Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

AunTIN 11. .x-EeAa PRICE DANIEL ATTcl*NEYGENERAL September 24, 1951 Hon. James I-I.Moore Opinion Ho. V-1292 County Attorney Ange lina County Re: Validity of a contract Lufkin, Texas for the superintendent of a rural. high school district which was ex- ecuted on June I., 1950, for the two years from July 1, 1951, to June Dear Slrr 30, 1953. We quote from your letters in substance as follows: On June 10, 1948, Huntington Rural High School District entered into a contract with J. B. Kannenburg to be its superintendent for a period of the three years, 1948-49, 1949-50 and 1950-51, the employment to begin on July 1, 1948, and expiring on June 30, 1951. On June 1, 1950, one year prior to the expiration date of the foregoing contract, the board of trustees executed a new contract with Kannenburg. This second contract is for a term of two years commencing July 1, 1951, and end- in& June 30, 1953. It was approved by the county superintendent. The truatees’contend that this Bec- ond contra.ct is void in that it violates Article 275Oa-1, V.C.S. Their 4ispositlon is not to recognize Its validity for any period of tims. Queryr Is the superintendent’s em- ployment contract, dated June 1, 1950, providing for his employment to begin in a future year (July I., 1951) and to ex- pire two years thereafter, totally void by reason of Article 2750a-1, or is the Hon. James H. Moore, page 2 (V-1292) contrsct severable and therefore valid for, the 1951,752 year? The district in qUeStiOn iB Classified as a rural high school district, Bnlletin 512, TeXa8 Education Agency 1950-5~, and a8 BUCh it i8 Subject to the same provisions and restrictions applicable to conmon school district8 except where otherwise provided. Article 2922k, V.C.S. Therefore, Article 375Oa-1, V.&S. controls a8 to the period of time for which a superintendent% contract may run ,&try Gen. Op. V-1229, and not Article 2781, V.C.S., which is applicable to independent district3 only. ,Article 275Oa-1 provide3 as fOllOWBS ?Frustees Of any Common School MB- trict . . . Shall have authority to make contracts for a period of time not'ln ex- ces8 of two (2) years with principals, superintendents, and teachers of Said Common School Districts . . . provided that BUCh cc8&%ct8 Shall be approved by the County Superintendent. ??o con- tract may be Sign8ff by the Trustees of hIIIIIIOR School MStriCtB . . . until the newly elected trustee or trustees have ualified and t8ken the oath of office." 9mphaBiB added.) The last sentence of Article 275Oa-1 ha3 been construed to mean that a board of trustees of a rural high school district has no authority to execute or sLan teach8rs' contracts during the time between the e!.ectimof the district's new trustee8 and their qualification. Att'y Oen. Op. V-l051 (1950). Section 4 of Article 2774a, V.C.S., vests the control and management of a rural high BChOO~ district in a boar& 3f seven trustees. That ZPW provide3 for an election annualiy Of two or three trustees for;the bcmrd. It 18 thus possible that once in any three-y88r trustee election period it8 entire membership amv change. Furthermore, the board of trustees of a ruz%?d.high school district is constituted a body politic and corporate and as such may contract and be contracted with. Arts. 2748, 2922k, V.C.S. ROII. James H. Moore, page 3 (V-1292) Therefore, any lawful contract8 made by a rural high school district board are corporate contracts, and not the contract8 of individuals who then constituted the board. By Statute, it is a continuing corporate body. It8 membership may change but the body corporate does not. The cor- porate body after the first Saturday In April of each year is the same a8 it was preceding that trustee election day. True, the new officers 818 not like then lawful contracts made through the o9d . officers prior to election day, but that doe8 not affectthe validity of such contracts. They will have a like privilege of makfng lawful contracts near the close of their terms, which they can pass OR t0 their BUCCeBSOr8. State v. Board of Eduoa- w, 118 S.E. 877 (W. Va. Sup. 1923). In Town of Pearsall v. Woolls, 50 S.W. 959 (Tex. 'Xv. App.1899) it d I Gulf Bitullthlc Co. v. Rueces County 11 6.: 2: 30; TComm. App l$%), the School board e&red in& a written contra&. dated June 27, 1898 (four days before the expiraiion of their office: Art. 3953, R.C.S. 1895). with MI-S. Woolls to teach for .the immediate ensuing school term beginning September 1, 1898. In upholding the validity of her contract, the court stated3 " It i8 well settled, also, that a'bia;d of 8ChOOl trustees may make contracts for teacher8 for the term of BChOOl succeeding their term of office." Prom the opinion in Miller v. Smile& 65 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. Appm, error ref.) we quote as followsr (I But we cannot bring our- selves io'billeve that a mere fortuitous change in the YWmber8hip of the board, prior to the formal approval by the