United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 28, 2006
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
_________________ Clerk
No. 04-61100
_________________
SERGIO BANDA-ORTIZ,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R GONZALES, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of a Final Order of Removal Entered by the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Sergio Banda-Ortiz petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) finding him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.
I
Banda-Ortiz, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1989. In March 2000, the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) issued a Notice to Appear, charging him with
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I) as being present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled. Banda-Ortiz conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal,
claiming that his departure would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D), on his older son and adoptive parents, and in the alternative for voluntary
departure. As a prerequisite to being granted voluntary departure, Banda-Ortiz was required to, inter
alia, establish by clear and convincing evidence that he had the means and intent to depart from the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D). The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied cancellation of
removal and granted Banda-Ortiz’s request for voluntary departure.
Banda-Ortiz filed an appeal with the BIA. On August 22, 2002, the BIA affirmed and granted
him thirty days to depart voluntarily.1 Rather than departing, Banda-Ortiz moved to reopen his
removal proceedings to introduce new evidence of hardship to his family that would result from his
departure.2 He did not accompany this motion with a request to stay removal, to toll the voluntary
departure period, or to reinstate the voluntary departure period. The BIA nevertheless granted the
motion to reopen and remanded to the IJ for consideration of Banda-Ortiz’s new evidence in support
of his application for cancellation of removal.
After a hearing, however, the IJ held that Banda-Ortiz was ineligible to apply for cancellation
1
As required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(3), the BIA’s decision concluded with the following
notice:
If the alien fails to depart the United States within the time period specified, or any
extensions granted by the district director, the alien shall be subject to a civil penalty
of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000, and shall be ineligible for a period
of 10 years for any further relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and
249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See section 240B(d) of the Act.
2
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (permitting an alien to file one motion to reopen). Although
Banda-Ortiz filed his motion on September 23, 2002, two days after his voluntary departure period
expired, the INS granted a two-day nunc pro tunc extension, thereby rendering the motion timely.
2
of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (providing that an alien who fails to depart voluntarily
as scheduled is ineligible for cancellation of removal) because even though he had filed his motion to
reopen prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period, he had failed to depart timely while
that motion was pending. The BIA affirmed. It agreed that 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) rendered Banda-
Ortiz ineligible for cancellation of removal, rejected Banda-Ortiz’s argument that filing a motion to
reopen tolls the voluntary departure period, and held that it (the BIA) had erred in initially granting
the motion to reopen.
II
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005). We review for an abuse of discretion. Id.
This case concerns the interaction of several statutory provisions and an administrative
regulation concerning voluntary departure and motions to reopen. With respect to voluntary
departure, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) allows the Attorney General to permit an alien to voluntarily
depart the United States at the alien’s expense. “Permission to depart voluntarily under this
subsection shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2). To ensure
that aliens abide by their obligation to voluntarily depart, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) provides:
If an alien is permitted to depart voluntarily under this section and fails voluntarily to depart
the United States within the time period specified, the alien
(A) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000; and
(B) shall be ineligible, for a period of 10 years, to receive [cancellation of removal].
The statute concerning motions to reopen states, “An alien may file one motion to reopen
proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) . That motion must be filed within ninety days of the date
of the final administrative order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i). Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d),
provides that “[a]ny departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a
3
person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing
of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.”
The BIA held that because he had overstayed his voluntary departure date, Banda-Ortiz was
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) and was ineligible for cancellation of removal. Despite the clarity
with which the statute speaks and his undisputed failure to depart timely, Banda-Ortiz argues that he
is eligible for cancellation of removal. He contends that the BIA is required to toll automatically the
voluntary departure period during the pendency of a motion to reopen. According to Banda-Ortiz,
the statute and regulation placed him in an “impossible situation” because, if he complied with the
voluntary departure order and left the country, his motion to reopen would be deemed withdrawn
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). If he stayed, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) would render him ineligible for
cancellation of removal.
