Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Honorable William P. Hobby Opinion No. H-1022 Lieutenant Governor of Texas State Capitol Austin, Texas Honorable Bill Clayton Speaker of the House Re: Valuation of property State Capitol for ad valorem taxation Austin, Texas purposes. Dear Governor Hobby and Speaker Clayton: You have asked our opinion on four questions relating to ad valorem taxation and the distribution of funds for public school purposes. Your first question is: Ray the' Legislature, in exercising its duty under Articl.e 8, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution, to provide by law how value is to be ascertained for ad valorem tax purposes, constitutionally provide that land used to produce agricultural products be valued for ad valorem tax purposes ac- cording to some standard of value other than market value, such as valuation on the basis of use or capability to produce agricultural products? We initially note that the first question is directed solely to article a, section 1 and does not involve article 9, section l-d which is discussed in your second question and which involves valuation of certain agricultural land. Article a, section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides in part: Taxation shall be equal and uniform. All property in this State, whether owned by I’. 4220 . . Honorable William P. Hobby Honorable Bill Clayton - Page 2 (H-1022) natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be taxed in propor- tion to its value, which shall be ascer- tained as may be provided by law. On several occasions Texas courts have specifically in- dicated that the term "value," as used in article 8, section 1, means market value. Lively v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. of Texas, 120 S.W. 852, 856 (Tex. 1909); Rowland v. City of Tyler, 5.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adoptea) Har- lingen Independent School Dist. v. DunlaE, 146 S.W.2d 235, m (Tex. Civ. App. -- San Antonio 1940, writ ref'd); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Warren Independent School Dist., 453 S.W..2d 190 19/ (Tex. Civ. App. -- Beaumont 1970 writ ref'd n.r.e.); Diekrich v. Phipps, 438 S.W.2d 900, 902 (&ex. Civ. App. -- Houston [lst Dist) 1969, no writ). See Whelan v. State, 282 - S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1955); State v. Whittenburq, 26 5 S.W.Zd 569, 572 (Tex. 1954). While it can be argued that the portion of article a, section l,.which refers to a~scertainment of value "as provided by law" permits the Legislature to establish a standard of value for taxation purposes other than market value, the courts have clearly ruled otherwise. See also Tex. Const. art. 8, § 20. Accordingly, it is our opinion that article 8, section 1 of the Constitution does not permit the Legislature to provide for the taxation of property other than in propor- tion to its market value. Your second question is: If the answer to question #l is negative, could the Legislature constitutionally .pro- vide for use of a standard of value other than market value for taxation of agricul- tural land if Article 8, section l(d), of the Texas Constitution were repealed? Article a, section l-d permits assessment of certain land at its agricultural use value. While this technique is based on market value principles, see King v. Real, ~466 S.W.Zd 1 (Tcx. Civ. App. -- San Antonliol971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); At- torney General Opinion H-863 (1976). it will generally result in a lower value than assessment at full market value. If article 8, section l-d were repealed the standard of value would be determined by the requirements of article 8, section 1. In light of the judicial authority reviewed in P. 4221 Honorable William P. Robby Honorable Bill Clayton - Page 3 (H-1022) discussion of your first question, it is apparent that the repeal of article a, section l-d, would leave the Legislature without authority to value agricultural land other than in proportion to its market value. Your third question is: May the Legislature, by statute, consti- tutionally provide that single-family res- idences be valued for tax purposes on the basis of a percentage of market value? We understand this question to involve the power of the Legislature to provide for the assessment of residential prop- erty at a different percentage of market value than other prop- erty. As noted above, article 8, section 1 of the Texas Con- stitution requires that taxation be equal and uniform. The courts have found schemes to tax one class of property at a percentage of its value and another class at a differentper- centage to be unconstitutional. Among the plans the courts have overturned include an omission of certain types of pro- perty from the tax rolls, City of Arlington v. C%Inon, 251 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tex. 1954); the assessment of railroad intan- gible property at full market value while all other property was assessed at 67 percent of value,