Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

Hon. D. C. Greer Opinion No. C-702 Stat,e Highway Engineer Texas Highway Department Re: Whether firma which Austin, Texas provide TV cable ser- vice have the right to place their cables a- long State Highways within the highway right of way. Dear Mr. Wear: By letter you state that the Texas Highway Depart- ment has been approsched by firma whlcfi provide TV cable eervice, concerning the placement of their cables along State Highwayr . You advise th&t these firms generally install re- ceiving antennae at some high area where the signals from television broadcast statlone.can be picked up., The signals may then be relayed by micro-wave to a community distributor antenna, and thence by cable to subscribers to ihe service. The we of State Highways by the cable Is of concern to the Texas Highwsy Department. The question which you present is as follows: “Un- der the laws of the State of Texata, do firms which provide TV cable service have a right to place their cables along State Highways within the hlghwry right of’ way?” If such firms which provide TV cable service do have a right to place their cables along State Highways with- in the hi hway right of way, this right must be derived from Article 1&16, Vernon’s Civil Ststutes, which provides: “Corporations created for the purpose of constructing and maintaining magnetic telegraph lines, are authorized to set their poles, piers, abutments, wires and other fixtures along, upon, and across any of the public roads, streets and waters of this State, In such manner as not to incommode the public in the use of such roads, streets and waters. ” Acts 1874, p. 1%; O.L. vol. 8, p. 134. - 3384- . . . ’ Hon. D. C. Greer, pege 2 (C-702) In the absence of statutory authority, a corpora- tion contemplated by Article 1416 could not place its cables along State Highwhys within the highway right of way. Alice, Wade Cit k C. C. Tel. Co. v. Bllllngsley, 77 S.W. 255 (Tex. ~ppigo~, error ref.). The authorlty must be granted directly by the legislature or by munlclpsl authorities pur- suant to express or Implied powers delegated to the munici- pallty . 86 C.J.S. 32, Telegrams, Telegrsphs, Radio, and Television, Sec. 24. 54 Tex.Jur.2d 598, Telegrbphs and Teie- phones, Sec. 6; p. (32, Sec. 32. The controlling legal question presented is whether Article 1416 is broad enough in scope and meaning to include corporations providing TV cable service. sonable, practical, and liberal construction to carry out the leglslatlve purpose. In holding that the etatutory phrase “magnetic telegraph lines” w&s broad enough to include the “telephone,” the Court pointed out that at the time of the criglnal passage of the statute, telephones had not been in- vented, and said: II . (they were not generally known; and It cannot’b; suppose 6 that the Legislature had telephones j.n mind when It used the word ‘telegraph. 1 However, the fact that the telephone w&s not then in contemplation of the le lslature does not control the construction of Ar- ticle &42, subd. 8; for If the language used Is broad enough to embrace a subsequently developed method, the later invention might be controlled by the pre-existing law, as if it had been in existence at the time the law was m&de . . . ” Quoting from the English case of Attorney General , 6 Q.B.Dlv. 254, 255, th Supreme Antonio & A. k P. Ry. CE. c&se - pm, proceeded to give a DrObd 1 1 a rlNt1 on of what ‘ ii embraced in the mesning of “tele~%ph”eas used in the statute: “The result of the definition seems to be that any apparatur for tranmmltting merrager by electric signals Is a telegraph, whether a wire is ured or not, and that -3385- Hon. D. C. Greer, page 3 (C-702) any spparatue of which a wire used for telegraphic com- munications Is an essential part Is a telegraph, whether communication 18 made by electricity or not.” In accord, see poievof the leglelsti& in the statute w&e to provide ior ‘the transmleelon of messages by wires acted on by electri- city. ” In construing the atatute in question, it Is 6180 pertinent to observe that it Is in the public Interest in re- ceiving utility eervlcee that gives rise to the right of such public utfllty companlee to use the roads and streets. State v. Dallas, 319 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.Civ.App. 1959, no writ hlr tory). Even a “de facto” telephone corporation may take ad- vantage of Article 1416, eu ra. Co. v. Paducah Tel. Co., ldl writ nietory). This office, In Opinion No. W-1417 (1962)? had occasion to construe the meaning of “telegraph lines’ as used in the same statute, in the light of the above cases, and it was held that the statute was brosd enough to Include tele- vision lines, which transmit meeeagee by wires acted on by electricity. The basis of our holding was t.hat television was a “communication system of the same nature as the tele- i:;:; e,e;em, but on a more limited ecsle and with pictures . It Is merely an advancement or improvement in the sit ~f’~elegrbphy and telephony, with the same purpose of transmitting meeaagee by wires acted on by electricity.” Since the issuance of our Opinion WW-1417 on Au- gust 17, 1962, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, on Dec. 3, 1962, In Independent Theatre Owners v. Arksneae Public Ser- vice Cos&eeion, Z35 Ar K. hot! m &iw. m *n bnaea aown 6 sirnil ar opinion In whldh the suthoritiee o other juriedlctlone were reviewed, concluding that television ca- ble rervlce provides a telephonic or telegraphic communlca- ;:ee:ervice wlthln the naturel purpose and meaning of the . The court said that, television tranemlseion is an Integral part of the telephone and telegraph business as It has developed and now lxlete.” It therefore held that the Public Service Commlerlon h&d jurledlctlon to require the telephone company to furnish its facilities for purpose of -3386- - . Hon. D. C. Greer, page 4 (c-702) television, since the sending of bn electrical impulse over a cable owned by the telephone co~panyproduclng a picture or sound was 6 system of conveying 6 meeeage or communica- tion by telephone or telegraph” within the statute making such service a public utility and subjecting it to regula- tion by the commleeion. ., Dletlngulehlng the case of Television Tranemleelon, Inc. v. Public Utility Commlselon, 47 cbl.zd 82 301 P . 