In support of his argument, Banda-Ortiz relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Azarte v.
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2005). The Azarte court noted that the BIA’s reasonable
interpretation of the immigration statutes are entitled to deference, as provided by Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. at 1285. The Azarte
court nevertheless declined to defer to the BIA’s interpretation, holding instead that it would be
absurd for Congress to provide an alien who elects voluntary departure with the right to file a motion
to reopen when that motion would, in the vast majority of cases, be deemed withdrawn when the alien
complies with the voluntary departure order. Id. at 1288-89 (describing this result as “nonsensical”).
See also Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005) (agreeing with Azarte); Sidikhouya v.
Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2005) (same). We disagree.
Voluntary departure is the result of an agreed-upon exchange of benefits between an alien and
4
the Government. It is not granted “unless the alien requests such voluntary departure and agrees to
its terms and conditions.” 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(c). By requesting voluntary departure, an alien
represents that he has the intent to leave the country within the specified time period. 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(b)(1)(D). Banda-Ortiz made this representation to the IJ but failed to depart. As a result, he
gained access to the numerous benefits that voluntary departure provides, including:1) the ability to
choose his own destination point; 2) the opportunity to put his affairs in order without fear of being
taken into custody; 3) freedom from extended detention while the government prepares for his
removal; 4) avoidance of the stigma of forced removal; and 5) continued eligibility for an adjustment
of status. Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2004). Voluntary departure is not,
however, without cost to the alien. As noted, it exposes him to civil fines and renders him ineligible
for certain forms of relief if he does not timely depart. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d).
The statutory scheme “reveals Congress’ intention to offer an alien a specific
benefit))exemption from the ordinary bars on subsequent relief))in return for a quick departure at
no cost to the government.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 194 (4th Cir. 2004). The purpose
of voluntary departure is to provide an incentive to aliens “to depart without requiring the agency and
courts to devote resources to the matter.” Alimi v. Ashcroft, 391 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that stay of removal does not automatically toll voluntary departure date). “But if the alien
does not depart promptly, so that the [Government] becomes involved in further and more costly
procedures by his attempts to continue his illegal stay here, the original benefit to the [Government]
is lost.” Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1976). What Banda-Ortiz seeks is
“the opportunity to litigate to the last without bearing the attendant costs [and] the chance of winning
outright, plus benefits the law offers to those who avoid litigation through voluntary departure.”
5
Alimi, 391 F.3d at 892.
Furthermore, the remedy Banda-Ortiz seeks is in tension with, if not opposed to, limits on the
length of and authority to extend voluntary departure. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) provides,
“Permission to depart voluntarily under this subsection shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60
days.” See also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (“In no event can the total period of time, including any
extension, exceed . . . 60 days as set forth in [8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2)].). Automatic tolling would
effectively extend the validity of his voluntary departure period well beyond the sixty days that
Congress has authorized. Second, a judicial extension of the period of voluntary departure is
arguably contrary to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f), which states, “Authority to extend the time in which to
depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only within the
jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and
Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs.”3
Banda-Ortiz disputes this conclusion because Congress authorized aliens to file a motion to
3
See Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 194 (holding that court of appeals may not toll voluntary
departure period during judicial review); Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir.
2004) (“[U]nder IIRIRA, the executive branch, not the judiciary, is given the sole authority to
determine when an alien must depart.”); Garcia v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that court of appeals lacks authority to grant a motion for a stay of the voluntary departure
period filed after that period has expired); Zazueta-Carillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1172-73 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“It is executive rather than judicial officers who decide when an alien must depart.
Neither the statute nor the regulations give courts any designated role in this process of setting the
deadline for departure. . . . For us to specify in effect a different period starting more than a year later
would contravene Congress’s scheme and invade the executive branch’s authority to specify a
deadline for voluntary departure.”). But see Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that “tolling” the voluntary departure period does not “extend” it, but instead merely
stops its running); Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that 8
C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) only limits executive officials); Khalil v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir.
2004) (same).
