J-S91027-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
S.A.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
R.L.B., JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 911 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 2013-00282,
PACSES 624113754
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2017
R.L.B. (“Father”) appeals from the May 5, 2016, order entered by the
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas ordering Father to pay child
support to S.A.G. (“Mother”) for minor child, M.C. (“Child”). After careful
review, we affirm.
We adopt the following from the trial court’s findings of fact, which are
supported by the record. See Trial Court Memorandum Opinion and Order,
12/01/2015, at 3-13.
Child was born in the Commonwealth of Virginia on June 24, 2004.
R.C. was Mother’s boyfriend immediately after Mother became pregnant with
Child. R.C. believed that he was Child’s father, was present at Child’s birth,
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and was identified as the father on Child’s birth certificate. Thereafter,
R.C.’s parents provided financial support to Child.
Nevertheless, Mother and Father had been involved in an intimate
relationship at times from 2002 into 2004, and Mother “knew” that Father
was the biological parent of Child. Sometime after 2005, Mother told Father
that he was the biological parent. Following Child’s birth, Father visited with
Child and developed a relationship with her. Father purchased gifts for Child
and took Child on vacations. The relationship was longstanding. Father
relocated from Virginia to Pennsylvania in 2005. In 2012 Father took Child
on a two-week summer vacation to Dorney Park, located in Allentown,
Pennsylvania.
In January 2005, Mother commenced a support action against R.C.
However, Mother was incarcerated thereafter on two occasions. During her
periods of incarceration, Child was cared for by maternal grandmother or
R.C.’s parents. Following her second release from incarceration, Mother
requested genetic testing to confirm whether R.C. was the biological parent
of Child. Testing excluded R.C. as the biological parent. Thus, in October
2011, a domestic relations court in Mecklenburg County, Virginia, issued an
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order directing that R.C. cannot be legally compelled to pay child support for
Child.1
Mother was receiving state assistance from Virginia. As R.C. had been
excluded as the biological parent of Child, Mother was required to file for
support against Father. Subsequent genetic testing confirmed that Father is
the biological parent of Child.
Hearings were held in this matter in April and August 2013. At these
hearings, Father stated his intention to continue his relationship with Child
but contested his support obligation. Child acknowledged that she has “two
daddies,” but suggested that she learned to tell the truth from her Father.
Based upon the testing results and testimony from the hearings, the trial
court recognized Father as both the biological and legal father of Child. In
October 2013, this matter proceeded to a support conference, following
which, the trial court adopted the conference officer’s recommendation of
support.
Father sought additional hearings and argued that the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel worked to preclude his support obligations. The trial
court rejected his arguments without analysis, and Father timely appealed.
Following a procedural delay, this Court reversed the support order and
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1
A second order, also issued in October 2011, recognized R.C. as the
psychological father of Child, but did not define the identity of Child’s
putative father.
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remanded for further proceedings, specifically directing the court to address
Father’s arguments and, specifically, the relevant factors outlined in R.K.J.
v. S.P.K., 77 A.3d 33 (Pa. Super. 2013). See S.A.G. v. R.L.B., 113 A.3d
352 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
Hearings were held in March and May 2015. Thereafter, the court
rejected Father’s contention that he was not liable for support. Following
support conferences, the court issued a final order of support in May 2016.
Father timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. The trial court issued an order stating that the issues raised in
Father’s Rule 1925(b) statement had been fully considered and addressed in
its December 1, 2015 memorandum opinion and order and its February 1,
2016 supplemental opinion.
Father presents one issue for review:
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found
that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel did not apply when the
putative father and his family raised the child during the early
years of her life while the biological father has had limited
contact with the child throughout her life.
Father’s Brief at 4.
We review a child support order, including matters involving a question
of paternity, for abuse of discretion. Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459,
462 (Pa. Super. 2007). The trial court is responsible for making factual
determinations, weighing the evidence, and making credibility
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determinations, and we will not disturb its findings if the record supports
them. Id.
Father asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel did not apply. Paternity by estoppel:
is merely the legal determination that because of a person’s
conduct (e.g., holding out the child as his own, or supporting the
child) that person, regardless of his true biological status, will
not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will the child’s mother
who has participated in this conduct be permitted to sue a third
party for support, claiming that the third party is the true father.
Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999). Paternity by estoppel will only
apply where it can be shown, on a developed record, that it is in the best
interests of the involved child. K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 810 (Pa.
2012); see also Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464.
This Court has recognized the following psychological and economic
considerations as relevant to the determination of the child’s best interests
in a support case involving an allegation of paternity by estoppel:
(1) a party cannot renounce an assumed duty of parentage
when the innocent child would be victimized; (2) the law can
prohibit a putative father from employing sanctions of the law to
avoid the obligations that his assumed relationship with the child
would impose; (3) the closeness of the child’s relationship to the
putative father; (4) the harm that would befall the child if the
putative father’s parental status were to be disestablished; and
(5) the need for continuity, financial support, and potential
psychological security arising out of an established parent-child
relationship.
R.K.J., 77 A.3d at 38.
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Father claims that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
found that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel did not apply where R.C. and
his family raised the child during the early years of her life. See Appellant’s
Brief at 4. Appellant argues that it would not be in the best interests of the
child to disestablish the paternity of R.C., who acted as the child’s father
during her youngest years. Id. at 9.
The trial court analyzed the factors identified R.K.J. and concluded: 1)
the order issued in Virginia prevented a support obligation from being
imposed upon R.C., though R.C. has continued the relationship; 2) that
Father, not R.C., was attempting to avoid the obligations his assumed
relationship with Child would impose; 3) there was evidence R.C. would
continue his close relationship with Child; 4) no harm came to Child as a
result of R.C.’s disestablishment of paternity, as he continues to have a
relationship with Child and provide material support; and 5) Child has
psychological and emotional security with both R.C. and Father, and given
Child’s positive description of her bond with Father, it would be in her best
interests to continue the relationship. TCO at 15-20. Further, Father
remains the only person legally chargeable with fulfilling the role of father in
respect to the duty of support, and it would be in the child’s best interests if
that support continued. TCO at 20.
Based upon our examination of the record, the trial court appropriately
discussed the factors outlined in R.K.J. and concluded that the best interests
of the child would be served if Father contributes to her support. See
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R.K.J., 77 A.3d at 38. We do not discern an abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s analysis or conclusions of law and, accordingly, affirm. See Vargo,
940 A.2d at 462.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/21/2017
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