967) ; see Moore YL Edna Rosultal District, 449 S.W.Zd 508 (Tax. Civ. 381747.5239 APP * - %iii:iSti 1969. writ ref’d n.r.e.). Special purpose district8 have on3.y the authority which is clearly granted by the legislature. Tri-Xty Fresh Water Supply District No. 2 of Harris ‘309 N. Tenth. Suite S County V. Hannn? S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940); Lower Nueces River kAllen. TX. 78501-1085 ,W882-4547 Water Supply District v. Cartwright. 274 S.W.Zd 199. 207 (Tex. Civ. APP. - San Anton:;) 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.); -see Moore v. Edna HOEPita District, >n. 00 win Pius. suite 490 ian Antonio. TX. 7S2952797 The Fifty-eighth Legislature authorized creation of the Sweeny 51212254191 Hospital District ..n accordance with article IX Texas Constitution.’ Act8 1963, 58th Leg.. ch. &.‘??l yVP,‘C? art. 4494q-13). The enabling statute provides. in part, as follow: Sec. 2. The hospital district herein author- ized to be created, shall provide for the esta- blishment of a hospital system to furnish medical and hosl~.tsl care to person8 residing in said hospital-district by the purchase, construction, acquisit Tona. repair, or renovation of buildings and impxcvements; and the equipping of same and the adml&tration thereof for hospital purposes. Such district shall assume full responsibility for p. 1143 Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 2 (m-257) providing medical and hospital care for its needy inhabitants. . . . . Sec. 9. A hospital district organized in nursuance of this Act shall have the right and power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring by condem%ion any and all property of any kind or charact&. resl, personal or mixed, or any interest therei,-, including outright ownership of such property in fee simple absolute, within the boundaries of tE8 said district, necessary or convenient to the clxercise of the rights, power, privileges and funcc::lons conferred upon it by this Act, in the manner provided by General Law with respect to condemnal::.on . . . . (Emphssis added). Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 131i at 361. The only express reference to acquiring real property limitli the district’s power of condemnation to property “within the boundaries of the said district.” Nevertheless, the purpose for the restriction also logically applies to non-condem- nation acquisitions of properl:y. Thus, neither the enabl:lng statute nor the constitutional pro- vision upon which it is based expressly prohibit8 acquisitions of real property located outside the district. However, because special purpose district8 have only the authority clearly granted by the legislature, the determinative? question is whether the legislature has clearly granted the Sweeny Hospital District the authority to acquire real property outside of ~I:II boundaries, not merely whether the legislature has not prohibil:c!d such action. See Attorney General Opinion WW-914 (1960). In c:he Sweeny Hospital-strict’s enabling statute, the legislature gra~,ted authority to acquire real property but did not clearly indicate l:he scope of the power. Because the constitution does not require that the boundaries of a special purpose political subdivision include all area8 in which the subdivision has operations, c:he legislature may authorize operations outside a district’8 boundaries. San Jacinto River Conservation and Reclamation District V. Sellf:rs, 184 S.W.2d 920. 923-24 (Tex. 1945); State ex rel Grimes County IzFpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258-(Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [lst Dist.] 1978. no writ); Harris County Water Control and Improvement Dj~strict No. 58 v. City of Houston. 357 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Lover NUaCe8 River Water Supply District v. Cartwright, supra. However- the cases allowing acquisitions of real property outside the houndarles of ‘a special district usually deal with a specific legislative Srant of authority to acquire property vithin or without the district. See, e.g., San Jacinto River ?