6
reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), and did not exclude aliens who elect voluntary departure from its
application. The BIA has reasonably interpreted the governing statutes in light of the purposes of the
voluntary departure scheme to permit the filing and resolution of a motion to reopen, so long as it
does not interfere with the agreed upon voluntary departure date or the Government’s interest in the
finality of an alien’s voluntary departure. Banda-Ortiz’s interpretation, on the other hand, permits
an alien to request voluntary departure, exhaust his administrative appeals, move to reopen the
removal proceedings, and overstay the period of voluntary departure, thereby depriving the
government of a speedy departure. “This is as if the accused in a criminal prosecution demanded not
only the chance of acquittal at trial but also the benefits that go with a guilty plea and the acceptance
of responsibility.” Alimi, 391 F.3d at 892. Accordingly, we decline to read into 8 U.S.C. § 1129c(d)
the requirement that the BIA automatically toll an alien’s voluntary departure period during the
pendency of a motion to reopen.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review.
7
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The panel majority today unnecessarily creates a circuit split on an important issue of im-
migration law and ensures that a sizable number of aliens facing departure will be effectively unable
to avail themselves of the statutory right to file one good-faith motion to reopen, regardless of the
merit of their underlying claims. Because Congress could not possibly have intended this result,
I respectfully dissent.
I.
We are the fourth circuit to consider this precise question: Does a timely filed motion to re-
open toll an alien’s voluntary departure period?1 We are the first to answer in the negative. Normally
“we begin with trepidation in the face of the solid array of . . . federal courts of appeals” that have
reached the same conclusion, because “[w]e are always chary to create a circuit split.” Alfaro v.
Comm’r, 349 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, however, the reasons offered by the majority
cannot overcome the “high hurdle” of preserving the uniformity of the circuits. See id. at 230.
The majority relies on two principal arguments: first, that it is sensible for aliens who receive
the benefits of voluntary departure to incur the costs associated with not leaving the country in a
timely fashion, and second, that courts have no authority to extend the voluntary departure period
1
See Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005); Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d
950 (8th Cir. 2005); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Barroso v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that tolling occurs even if alien fails to file
a separate motion to stay removal).
8
beyond the sixty days authorized by statute.2 The majority errs by searching for Congress’s intent
almost exclusively in the set of provisions governing voluntary departure to the detriment of the
provisions concerning motions to reopen.
In Azarte, the Ninth Circuit exhaustively studied the history of motions to reopen and vol-
untary departure, including the 1996 codification of both rights in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), and concluded that tolling was necessary to “avoid
creating an incompatibility in the statutory scheme, to implement a workable procedure for motions
to reopen in cases in which aliens are granted voluntary departure, and to effectuate the purposes of
the two statutory provisions.” Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289. In particular, before codifying 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7), which governs motions to reopen, Congress directed the Attorney General to conduct
a study on perceived abuses of these motions, and ultimately concluded that the proper way to curb
abuse was (1) to limit aliens to one motion to reopen, (2) to require evidence of the factual basis for
reopening, and (3) to limit to ninety days the time for filing a motion to reopen.3
In sum, Congress addressed the problem of proliferating motions to reopen by regulating their
quantity, quality, and timeliness. Nowhere, however, did Congress suggest that an alien’s traditional
right to file a motion to reopen depends on the nature of the order of removal. In fact,
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) specifically declines to adopt this limitation, stating only that the motion to
reopen shall be filed within ninety days of “a final administrative order of removal” (emphasis added),
2
See 8 U.S.C § 1229c(b)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f).
3
See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283-84; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (“An alien may file one motion
to reopen proceedings under this section[.]”); § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (“The motion to reopen shall state
the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be sup-
ported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (“[T]he motion to reopen
shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”).
9
which includes in its terms an order granting voluntary departure.
