Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

October 8, 1951 Executive Director Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools Austin, Texas Opinion No. V-1305 Re: Authority of the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools to transfer funds between appropriated line Items or between appro- priations of the various in- stitutions in Article II of House Bill 426, Acts 52nd Dear Sir: Legislature. Your request for an opinion concerns certain ri- ders In Article II of House Bill 426, Acts 52nd Leg. R.S. 1951, ch. 499, p. 1228 (the general appropriation bill), pertaining to the appropriation for the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools and the State Hospitals and Special Schools under the jurisdiction of the Board. You state that the questions arise by virtue of the holding of this office in Opinion V-1254 (1951) with regard to the constitutionality of the riders placing additional duties upon the Legislative Budget Board. You then ask: “1. Whether the Board for Texas State Hos- pltak and Special Schools may add or substitute position titles in accordance with Section 2, Ar- ticle 2, H.B. 426. “2. Whether the Board for Texas State Hos- pitals and Special Schools may transfer between line items of an institution and the central of- fice appropriations or between institutions in- cluding the central office appropriations as pro- vided in Section 7, Article 2, H.B. 426. “3. Whether the Board for Texas State Hos- pitals and Special Schools may expend for renova- tion or new construction of warehouse facilities Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 2 (V-1305) as provided in subsection (c) of Section 10, Article 2, H.B. 426." You subsequently requested the opinion of this office with regard to the authority of the Board to use the annual $600,000 appropriation to the Board's Special Reserve Account set up in Section 9(a) of Article II, House Bill 426, m, for purchase of food, clothing dry goods, etc., without approval of the Legislative Bud- get Board. This particular appropriation was made to cover unforeseen emergencies and needs which could not be cared for by speciflc,appropriatlons to the various institutions because of the inability of the Legislature to predict how many persons may become mentally ill or contract tuberculosis or other illnesses requiring their admission to State Schools and Hospitals. Neither could the Legislature forsee how much the cost of food, cloth- ing etc., might rise above the amounts appropriated di- retF,to each institution. The rider (Sec. 2 of Art, II, House Bill 426, Eitwhich gives rise to your first question provides : -. "No institutions shall employ any person at any title not contained in the list of ti- tles of positions under the heading of Medical Treatment and Patient Care Division for each institution provided in this Article, unless or until there has been prior approval by the Legislative Budget Board to add or substitute position titles with rates of pay within the following maximum salary scales appropriate to the class of position herein set forth,11 (There follows a list of position titles and the salaries to be paid the persons having the titles set out.) Your second question involves Section 7(a) of Article II, House Bill 426, m, which provides: "Transfer of Appropriations: (a) No funds may be transferred between line items of an institution and Central Office Appropriation or between institutions including the Central Office appropriations as provided in this Arti- cle, without prior written approval of the Leg- islative Budget Board. All requests for said -. Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 3 (V-1305) transfers submitted to the Legislative Bud- get Board must have the prior written ap- proval of the Board and/or Council. Requests for all said transfers must be submitted to the Legislative Budget Board in writing with complete and adequate justification, ,together with all pertinent supporting data pertaln- ing to the necessity for such transfer, in- cluding a certified copy of the minute or min- utes approving said request for transfer by the Board and/or Council. Upon approval of transfer requests made by the Board and/or Council, the Legislative Budget Board shall certify same in writing to the State Comptrol- ler of Public Accounts who Is hereby directed to make transfer of the fund, or funds, from either or all of the aforesaid accounts, in whole or in part, from one line item to an- other within the appropriations of any or all institutions and Central Office, or from one institution to another Including the Central Office, In the amount or amounts and for the purpose or purposes as set out in the certi- fication of approval by the Legislative Bud- get Board. The State Comptroller shall set up a separate account for the purpose of each transfer." Section 10(c) of Article II, House Bill 426, supra, Involved in your third question, provides: "Central Warehouse System: The Board is hereby authorized to establish a central warehouse system of not to exceed three ware- houses to serve all Institutions under the jurisdiction of the Board. In order to facil- itate such a warehouse system, there is here- by appropriated out of the Board Local Fund the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,- 000), to be known as the Warehouse Revolving Fund, to purchase stocks of goods, supplies, materials and equipment to be distributed to the said institutions Included In this Article, on a reimbursable basis. Any funds collected by the Central Warehouse System from sales is hereby reappropriated to the Warehouse Revolv- fng Fund for future purchases and operations. Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 4 (V-1305) Charges made to institutions for such mer- chandise furnished shall include overhead charges sufficient to meet the cost of op- eration of said warehouse system. Pro- vided, however, that the Board of Control shall continue to handle purchases for the Board in the same manner as is done for other State agencies. All stocks of goods, supplies, materials and equipment belong- lng to any institution in excess of a three (3) month normal usage requirement are here- by transferred to the Central Warehouse Sys- tem without cash or credit reimbursement. All stocks of goods, supplies, materials and equipment required for a three (3) months normal usage may be transferred to the ware- house system at a value set by the Executive Director. The Board is hereby authorized to utilize any available buildings owned by the State that may be suitable for warehouse pur- poses; however, no expenditure from any source shall be made for renovation or new construc- tion of warehouse facilities without obtain- ing prior written approval of the Legisla- tive Budget Board.” Section 9(a) of Article II, House Bill 426, m, which is Involved in the question you asked subsequent to the opinion request considered herein, provides: lfSec.9. (a) There is hereby appropri- ated out of any moneys In the State Treasury not otherwise appropriated the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000) for the fiscal year beginning September 1, 1951, and ending August.31, 1952, and a like amount of Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000) is hereby appropriated for the fiscal year be- ginning September 1, 1952 and ending August 31, 1953, to be set up anA known as the Board Special Reserve Account to be made avail- ;:bleto meet unforeseen emergencies which may arise during the biennium covered by this ap- propriation for Hospitals and Special Schools. Any balance remaining in said reserve account as of August 31, 1952, is hereby appropriated to said account and made available for the fis- cal year beginning September 1, 1952. Said Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 5 (V-1305) Board Special Reserve Account shall be ex- pended only for purchase of food clothing and dry goods medicines, and ut1lity ser- vice, only ader approval of transfer to the institution, or institutions, where said funds are to be expended; except that in the event an institution is activated at Brady, Texas, moneys from the Reserve Account may ‘be used for the operation, in- cluding salaries, of said institution. “All transfers from said account shall require prior written approval by the Legis- lative Budget Board, in the same manner and by the procedure as provided in (a) of Sec- tion 7.” It will be noted that in each of the above ri- ders, in addition to the approval or action of the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools, the approv- al by the Legislative Budget Board is also required prior to the expenditure or transfer of the funds appro- priated or the change in the titles listed in other parts of the appropriation bill. In Attorney General’s Opinion V-1254 (1951), it was stated that “Since the State departments, institu- tions of higher education, and other State institutions are not a part of the legisla- tive branch of the State government, these riders, in requiring further itemization of appropriations or approval of the expendi- ture of appropriated funds by the Legislative Budget Board, violate the constitutional pro- vision prescribing the separation of powers. N. . 0 “Therefore, in so far as the powers and duties of the Legislative Budget Board are extended in House Bill 426 beyond the duties prescribed for that Board in the statute by which it was created, the Legislature has at- tempted to place upon the Board duties which are in violation of Section 1 of Article II of the Texas Constitution.” The riders involved in your request, except Sec- tion 9(a) of Article II, are worded in a negative manner, and the questions arise because of a possible contention that after striking down the unconstitutional portion, the authority conditionally granted thereby would be expressly Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 6 (v-1305) prohibited. This is an extremely technical construction which is dependent solely upon the grammatical style in which the Legislature expressed its willingness for cer- tain functions to be performed by the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools. The effect of this construction would be that the Legislature intended for the Board and the hospitals and schools under the jurisdiction.of the Board to oper- 'iate strictly under the line appropriations during the bi- ennium unless the operation was exactly as provided in the various riders. The rationale of such a position would have to be that the transfer and other provisions were unnecessary to the operation of the system unless they could be carried out by the Legislative Budget Board. In State v. Carter 27 P.2d 617 (Okla. Sup. 1933)) the Court had before it an appropriation bill in which it was provided that the funds appropriated to the Corporation Commission were to be expended-"by and with the approval of the Governoron The Court held that the approval provision was an attempt to place general legis- lation in an appropriation bill and, therefore, unconsti- tutional. It was contended that if the limitation was void the entire appropriation must fall. In overruling this contention, the Court said: II We are dealing with a general appropiiit;on bill. None of the decisions cited applies to such a bill. If the rule stated is applicable to the provisions of the general appropriation bill, its applica- tion is dependent upon a construction of the legislative Intent. In determining that question, the rule is stated in 59 Corpus Juris, S 206, pages 642, 646, to be I* * * If, when the invalid part is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with apparent legislative intent wholly independ- ent of that which was rejec4ed, it must be sustained to that extent; and this rule is especially applicable where the statute pro- vides for two distinct subjects. In this connection it has frequently been declared that the valid part of a statute will be sus- tained where the valid and invalid parts are so separate and distinct that it is clear or may be presumed that the legislature would - have enacted the former without the latter, if it had known of the invalidity, or, as