* 1144 Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 11 (311-257) Conservation and Reclamntio~ District v. Sellers, rupra; Lower Nueces River Water Supply District~r. Cartwright, B. The court in State ex Eel Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency. supra , upheld inclusion of a portion of Grimes County within the TlUta8 Municipal Power Agsncy’s [hereinafter TMPA1 operating area that was not within its boundaries although the enabling statute did not expressly authorize acquisitions of property outside of the TMPA’s boundaries. See V.T.C.S. srt. 1435a. 14(2). However, the court emphasized that rwss undisputed that from the inception of planning to establish the TMPA, it was contemplated that certain areas outside its boundaries were to be acquired as sources of lignite coal to carry out the purpose of the TMPA of producing electricity. Further, even when a statute does authorize acquisitions outside district boundaries, the acquisitions must further the purpose for creation of the district. Harris County Water Control and Improvement DiStriCt No. 28 V. City of Houston. supra; Attorney General oninion WW-914 (1960). Therefore, determination of the legislative intent for c&&n of the Sweeny Hospital District is necessary. The legislature is not required to set forth in detail all the provisions governing the e.uthority of a political subdivision in carrying out its legislative purpose, State ex rel Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. T~?:tas Municipal Power Agency, supra at 273, and the courts vi11 occa&nally add words or phrase8 to a statute when necessary to give effect to-legislative intent when the intent is clearly disclosed by the ::t!mainder of the statute. Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, 378 S.W.ld 40, 47 (Tex. 1964). Eowever, we conclude that the lack of an express grant to the Sweeny Hospital District of authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, and the express limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to vithin its boundaries indicate that the legislature did not intend the district to have the implied power to acquire property located outside of its boundaries. Further, the fundsmcztal purpose for the hospital di8triCt militates against implied authoritation for the acquisition of facilities outside the boundaries of the district. The sole purpose of the Sweeny Hospital District is to provide medical ar.d hospital care to persons residing ,111the hospital district. Acts 1963. 58th Len.. ch. 135. 52. Conce Stably, a medical facility locat.ed outside th; district’s boundaries ‘&ny dc~near enough to the district to serve its inhabitants efficientl:r.~ Although purchasing an existing facility outside the district could be less expensive than purchasing one inside the district and less expensive than constructing a new facility, the inhabitants of a hospital district will usually best be served through medical fa~::Llities located within their district. A hospital district’s difficulty in serving its inhabitants within its boundaries may indicate a need for a change in district boundaries rather than a need for acquisitions of facilities outside its p. 1145 Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 4 UM-257) boundarier. The legislature uay provide a solution to this problem by authorizing expansion of the boundaries of a hospital district even when it is alreadv in creat!.oo and subiect to bonded indebtedness. See Stamford Hospital District. v. Vinsoi. 517 S.W.Zd 358 (Tex. Civ. App. - Rastland 1974, wit r;f’d n.r.e.1; see also Carter V. Aamlin Hospital District. 538 S.W.211 671 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1976. writ ref’d n.r.e. . Rowever, we note that ill fulfilling its constitutional duty to assume full responsibility for providing medical and hospital care for its needy inhabitants. the hospital district has the authority to pay for the medical expense of cwndlng a needy inhabitant to a medical facility outside the district because of a temporary or emergency lack of sufficient medical or hospital facilities. Attorney General Opinion M-171 (1967); see also Attorney General Opinion h-870 (1971). We conclude only that the S&eny Hospital District may not acquire real property located outside the district to fulfill its purpose of providing regular medical and hospital care for inhabitants of the district. The Sweeny Hos+tal District has only the authority which :La clearly granted by the legislature. The lack of an express grant to the district of authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, the express limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to within its boundaries. and th,e fundamental purpose for the hospital district of providing medical and hospital care to its inhabitants indicate that the legislature did not intend the district to have the authority to ac,quire property located outside of its boundaries. J k Very truly yo , iv JIH MATTOX Attorney General of TLxas TOM GREEN First Assistant Attorney General DAVID R. RICHARDS Executive Assistant Attorney General RICK GILPIN Chairman. Opinion Committee p. 1146 Ronorable Jim &lapel - Page 5 (JM-257) Prepared by Jennifer Riggs Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Rick Cllpin, Chairman Co1111Carl Susan Garrison Jim Moellinger Jennifer Riggs Nancy Sutton pi 1147