I do not quarrel with the general proposition that voluntary departure represents a bargain
struck between an alien and the government. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(c). I object, however, to limiting
our search for the terms of that bargain to statutory provisions conferring benefits on only one of the
parties.4 To be sure, IIRIRA “drastically limited” the amount of time available for voluntary
departure. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285. The Azarte court, however, correctly refused to read the
departure statute in isolation:
[V]oluntary departure and motions to reopen both are the subject of a long, unin-
terrupted, historic practice in immigration law . . . We find absurd the proposition
that Congress, while expressly codifying the tradition of motions to reopen, intended
sub silentio to preclude their availability in a significant number of cases, likely a
substantial majority.
Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289.
Rather than adopt this more sensible analysis, the panel majority imposes a Hobson’s choice
on aliens facing removal. “Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or re-
moval of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring
after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such
motion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). Under this section, an alien subject to forcible removal will auto-
matically forfeit his motion to reopen once deported. Should he attempt to avoid this result by ap-
plying for voluntary departure, however, he will still forfeit his motion, under the court’s analysis, if
he remains in the country past his departure date (which will often come too soon for the agency to
4
See United States v. Caldera-Herrera, 930 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
“statutes must be read in harmony with one another so as to give meaning to each provision”).
10
consider his motion on the merits).5 If, on the other hand, he complies with the departure order by
leaving the country, his leaving would again constitute withdrawal under § 1003.2(d).
It makes little sense why Congress would codify a right to file a motion to reopen “within 90
days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal,” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), if, in a
substantial number of cases, the order of removal itself would result in forfeiture of the motion. The
majority’s rule puts Banda-Ortiz in the “untenable position of having to choose between two equally
undesirable alternatives.” In re Wilson, 2006 WL 574273, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006).
The result is particularly harsh when one considers that it operates to disadvantage those
aliens whose good behavior has entitled them to the solicitude of the law of voluntary departure. To
qualify for voluntary departure, one must show, inter alia, good moral character for at least five years
before applying, and must not be removable for reason of aggravated felony conviction or for
security-related reasons. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1). Banda-Ortiz, for example, is employed, has never
been convicted of a crime, and has two children who are United States citizens. While his removal
proceedings were pending on appeal to the BIA, his younger son was born and was diagnosed with
reactive airway disease and chronic allergic rhinitis, which in one doctor’s opinion would require
constant medical attention not available in Mexico.
The only means Banda-Ortiz had to introduce these facts as evidence of “exceptional and
5
Although the immigration judge (“IJ”) has authority to grant up to 60 days’ initial departure
time after the conclusion of removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C § 1229c(b)(2), the BIA can typically
grant only 30 additional days after the termination of an appeal. See Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 168, 170 (BIA 1977) (holding that where the IJ initially granted more than 30 days’
departure time and that period had expired, “the respondent will be given 30 days from the date of
our decision in which to depart voluntarily.”). Therefore, even if an alien files a motion to reopen the
day the BIA awards voluntary departure, the agency will have at most 30 days to resolve it. This will
be unlikely, given the fact that, as of September 30, 2004, there were 33,544 cases pending appeal
before the BIA, of which 6,059 had been pending from 2003 or earlier. 2004 EOIR Stat. Y.B. U2.
11
extremely unusual hardship” to the child, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), was a motion to reopen, requesting
adjustment of status. This possibility of intervening circumstances is precisely what Congress anti-
cipated when it afforded aliens such as Banda-Ortiz the right to file such a motion.6
The panel majority believes it sufficient that its interpretation of the statutes “permit[s] the
filing and resolution of a motion to reopen, so long as it does not interfere with the agreed upon
voluntary departure date or the Government’s interest in the finality of an alien’s voluntary de-
parture.” But, it cannot accord with due process for the resolution of motions to turn on the hap-
penstance of how quickly an agency can clear its docket during a given thirty-day period.7 The pos-
sibility that two materially similar motions will be treated differently, depending on the extent of
administrative backlog at the time of filing, should convince the panel majority that its interpretation
leads to absurd results.8
Tolling, by contrast, accords with all of Congress’s objectives in IIRIRA. It preserves the
right of all removable aliens to file a single, good-faith motion to reopen after a final adjudicative
order of the BIA. It also allows aliens to seek voluntary departure without fear of surrendering other
avenues of procedural relief. Finally, it does no damage to Congress’s desire to place reasonable
6
“A motion to reopen seeks fresh consideration on the basis of newly discovered facts or a
change in circumstances since the hearing[.]” Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman, & Stephen
Yale-Loehr, 1-3 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05[7][a] (2005). I take no position on
whether Banda-Ortiz would ultimately prevail on his claim for adjustment of status.
