Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

A-- o- July 17, 1968 Honorable John F. Pettlt *OpinionNO. M- 260 County Attorney Val Verde County Re: Authority of the Commls- Del Rio, Texas 78440 sioners Court of Val Verde County to transfer certain real property to the Val Verde County Hospital Authority created pursuant to the rovlsions of Arti- cle 449% 7, V@rXWh'S ClVll Dear Mr. Pettit: Statutes. Your request .for an opinion on the above subject mat- ter reads, in pert, as follower: "Recently the Commlssloner~sCourt of Val Verde County, by order of said Court, created the Val Verde County Hospital Authority ln ac- cordance with the provisions of Article b&k v.a.c.8. Presently Val Verde County operates and maintains a hospital, Val Verde Memorial Hospital, which the Court anticipates trans- ferring to the newly created Authority. The existing hospital was built by the County with funds derived from a bond Issue; and title to the real estate upon which the hospital 1s situated 1s vested in the County. II.... "Therefore, I respectfullyrequest your opinion as to whether a transfer by the Com- missioner's Court of Val Verde County of all the physical assets of the Val Verde Memorial Hospital, Including the real estate upon which said hospital Is situated, to the,Val Verde County Hospital Authority la authorized under the laws of the state of Texas." The pertinent provisions of Article 449&r, Vernon's Civil Statutes, reads aa follows: "Section 1. County Hospltal Authorities without taxing power may be created as hereln- after provided. This law shall be known as the lCounty Hospital Authority Act.' - 1258- Hon. John F. Pettit, page 2, ~-260 "Sec. 2. As used In this law, 'County' means any county'ln the State of Texas; 'Qovern- lng Body' means the CommissionersCourt of a county; 'Authority'means a County Hospital Authority created under this Act; 'Board' or 'Board of Dlr- ectors' means the board of directors of the Au- thority; 'Bond Resolution'means %he resolution authorizing the Issuance of revenue bonds; 'Trust Indenture'means the mortgage, deed of trust or other instrument pledging revenues of, or creat- ing a mortgage lien on properties, or both, to secure the revenue bonds Issued by the Authority; 'Trustee'means the trust'eeunder the Trust Indenture. "Sec. 3. When the Governing Body of a county shall find that It Is to the best Interest of the County and Its inhabitantsto create a County Hospl,talAuthority, it shall pass an order creating the Authority and deslg- natlng the name by which It shall be known. The Authority shall comprise only the territory In- cluded within the boundarles of such County and shall be a body politic and corporate and a political subdivisionof the State. It shall have the power of perpetual succession,have.a seal, may sue and be sued and may make, amend and repeal its bylaws. II .... "Sec. 7. The Authority may Issue revenue bonds to provide funds for any of its purposes. Such bonds shall be payable from and secured by a pledge of the net revenues to be derived from the operation of the hospital or hospitals and any other revenues resulting from the owner- ship of the hospital properties. The bonds,may be additionally secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real property of Authority or by a chattel mortgage on Its personal property, or by both. I, .... “Sec. 17. For the purpose of carrying out any power conferred by this Act, Authority shall have the right to acquire the fee simple title 20 land and other property and easements by con- -1259- Hon. John F. Pettlt, page 3, M-260 demnatlon In the manner provided by Title 52, Re- vised Civil Statutes as amended, relating to eminent domain. Authority Is hereby declared to be a municipal corporationwithin the mean- ing of Article 3268 of said Title 52. The amount of and character or interest In land, other prop- erty and easements thus to be acquired shall be determined by the Board of Directors." (Emphasis added.) In view of the foregoing provisions, a Hospital Au- thority created pursuant to the provisions of the above quoted statute constitutes a separate entity, a body politic and cor- porate, and a political subdivision of the State with the power to issue revenue bonds, but without the power of levying or col- lecting taxes; and that Authority also possesses the right or power of eminent domain. The statute does not expressly or lm- pliedly limit the right or power given. Since the Val Verde County Hospital Authority may exercise power of eminent domain pursuant tomthe provisions of Section 17 of Article 4494r, It has the power to acquire by condemnation the real estate of Tyler v. Smith County, 151 Tex. 80, 246 Klngsville Independent