[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 6, 2010
JOHN LEY
No. 09-11567 ACTING CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-20820-CR-JEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHADWICK NEELY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 6, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Chadwick Neely appeals his 70-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On appeal, Neely argues that his sentence was unreasonable because it was
greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Neely also argues that the district court failed to state the reasons for its
decision and that it did not consider his arguments and the § 3553(a) factors.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594, 169 L. Ed.
2d 445 (2007). A defendant challenging his sentence bears the burden of
establishing that it is unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788
(11th Cir. 2005). Overall, the analysis is a two-step process. United States v.
Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). First, we examine whether the
district court committed any significant procedural error. Id. Second, after we
determine that the sentence is procedurally sound, we review the sentence for
substantive reasonableness. Id.
When reviewing for procedural unreasonableness, we should ensure that the
district court: (1) properly calculated the guidelines range; (2) treated the
Guidelines as advisory; (3) considered the § 3553(a) factors; (4) did not select a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; and (5) adequately explained the chosen
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sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. When the district court considers
the § 3553(a) factors, the district court need not discuss each factor. Talley, 431
F.3d at 786. All that is required is that the district court acknowledge that it has
considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005).
A sentence is substantively unreasonable “if it does not achieve the purposes
of sentencing stated in § 3553(a).” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The analysis includes “examining the totality of the
circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a)
support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324
(11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2848 (2009). The § 3553(a) factors are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
Talley, 431 F.3d at 786 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The weight the district court
accords to “any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the district court . . . .” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832
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(11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In terms of the reasonableness
of the sentence imposed, we have held “that there is a range of reasonable
sentences from which the district court may choose, and when the district court
imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect
that choice to be a reasonable one.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
We conclude from the record that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a 70-month sentence. The sentence was both procedurally
and substantively reasonable, and Neely failed to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Neely’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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