7
Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982) (concluding that state’s
failure to convene a timely hearing, through no fault of petitioner, violated due process in part
because a “system or procedure that deprives persons of their claims in a random manner . . .
necessarily presents an unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be terminated”).
8
See United States v. Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14, 16-17 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Axiomatic in
statutory interpretation is the principle that laws should be construed to avoid an absurd or
unreasonable result.”).
12
limits on the voluntary departure period: The total time initially allotted for departure (and hence the
time available to file to reopen) still cannot exceed sixty days, and limiting claimants to one motion
to reopen, supported by evidence of newly-discovered facts, will temper the frequency and duration
of tolling.
II.
The panel majority resists this conclusion in part because it believes we lack jurisdiction to
toll the voluntary departure period. It cites four cases for this proposition, three of which hail from
circuits that have since accepted the position advanced by Banda-Ortiz. See Reynoso-Lopez, 369
F.3d at 280; Zazueta-Carillo, 322 F.3d at 1172-73); Garcia, 368 F.3d at 1159). The remaining case,
Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 194, does not require a different result here.
The court in Ngarurih held that it lacked authority to reinstate, or in the alternative, stay the
voluntary departure period pending appeal. Id. at 193-94. The court noted, however, that the “most
fundamental[]” reason for holding that it lacked jurisdiction was that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the
court could continue to hear the merits of a petition for review even after the alien had left the
country. See id. at 192-93. Therefore, “an alien may continue to prosecute his appeal of a final order
of removal even after he departs the United States, and there is no longer any prospect that the
government could manipulate voluntary departure orders to deprive an alien of judicial review.” Id.
Here, however, the government has offered no similar safeguard to provide that an alien can
have his motion to reopen heard on the merits if he leaves the United States. In fact, it is undisputed
that, if Banda-Ortiz had left the country pursuant to his voluntary departure order, he would have
automatically forfeited his motion under § 1003.2(d). Ngarurih, by contrast, received full considera-
13
tion of his asylum application, notwithstanding that he overstayed his departure period. Id. at 188-91.
I would merely ask the court to extend the same courtesy to a petitioner filing a motion to reopen.9
The panel majority also believes we cannot toll because tolling contravenes the text of
§ 1129c(b)(2), which provides that “[p]ermission to depart voluntarily under this subsection shall not
be valid for a period exceeding 60 days,” and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f), which vests sole jurisdiction “to
extend the time in which to depart voluntarily” in specific executive officials. Although I admire the
majority’s attention to statutory and regulatory text, a strict reading of these provisions proves both
too much and too little in this case.
It proves too much because it calls into question a longstanding practice of the agency that
the majority cannot intend to assailSSthe tolling of the voluntary departure period pending appeal to
the BIA.10 If the voluntary departure period cannot exceed sixty days under any circumstance, an
alien would risk more than a motion to reopen when he elects voluntary departure; he would also put
in jeopardy his right to any review of the IJ’s decision.11
It proves too little because we cannot avoid doing some damage to statutory text in this case,
9
But see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B) (preventing aliens from receiving certain forms of relief
for ten years after overstaying the voluntary departure period, but not including an appeal of an
asylum application).
10
See Matter of Villegas Aguirre, 13 I.&N. Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1969) (holding that a timely
appeal “tolls the running of the voluntary departure authorization”); Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I.&N.