coun- tg SUperiI&8ndent of the lawful contracts theretofore msde by the board, pemnits such contract8 to be arbitrarily revoke& by the new board and the county superin- tendent without any charge of fraud, lm- position or mutual misteke, and with no I L hearing given the tOdch8r8 of such in- tended revocation of their contracts. Hon. James H. Moore, page 4 (v-1292) "It seems to us that to hold other- wise would be to violate the plainest principles of fairness and justice, and to acquiesce in arbitrary and dic- tatorial power8 not conferred by our statutes upon the boards of BChOOl trustees, or county superintendents." For-other authorities to the effect that school boards may make lawful contracts for employ- ment of teachers or superintendents for the immed- iate ensulna school vear or terms which will be If, therefore, the contract in question herein, dated June 1, 1950, is a lawful contract (is BUCh 8 contract as may have been made under the contractusl powers Vested in the school board of a rural high school district under Article 2750a-l), it is binding on the present board, in the absence of,fraud, imposition, or mutual mistake in its mek- iD&. It is contended on behalf of Mr. xannen- burg that in the event the contract is not valid for the entire term contemplated, the ContlgCt is sever- able and velid for the year beginning July 1, 1951. This is based on the fact that the trUBteeS had the authority to contract for two years from June 1, 1950, and under the theory advanced, the final year of the lg.68 contract (beginning July 1; 1950) and the first year of the 1950 contract (beginning July 1, 1951) would CW~tpriSe the two-gear period. Although under the holding in Smith v. : Morton Independent School DiSt, 85 S.W.2- ?Xv. App. 1935, writ dism.) it might appear that "t% contract here involved is severable, we think Such Hon. James H. .&ore, page 5 (V-1292) a conclusion is foreclosed by the decision in Fikes v. Shar 112 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938, error pe%.). In that case it was held under Article 2750 (prior to the enactment of Article 2750a which was superseded by Article 2750a-1; see Att'y Qen. Op. 1051) the trustees of a common school district had no power to con- tract with teachers fora period longer than one year. In that case, on the night of April 3, 1957, after the polls for trustee election held on that day were7closed, two trustees of the common school district met and elected five teachers for the immediate ensuing scholastic year. Thqexecuted contracts with the teachers covering,such one-year period, which were filed with the county school superintendent on April 20. On April 26 there was a meeting of the trus- tees, at which all three were present, and the same teachers were elected for the ensuing two- term period (1937-38 and 1938-39). These con- tracts were filed with the county superintendent April 28. On August 20 the county superintendent erased the provisions calling for the two-year employment and substituted therefor a one-year term employment. There was an appeal from this action to the county school board and frond that action to the State Board of Education, result- ing in the disapproval of the contracts by the latter. Suit was then filed by appellants (teach-, ers) in the nature of an appeal from that action. We quote from the opinion of the Court as fol- : lowsr "After careful consideratkon of our statutes and their uniform inter- pretation, we have reached the con- clusion that the contracts were void, in that they were for a period lower than one year. . . ." (Emphasis added.) It is to be observed that the Court held that those two-year written contracts were totally void, even though the county superintendent at- tempted to change their term to cover only one yeap to confrom with what he though the law per- mitted. Thus, school board employment contracts executed to cover a period of time which exceeds Hon. James H. Moore, page 6 (V-1292) the time permitted by the laws governing that board are totally void. Under the law and the facts in the Fikes case, the school board could have entered ma lawful teacher contract to cover the ensuing year 1937-38, and did enter a two-year contract covering the terms of 19370 38 and 1938-39, yet the court did not hold the invalid two-year contract was severable and valid for the immediate ensuing 1937-38 period. Article 275Oa-1, enacted in 1941, ex- pressly authorizes the school boards of districts classified as common to execute contracts with teachers, principala, and superintendents for a periqd. of time not to exceed tvo’years. But fol- lowing the holding and in the light of the ma- soning in the’ pikes case, such a board, fzincethe enactment of Ame 275Oa-1, would have no au- “,thmity to enter into a contract for a three-year period of time, Under the facts herein submitted, the School board of the HUitil@on district on June 1, 1948, contracted with J. H. Itarmenburg to be its superintendent for a three-year period of