other- wise stated, if the valid or.invalid parts are Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 7 (V-1305) not so intimately connected as to raise the pre- sumption that the legislature would not have en- acted the one without the other, the act will be upheld so far as valid. On the other hand, the whole statute will be declared invalid where the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions are so connected and interdependent in subject matter, meaning, and purpose as to preclude the presumption that the legislature would have passed the one without the other, but, on the contrary, justify the conclusion that the legislature in- tended them as a whole and would not have enacted a part only. In other words, the whole act will be declared invalid where the unconstitutional part Is so connected with the remainder or with the general scheme, that it cannot be stricken out without making the legislative intent inef- fective, or is of such import that without it, the other parts would cause results not contemplated or desired by the legislature, or is the consid- eration and Inducement of the whole act, although it has also been held that the rule of lndlvisi- bility where the invalid part is the inducement or consideration of the whole act does not apply if the lnvalld provisions, although appearing in the same chapter of the revised laws, were enacted in previous years. In determining the question whether the act would have been passed without the invalid part, the rule has been laid down, that, If the mere elision of the words or provi- sions which give an unconstitutional effect, will leave a consistent and workable act, the remain- der will be valid; but if modifications or limi- tations must be inserted or understood to avoid the fatally broad effect of the statutory lan- guage, the whole act must fail. l * *I "As to the item in question, when measured by that rule, we find that the lelislon of the words or provisions which give an unconstitu- tional effect, will leave a consistent and work- able act.' that Is, will leave an appropriation singular, definite, land certain. That which will remain, ‘is complete in Itself and capable of being executed In accordance with the appar- ent legislative intent.' The valid and invalid parts are so separate and distinct that It is clear, or may be presumed, that the Legislature would have enacted the former without the lat- ter, if it had known of the invalidity of the Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 8 (V-13@) latter. We cannot hold otherwise without holding that the Legislature would not have made an appropriation for the purpose of enabling the Corporation Commission to per- form a.duty enjoined upon It by the Consti- tution, if it had known that it could not require the amount appropriated to be ex- pended 'by and with the approval of the Governor.' We cannot 80 hold. We must give to the Legislature every presumption of an intention to conform its actions to the pro- visions of the Constitution. We do so in this case. We therefore hold that, had the Legislature known of the invalidity of its attempt in a general appropriation bill to vest the Governor with power that he did not theretofore have, it would have made the appropriation for the performance of the constitutional duty of~the Corporation Com- mission notwithstanding. The Legislature made the appropriation. Evidently It was intended to be used. There Is nothing in the act to indicate any other intention. The fact that the Legislature attempted to vest approval of its use in the Governor in no wise operates.to show that the Legislature did not intend for the amount to be used. . 0 s We cannot conclude that the Legisla- ture intended that, if those legislative pro- visions were void, the appropriations made in a general appropriation bill would fail. We refuse to so hold. To do so would be to hold that the Legislature did not intend to make appropriations for the conduct of the government of this state, unless its attempt to legislate in a general appropriation bill, in violation of the plain and unambiguous pro- visions of the Constitution, was lawful." Texas Courts have applied these same rules of construction in cases Involving statutes which are uncon- stitutional in part. Ohio Oil Co. v. Giles, 235 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Sup. 1951); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 62 Tex. 630 (1884). Under these rules, all of Articles II of House Bill 426 must be considered in determining if the author- ity contained in the quoted riders would have been in- cluded In the Article without the proviso requiring ap- proval by the Legislative Budget Board,. A technical con- struction which would remove a word or phrase from a Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 9 (V-1305) sentence and attempt to apply literally what remains would be prohibited. The primary intent of the Legislature in pass- ing the various provisions in Article II, as shown by the wording of those provisions, was to set up a method whereby transfers of funds and other changes could be made in order for the State Hospitals and Special ,Schools to be efficiently and economically operated. The proced- ure adopted was to place the initiating power in the Board for State Hospitals and Special Schools, and then have their action approved by the Legislative Budget Board. We think it is clearly evident that the power to carry out these provisions would have been placed solely in the Board for State Hospitals and Special Schools had the Legislature known the Budget Board requirement was unconstitutional. The number of riders contained in the “General ProvlsionsV’portion of Article II which grant to the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Sd’mols authority to make changes in the line appropriations set out in Section 1 shows that the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that the specific appropriations must be sup- plemented and changed to some extent. In the final analy- sis, it appears that it would be virtually impossible