Dec. at 170 (affirming Aguirre to the extent that a “grant of voluntary departure made by an
immigration judge shall not be jeopardized by taking an appeal”). This practice strongly suggests that
tolling does not constitute “exten[tion]” within the meaning of § 1240.26(f).
11
For example, Banda-Ortiz received 60 days’ voluntary departure from the IJ on February
23, 2001 (until April 24). He timely appealed on March 26, which tolled the departure period. The
BIA did not release its opinion affirming the IJ’s order, and granting 30 additional days for departure,
until August 22, 2002, six months after the IJ’s decision.
14
because we are faced with conflicting legislative commands. As I have explained, the language of
§ 1229a(c)(7) is intentionally broad; it does not make exception for aliens subject to voluntary
departure and, in fact, it contemplates that any alien facing removal may file a motion to reopen.
Therefore, the panel majority’s decision carves out an exception to the motion-to-reopen statute that
its text cannot bear.
Even if Banda-Ortiz could not muster strong textual arguments, the majority’s reading of
§ 1129c(b)(2) would be unpersuasive. It is not enough to defeat an argument for tolling to point out
that tolling would undermine the statutory text. It is in the very nature of tolling to suspend the
period of time provided by statute for certain actions, when the circumstances of the case require.
In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested, at least in the statute of limitations context, that we
presume the availability of tolling against the government unless Congress provides otherwise.12
Tolling is particularly appropriate in a case like this, where it is necessary to preserve a stat-
utory right and prevent the creation of a legal Scylla and Charybdis that will inevitably lead to the
denial of meritorious claims.13 For these reasons, I would join those circuits that hold that “sus
12
See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (“We . . . hold that the
same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should
also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes
to do so.”). Of course, just because tolling is available by statute does not mean that we will
ordinarily grant it. See Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that tolling
is appropriate in those “rare and exceptional circumstances where it is necessary to preserve a
plaintiff’s claims when strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable”) (internal
quotations and alteration omitted).
13
We recently granted tolling for a federal habeas petitioner who waited until the final day of
the limitations period to raise a claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in a successive
habeas corpus petition. See Wilson, 2006 WL 574273, at *6. The court reasoned that the petitioner
was justified in waiting for the court to rule on his initial COA application because he lacked an
adequate vehicle for his Atkins claim. Because of a Texas procedural rule prohibiting concurrent state
(continued...)
15
pension of a voluntary departure period merely tolls the running of that period; it does not extend it.”
Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir. 2005).14
As our court encounters an increasing number of immigration cases, we are bound to confront
various iterations of the fact pattern before us today, and I have little hope that the mischief caused
by this panel majority’s decision will be limited only to the specific circumstances involving Banda-
Ortiz. One predictable consequence of today’s decision, for example, is that the immigration bar will
hesitate before requesting voluntary departure because of the now-heightened risk that a successful
request will result in the automatic denial of all forms of discretionary relief.
We might have avoided the problem by deferring to the accumulated wisdom of our sister cir-
cuits. Though the majority finds this weight of authority insufficient, it might at least, out of comity,
acknowledge the merit of the competing position by applying the “longstanding principle of
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.” INS. v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). This would promote a fair result for aliens facing removal
and would preserve a uniform interpretation of the relationship between the statutory provisions gov-
erning voluntary departure and motions to reopen. I respectfully dissent.
13
(...continued)
and federal petitions, he faced the “Hobson’s choice” of filing in state court, and dismissing his federal
petition (sacrificing review of all his federal claims), or filing concurrently in state and federal court,
and defaulting his state petition (but satisfying federal exhaustion requirements). See id. at *5. As
in Wilson, tolling is the only way to provide Banda-Ortiz with an adequate procedural means to assert
his claim. But see id. at *8 (Garza, J., dissenting) (concluding that equitable tolling, inter alia,
“disregarded AEDPA’s statutory scheme.”).
14
See also Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1205-06; Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 653 (holding that
§ 1240.26(f) does not bind judicial officers).
16