Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

TBDC ATNDISNF,Y GENERAL OF %-ExAs All-. - 7e711 March 29, 1977 The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson Opinion No. H-965 Chairperson Labor Committee Re: Constitutionality House of Representative6 of Fire and Police Austin, Texas 10767 Employee Relation6 Act. Dear Chairperson Johnson: You have requested our opinion concerning whether article 5154c-1, V.T.C.S., ia an unconstitutional delegation of authority. Article 5154c-1 provide6 for collective bargaining by police and fire employees where authorized by the voters of a political subdivision. Sec. 5. Section 10 provide6 for voluntary arbitration in the event of an impasse, and section 16 provides for judicial action when a political subdivision elects not to submit an impasse to arbitration. Section 20(b) states that a collective bargaining contract shal take precedence over state and local civil service provisions where the contract so provides. Thus, in the event of an impasse, the act provides for a delegation of the authority to fix the terms of employment to an arbitration board or the judiciary. Section 11 of article 5154c-1 provides for the voluntary selection of an ad hoc arbitration board to resolve an impasse; its provi6ions operate independently of the General Arbitration Act. V.T.C.S. art. 239, et seq. While we have discovered no Texas cases dealing with such a delegation, the rulings of courts of other states have been held applicable to Texas "on the subject of delegation of legislative power." Trinunierv 1 Carlton, 296 S.W. 1070, 1079 (Tex. 1927). The validity of collective bargaining statutes requiring compulsory, binding arbitration for public employees has recently been examined by the court6 of several states. Such statutes have been generally upheld againet attacks based upon an alleged unlawful delegation of authority to ad Town of Arlington v. hoc arbitration panels. -- ---Board of p. 4021 The Honorable Pddie Bernice Johnson - page 2 (X-965) Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E.Zd 914 Mass. 1976); '~h%&%f%& ~~~.~~':3~'~~E::~6290 (N.Y. 1975); Cit orwarwick v. i&wick Re ular Firemen'6 Assoc., 256 A.-d zbb(R.I,Tgm6V);State * of LaramZe, m2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). In Cityofize or c mrd Teacher's Assoc., 304 A.2d 387 (Me.T973), the c=rt ruled that such aqation would be lawful where sufficient standards are given for the exercise of the delegated authority, but held the act before it unconstitutional for lack of such standards. In Dearborn Fire Fi hters Union No. 412 v. Cit of Dearborn, 231 N W 2d 2237NbS~e70tr judges-7% sp it evenly on the queition of whethe; such A delegation could be made to an ad hoc arbitration panel. The only courts which have held such a delegation to be unconstitutional regardlea of standards have done so pursuant to constitutional similar to that of Texas is that such a delegation is proper where sufficient standards are provided. Of course, such standards are clearly necessary under Texas law. See, e. ., Housin Authority of City of Dallas v. Hi inbothaiiiiii14 S W 2d d.13140)1 A ttorney Gcemtter - -i%+%& 42%7h. In light of the authorities concerning compulsory arbitration, it is our opinion that the courts of Texas would uphold the voluntary arbitration and collective bargaining provisions of article 5154c-1 so long as sufficient etandards have been provided. Section 4 of the act provides that political subdivision6 shall provide firemen and policemen with "compensation and other condition6 of employment . . . which prevail in comparable private sector employment. . . .I Section 13(a) provider that an arbitration panel is to consider "hazards of employment, physical qualifications, educational qualifications, mental qualifications, job training, and skills," among other factors, in reaching a decision. We believe it clear that euch arbitrators should likewise consider the standard provided in section 4, su ra. These standard6 are substantially identical to those foun % sufficient in the aforementioned authorities. See -- Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitrat%i, supra; City o-fAmzerdam v. Heleby, supra;& of - Warwick vL Warwick p. 4022 The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson - page 3 (H-965) Regular Firemen's Assoc., supra. Accordingly, in our opinion sufficient standards have been provided for the exercise of authority by an arbitration board convened pursuant to article 5154c-1 and the delegation of such authority is constitutional. Section 16 of article 5154c-1 provides that in the event a political subdivision elects not to arbitrate, the collective bargaining association may bring an action in district court and that the court ehall have full power, authority, and jurisdiction to enforce the requirement6 of Section 4 hereof as to any unsettled issue relating to compensation and/or other terms and condition6 of employment for firefighters and/or policemen. If the court finds the political subdivision to be in violation of section 4, it "shall . . . declare the compensation and/or other terms and conditions of employment required by Section 4...." As previously noted, section 4 provides for: compensation and other conditions of employment that are substantially the same as [those] . . . which prevail in comparable private sector employment. . . . The fixing of salaries and terms of employment is a legislative or administrative act. Highway Cormnissionv. El Paso Buildin and Construction Trades Council, 234 Sx.2d 857-x4 w Assoc.ofrris Count% v. City of Houston, 105 S. . (Tex.9=). Tex. o=t. Gt. 3, s 44. We have found no Texas casein which a court has fixed compensation and other term6 of employment. See Austin Fire and Police Departments v. Cit of Austin, 21B S.W.Zd m($%.m; --+- o wmort-- Fire Department Worth v. Cit of Fort Worth, 2fl.W.Zd 664 (TG. 1949). In our ZeE+h--t e fixingofompensation is analogous to rate-setting. It is well established that the doctrine of separation of powers precludes a court from setting rates; it may only re- view the rates set to determine their legality. State v. 526 S.W.Zd 526 (Tex. m75): 93 S.W.Zd 372 ; WiSSOUri, K. --- 6 T. Railway Co. -- v. Empire EXpre6S p. 4023 The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson - page 4 W-965) Co.* 221 S.W. 590 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, jdpt. adopted). The courts have required a certain rate only under statutory provisions requiring equality of rates and evidence of a certain rate charged by one of the parties to others. Edin- &gL:Eg;t:;; Co. v. Paschen, 223 S.W. 329 (Tex. Civ.K -- O),an'mS.W. 1085 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, judgmt. adopted). While section 4 of article‘5154c-1 requires '6ubatantially the same* compensation as that prevailing in the private sector, this standard falls far short of the precisenes6 of the requirements enforced in Xdinbur quite similar to that of sectiondkm?v%?$ and of San Francisco v. Cooper, 534 P.2d 403 (Ca .- ZiTinvolved a zanenge to the legality of an ordinance which set the compensation and term6 of employment for public employees. The court began its analysis by noting that the ordinance was "clearly legislative in nature." - Id. at 411. The court explained: In'addition, because a fair prevailing wage determination may take into account many component elements - such as various fringe benefits - which are frequently not susceptible to precise appraisal, a substantial measure of legislative dir- cretion is inevitable. -Id. at 417. See Christy-Dolph v. Gragp, 59 F.2d 766 (W.D. Tex. 1932). - Consequently, when a district court sets the terms and conditions of employment in accordinance with leotion 4 of article 5154c-1, it inevitably exercises legislative discretion. Such an exercise of legirlative powerr by the judiciary is specifically prohibited by article 2, rection 1 Accordingly, in our opinion, section 16 of article 5154c-1 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the judiciary. p. 4024 , ,,. 1 The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson - page 5 (H-965) SUMMARY The delegation of authority to an arbitra- tion board to fix compensation and other terms of employment under article 5154c-1 is con- stitutional. The delegation of such authority to the judiciary by section 16 of article 5154c-1 violates article 2, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Very truly yours, APPROVED: NDALL, First Assistant C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairman Opinion Committee km1 p. 4025