time. The tems of that contract have been performed. However, for the pw?poses of this opinion, we must assume by virtue of the holding in the Fikes case that on June 1, 1950, when the HuntirigtiB7Tatrlct executed with Kannenburg the’two-year contract under consideration herein, there then existed no valid contract between the district and Mr. Kaunen- burg. Clearly under the facts submitted, under Article 275ba-1, and in the light of the author- ities afommantioned, the Huntington school board on Suue 1, 1950, could have entered into a contract with J. H. Kmnenburg, the term of employment to begin July 1, 1950, and to terminate on June 30, 1952 But that they did not do. The contract ox- l scutea on June 1, 1950, provides for the employ- ment term to comn~nce an July 1, 1951,and to ter- minate June 30, 1953. The question is thus reduced to the fol-, louing general propoaitiont Under Article 275Oa-1 is a school board of a common district e!?zPouered to make a contract with a superintendent for an , .) Hon. James H. Moore, page 7 (V-1292) employment period not to exceed two years, the term of employment to begin after and beyond the im- mediate ensuing school year or term? In the instant matter, if the Huntington board as constituted on June 1, 1950, could lawfully enter such a two-year contract to begin on July 1, 1951, then it could, conceivably, have contracted for it to have com- menced in 1952, 1953, 1954, or possibly any future date. We think that an examination of Article 2750a-1, containing, as it does, an express limits,- tion period of two years, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the legislature intended that the contractual power therein granted shall be limited to employment for the immsdiate ensuing two school years. If not so limited and construed, then the i school trustees might employ teachers, principals, and. superintendents for any number of future years beyond the immediate next ensuing two years, tie the hands of their successors in office, and wrest from the control of the people the schools which they are required to support. The spirit of that st.atute is repugnant to the idea that one board of trustees, by contract wholly to be performed in the future , insa, year or years beyond the imtnediate~en- suing year, can divest future boards of the power to select teachers, principals, and superintendents, and make contracts therefor, and indirectly take from the people all the advantages to be derived from annual elections. This conclusion is strength- ened by the universal practice of employing teachers, principals, and superintendents for one or two year periods, the employment period of which is to begin the immediate next ensuing school term or period. In every case cited herein, the contract considered by the court therein was for employment beginning the next ensuing school term or year. In an ex- haustive search for authorities,we have been unable to find a oing;Bzase involving the validity of a teacher contract, the term of which was to begin beyond the immediate ensuing school year or period. In short and by way of illustration, under the facts submitted, we think the Huntington school board on June 1, 1950, had authority by virtue of Article 2750a-1 to contract with Mr. Ksnnenburg for anemployment period of one year or two years beginning on July 1, 1.950, and terminat- . . . . Hon. James R; Moore, page 8 (V+92) ing on June 30 of 1951 or 1952, depending on whether the contract was for a one or two-year period. But the ,spirit and intent of Articl6 2750a-1, with its two-year employment limita- tion, militates against a cons*ruction thereof authorizing the board on June 1, 1950, to con- tract for his services for an employment period of one or two years duration to begin on July 1, 1951, and to terminate ,on June 30 of 1951 or 1952. Accordingly, we agree wfth you that the two-year contract dated June 1,. 1950, ex- ecuted by the board of trustees o~~.duntington Rural High School District with J. H. Kannen- burg, for superintendent services to commence on July 1, 1951, and terminate on June 30, 1953; is void, and, as such, is unenforceable for any period of time. AttOy Gen. Op. O-3465 (1941). SUMMARY Under the facts submitted and in view of the two-year employment lim- itation in Article 2750a-1, V.C.S., the superintendent employment contract ex- ecuted by the Huntington Rural Righ School District on June 1, 1950, for a two-year employment term to begin on July 1, I.951 and to terminate on June 30, 1953, is void and unenforceable for any period of time. Fikes v. Sha 112 S.W.28 774,,(Tex. Civ. App. 1 error ref.); Town of Pearsall v. Woolls, 50 S.W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App.m; Attry Gen. Opsr O-3456 (1941) and V-1051 ( 1 950) l APPROVEDr Yours very truly, J. C. Davis, Jr. PRICE DAEIEL County Affairs Division Attorney General Jesse P. Luton, Jr. Reviewing Assistant --Lf%ik+m- BY Everett Hutchinson Chester E. Ollison Executive Assistant Assistant CEOfawo