for the Board to carry out its functions without the author- ity contained in the above quoted riders and the other riders contained in Article II. The Legislature surely did not intend the Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools to cease operations should the functions of the Legislative Budget Board set out in Article II be uncon- stitutional. The primary intent discussed above is clearly indicated in the rider (Sec. 9(a) of Art. II, House Bill 426) which provides for the transfer from the Board’s Spe- cial Zeserve Account. The transferring authority is con- tained in affirmative language in the first paragraph, whereas in a subsequent paragraph the transfers are con- ditioned upon prior written approval by the Legislative Budget Board. Should this second paragraph be deleted as unconstitutional the affirmative authority to transfer the funds remains unconditioned. Therefore the Board clearly has the authority to transfer the Pun&s provided for in Section 9(a) of Article II. In urd P Aa i ul u . State Admu- l& N.W. l:O (de;. “,uit?924), the super- ITativecontra visory B*i of the agricultural college was, by the Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 10 (V-1305) appropriation bill, placed in the State Administrative Board instead of the State Board of Agriculture which previously had supervised the college. The Court held that the provision in the appropriation bill transfer- ring the supervision of the college was invalid and the contention was made that the invalidity of the provi- sion nullified the entire appropriation. In overruling this contention, the Court stated: ,I . This being true the question arises, Does the unconstitutional provision of the statute nullify the whole act? To hold that it doe.s,we must assume that the Legislature would not have made the appropri- ation except for the fact that the money was to be expended under the general supervisory control of the state administrative board. The main purpose of the Legislature was to grant an appropriation to the college to en- able it to carry on its extension work in co- operation with the Pederal authorities. A previous Legislature had committed the state to that policy. The appropriation was made to support one of the most Important activi- ties of the college. In making it the Legls- lature was but obeying the mandate of the Con- stitution that it should grant appropriations for the support of the college and its various activities. Section 10, art. 11, Constitution of 1908. It had become a fixed habit with this Legislature to confer upon the adminlstra- tive board general supervisory control over all appropriations. As has been heretofore pointed out, this appears Prom the various acts enacted at this same session. It is not reasonable to assume, therefore, that it in- tended the appropriation to fail If for any reason the state administrative board could not exercise a general supervisory control over its expenditure. As we have indicated, the appropriation was necassary to carry on the very important work of taking the college to the people. Its purpose was mainly to bsns- fit those who could not reside at the college. The Legislature did not want this work to fail; it knew that an appropriation was necessary if It were to be continued. The main purposa was the appropriation. The supervisory control was but incidental, due to the legislative policy. Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 11 (V-1305) In these circumstances we think that the Leg- islature did not intend the appropriation to fail, and that the attempt to confer uncon- stitutional authority on the state adminlstra- tive board did not nullify the balance of the act. . ..'I The Texas Legislature, in House Bill 426, placrd supervisory control over many appropriations in the Legis- lative Budget Board. The fact that the supervisory control is unconstitutional does not have the effect of doing away with the affirmative action which was conditioned upon the Board's approval. The legislative history of the provisions in question reveal that in the past the administrative body which had.control of the State Hospitals and Special Schools was always given the power to take the a'ctionsin question without the approval of a Legislative Budget Board. This is revealed in the following paragraph from your request: "Inasmuch as previous legislatures have nearly always provided for changes and substi- tutions of amounts appropriated to the State Board of Control and the Board for Texas State Hospitals, it is the interpretation of this department that the Legislature intended that the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools should have the authority to add or substitute position titles in accordance with Section 2 and to tran~sferappropriations in ac- cordance with Section 7 of,the appropriation bill. Prior to 1949 the State Board of Con- trol was in charge of the eleemosynary institu- tions, and we have checked the riders to the appropriation bills back to 1941, and we find that transfer of appropriations was allowed by the Legislature to the State Board of Control and to the Hospital Board in one form or an- other each biennium." A somewhat similar situation was involved in Moorq V. ShenQa 144 Tex. 537, 192 S.W.2d 559 (1946). The rider involved in'that case required the clerks of all courts to de:lositfees for making unofficial copies In the State treas- ury and to execute an affidavit that such deposit had been made, and provided that II . . ., The Comptroller shall not issue a warrant in payment of the salary of any such Hon. Larry 0. Cox, Page 12 07-1305) employee for any month unless and until the affidavit required herein has been filed for said previous month.* Holding the rider invalid, the Court said: 'There being no statutory duty requir- ing petitioners to furnish uncertified, un- official copies of opinions of the Courts of civil Appeals, no statute Pixing any fee for such services, and no Valid statute requiring that money received therefor be deposited in the State Treasury there is no debt owing by petitioners to