2d 86 2 5150) tn a f alrferent statutory ls&ubge or pur- pose, thoz Co:r?i%zez at page 645 from In re New York Tele- phone Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 115, In which it w&e s&la that 6 con- clusion as to jurisdiction by the Public Service Commission 'I cannot be m&de to depend upon the type of eyetem’u~ei; I.e., coaxial cable or ordinary telephone wires, but must .be based on 6 determination whether thereby a telephonic or telegraphic communication ser- vice la being provided. We think one le. It Is clesr that the telephone company Is undertaking to transmit intelligence from one point t,o another for the benefit of a subscriber, uelng’prlnclplee of telephony (or te- legrbphy . It proposes to provide this service upon elmllar 1 erme to one and all seeking It. The company’s filing of 6 tsrlff covering the service was proper.” The Court further observed: televlelon Is merely an advance or improvement In the art of telegraphy and telephony and therefore the right of eminent domain for telegraph and telephone purposes . . . Is applicable to televlelon.~ “In Ball v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 227 Nlee.~ ate s 0. 2a 42 tn e H.leelrelppl court said: ~Televlelon 1: but one OS ihe many lclentlilc achleve- manta of the past few decades made possible by develop- ments o? the carrier art. Some of the others are rbdlo, teletype, and the photo-telegrbph, each of which employs electrical lmpuleee In tranamleelon. All of these de- -3387- ._, .-.. _ -~ ..-. .__ .-.. -____ ~. ,.I Hon. D. C. Greer, page 5 (C-702) vices to aore extent make use of cables and wires in the transmission process. Transmission techniques de- veloped by or 6s an adjunct of the telephone business has made possible the services performed by these de- vices. We should not construe the eminent domain ~+a- tutee so as to require the telephone and telegraph companies to secure new eseemente for every new device that emp,loye the use of electrical impulser even wh?n the new device perfgrms 6 function other U&n the trans- mission of sound or articulate voice. To do so would lead to absurd and unreasonable results. We conclude that television tranemieelon is bn integral part of the telephone and telegrsph business 6s it has developed and now exists. “’ Article 1416 is broad enough in lenguage, purpose, and scope to Include television corporations created for the purpose of transmitting intelligence by electricity or “mes- s&gee by electric signals,” and “whether a wire is used or not, ” as was held in the San Antonio & A. P. Ry Co. case, suprs. In an interesting annotation on the legal aspects of television, we find this comment in 15 A.L.R.2d 785, at pages 7%‘-798r “Rejecting the defendant’s contention that the purnoee of the plaintiff telephone company in seeking to condemn a line &cross his property was primarily for the purpose of installing 6 coaxial cable for tele- vision rather than for telephone and telegraph pur oses, lo Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Steent(:E9to$ Ohio L.Abs. 114 Bald that i: evidence that’the primery purpose for the lnetallatlon of the cable was to provide telephone nnd telegraph circuits, and in addition to these uses it no doubt would be used in the future for television purpoete, adding that since the tranemleeion of tele- vision was merely an advancement in the art .of telegrs- phy end telephony the right of eminent domain for such rurpoees conferred by the etstute was applicable to television, since statutes granting the right of eminent domain, while strictly construed, should not be so tech- nically or unreae,onably interpreted as to interfere with the normal business of a utility and the development of the service which it rendered to the public.” -3388- Hon. D. C. Greer, page 6 (C-702) From the buthoritiee heretofore cited, it Is apparent that corporations providing TV cable service are public util~tiee in contemplation of law snd subject to regulatior. as well as the rights conferred under Articles 1416 through 1532, Vernon’s Civil Statutes. A corporation organized for public service and affected by the public in- terest is regarded as a public utility, whether or not ex- pressly declared so by the legiplatufe. 47 Tex.Jur.2d 391, Public Utilltlee k Service, Sec. 1. We therefore answer your question t,hat under hr- ticlee 1416, et. seq., corporations created for the purpose oE nroviding TV cable service have 6 right to place their cables slang Stste Highways within the highway right of way. SUMMARY Under Articles 1416, et. seq. V.C.S., corporations created for the putpose of providing TV cable service have a right to place their c&b:es along State Highways within the highway right of way. Yours very truly, Waggoner Carr Attorney General of Texas Ey* e* Aeeletant Attorney General KBT:km APPROVED : OPINIONCOMMITTEE w. v. Geppert, Chblr!nan W. 0. Shultz John Reeves James McCoy Robert Flowers Corbln Snow REVIEWEDFOR THE h!I!TORNEX GENERAL BY: T. B. Wright -3389-