School District v. q$l(T Cl A 1942 v. Ci~;'ofvilP;;so,3j7e::::2d We do not find any specific statutory provision au- thorizing transfer of real estate from the county to the Authority and ordinarily in the absence of such specific authorization the county could not dispose of Its real estate In this manner. However, in view of the decisions in City of Tyler v. Smith m;;;";l,;;r;. ,a;lngsvI;ri;IM;Penzent Schzol Dis;Pg;;:s;ir;C;n- Zii?xcep on to the general rule exists In view of th that the Authority has power of eminent domain. The cas?oS El Paso County v. City of El Paso, su ra Involved a suit fmlne +f' e validity of a trans- St: of real prope:t$Eom Ehe county to the city. The court in upholding the transfer made the following observations,begln- nlng at 357 S.W.2d 785: "Ordinarilythere could be no doubt that the Couhty, like any other political subdivision of the State, could dispose of Its real estate only in strict adherence to the pertinent stat- utes. Here, however, the City has cited two -1260- Hon. John F. Pettlt, page 4, M-260 cases that appear to be an exception to this rule. These cases are City of Tyler v. Smith County, 151 Tex. 80, 246 S.W.2d 601 (S.Ct.), and Klngsville Ind. School Dlst. v. Crenshaw, Tex.CIv.App.,164 S.W.2d 49 (dls'm. car. judg.). ...The Supreme Court held that the county owned the property In See simple, with the city having no rights In the square except its street easements along the sides, and while the county had the right to remove the courthouse, the entire square was Impressed with a public use and therefore could,not be diverted to private use or sold to private agencies or persons. On motion for rehearing, parties asked the court IS Its opinion meant that the city could never connect its hlghw;ieby running a street through the square. court answered pointing out that such was not the meaning of Its original opinion, but that the City of Tyler (like El Paso), being a home- rule city, had the right of condemnation,and in that right was contained the right to con- demn public as well as private property.... The Supreme Court then went on to say: "'If counsel will refer to Klngsvllle In- dependent School District v. Crenshaw, Tex. Clv.App., 164 S.W.2d 49, (error dismissed, cor.judgt.) they will find how the desired re- sult may be accomplished even without resort to condemnationproceedings.' "Article 1577 requires the appointment of a commissioner to sell county land at public auction, but it is obvious,that this statute could not be complied with In either the Tyler case or this case, because the land was lm- pressed with a trust and public use, and could not otherwise b,eemployed;.and this Is likely one of the reasons why the Supreme Court did not mention this article or suggest that It had to be complied with...... II.... "'We think the statutes hereinabove re- -1261- . . Hon. John F. P&tit, page 5, M-260 Serred to do apply wherever a political sub- division, subject to such statutes, desires to dispose of any of Its public land to an ln- divldual or private agency, but not where such political subdivisionwith the power of eminent domain and condemnation chooses to deal with its opposite number and reach an agreement as to the change of public use, rather than to resort to the expensive and tedious medium of litigating the entire matter through the courts, thereby holding up the public benefit and depleting to some extent the tax funds of. the subdivisions Involved." In view of the Soregolng, since Val Verde County Au- thority Is vested with the power of eminent domain, it may choose to deal with the county and reach an agreement as to the change of title to all the physical assets of the Val Verde Memorial Hospital, Including the real estate upon which said hospital Is located, rather than to resort to condemnationproceedings. El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783 at 787. You are therefore advised that If the Commissioners Court of Val Verde County and the Hoard of Directors of the Val Verde County Hospital Authority determine that it Is to the best Interest of both the county and the Authority to consummate such transfer, the CommissionersCourt of Val Verde County has the authority to make such transfer. SUMMARY A counts has the authority to transfer a County Hospital to a Hospital Authority created pursuant to the provisions of Article %@4r, Vernon's Civil Statutes. Verfiruly yours, C. MARTIN General of Texas -1262- Hon. John F. Pettlt, page 6, M-260 Prepared by John Reeves Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Hawthorne Phillips, Chairman Kerns Taylor, Co-Chairman James McCoy Roger Tyler Houghton Brownlee James Broadhurst A. J. CAFWBBI, JR. Executive Assistant -1263-