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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
THE PHILLIES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
REGIONAL RESOURCES, :
MANAGEMENT, INC., AND :
JOSEPH S. SIMONE, : No. 445 EDA 2016
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order, January 27, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. 001991
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017
Regional Resources Management, Inc. and Joseph S. Simone, Jr.
(“Simone”), appeal the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County that denied their petition to strike or open default judgment.
The facts, as recounted by the trial court, are as follows:
On February 16, 2015, Appellee, the Phillies,
sued Appellants for an aggregate unpaid contract
balance of $152,339.00 for a partial suite license,
Diamond Club seating, season tickets, and other
amenities. The Complaint raised counts of Breach of
Contract, Breach of Promise, and Unjust Enrichment.
The Complaint included contracts for a suite license
agreement signed by Regional Resources
Management, Inc. through its representative, Joseph
Simone at the address “PO Box 597, Voorhees, NJ
08043;” and a standard season ticket agreement
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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signed by Joseph S. Simone Jr. at the address
“Regional Resources Inc. PO Box 597, Voorhees, NJ
08043.” See Complaint, “Exhibit A” and “Exhibit B.”
On February 27, 2015, Appellee filed an
Affidavit of Service stating that Regional Resources
Management, Inc. a/k/a Regional Resources, Inc.,
had been served by personal service and that the
Complaint had been served upon Angela Decker, an
authorized agent, at 1307 White Horse Road,
Bldg. D., Voorhees, NJ, 08043, on February 20,
2015, at 10:20 a.m.
On February 27, 2015, Appellee filed an
Affidavit of Service stating that Joseph S. Simone,
Jr., had been served by personal service and that the
Complaint had been served upon Angela Decker, an
authorized agent, at 1307 White Horse Road,
Bldg. D., Voorhees, NJ, 08043, on February 20,
2015, at 10:20 a.m.
On April 10, 2015, Appellee filed a Praecipe for
Entry of Default Judgment against Appellants in the
amount of $157,202.43.[1]
On October 13, 2015, Appellee filed a Praecipe
to Issue a Writ of Attachment.
On November 19, 2015, Appellants filed a
Petition to Open Judgment. Appellants argued that
the Suite License agreement was between Appellee
and Regional Resources Management, only, and that
this entry of judgment “constituted a fatal defect in
the record” which required that judgment be stricken
as against Regional Resources Energy Group,
Regional Resources, Inc., and Joseph S. Simone, Jr.
Additionally, Appellants argued that the entities were
not parties to the contract and that this constituted
grounds to open the default judgment, as it was a
meritorious defense. The Petition also included an
affidavit from Joseph S. Simone, Jr., which stated
the following: Regional Resources, Inc., does not
1
This amount included interest and costs for the Sheriff.
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exist; Regional Resources Energy Group is a limited
liability company separate and apart from Regional
Resources Management, Inc.; that Regional
Resources Management, Inc., entered into a suite
license agreement, had a Diamond Club Ticket
Purchase Agreement, and purchased season tickets;
that at the time judgment was entered, Simone was
“unable to afford counsel to represent [him] or any
other entity . . . and instead contacted plaintiff to
discuss a potential resolution of the matter. . . .”
On December 9, 2015, Appellee filed an
Answer in Opposition to Appellants’ Petition to Open
Judgment, Appellee argued that all Appellants had
known about the lawsuit since February of 2015;
that they were notified on April 10, 2015 that a
default judgment was taken against them; and that
Appellants had not provided a reasonable
explanation [for their failure] to respond to the
Complaint in a timely fashion. The Answer noted
that the Agreement was entered into with Regional
Resources Management, Inc., a/k/a Regional
Resources Energy Group, a/k/a Regional Resources,
Inc., and that the purchase agreement was entered
into by Joseph Simone, and that the signature box
was signed in an individual capacity by Joseph
Simone. Appellee noted that it sued Regional under
the Suite Licensing Agreement, Simone under the
Ticket Purchase Agreement, Simone for season
tickets and parking, Regional for breach of promise
and guaranty, and all Appellants for unjust
enrichment in the amount of the balance due.
Appellee argued that it was not improper, under
Pennsylvania law, to sue Appellants under fictitious
names, that all Appellants used and benefited from
the suite, tickets, etc., and that all Appellants were
sued under the unjust enrichment claim.
On January 27, 2016, this court denied
Appellants’ Petition.
On January 28, 2016, Appellants filed a timely
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
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Trial court opinion, 4/5/16 at 1-3.
On appeal, appellants raise the following issues for this court’s review:
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to strike a
default judgment when the judgment was
defective on its face because the [appellants]
were not a party to the agreement on which
the judgment rests?
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to open a
default judgment when the [appellants]
presented a meritorious defense at the opening
of the execution proceedings and immediately
upon being able to afford representation, and
the facts in question are sufficient to present to
a jury?
3. Is a court required under Pa.R.C.P. 206.6,
when adopted through the local rules of civil
procedure of that county, to abide by the
language of the rule and issue a rule to show
cause as of course upon the filing of a petition?
Appellants’ brief at 2.
Initially, appellants contend that the trial court erred when it refused
to strike the default judgment because the appellants were not party to the
agreement upon which the judgment rested, which rendered the record
fatally defective. Appellants argue that the default judgment exists solely as
a result of an improperly pleaded complaint because the Suite License
Agreement in question was executed between Regional Resources
Management, Inc., and appellee and not the other entities. Appellants also
argue that the trial court erred when it found that because Simone signed
the Suite License Agreement, Simone was de facto personally liable even if
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he did not sign in his personal capacity. According to appellants, Regional
Resources Management, Inc. was the only party to execute the Suite License
Agreement with appellee so that this court should reverse the trial court’s
order because of a plainly defective record and strike the judgment as to
Regional Resources Energy Group and Simone.
With regard to a motion to strike a
default judgment, [a] court may only
look at the facts of record at the time
judgment was entered to decide if the
record supports the judgment. A petition
to strike does not involve the discretion
of the court. A petition to strike a
judgment will not be granted unless a
fatal defect in the judgment appears on
the face of the record. Matters outside
of the record will not be considered, and
if the record is self-sustaining, the
judgment will not be stricken.
Aquilino v. Phila. Catholic Archdiocese, 884 A.2d
1269, 1280 (Pa.Super. 2005). “A petition to strike a
judgment is a common law proceeding which
operates as a demurrer to the record.” U.S. Bank,
N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 991
(Pa.Super.2009) (quoting Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s
Cleaning Servs., 549 Pa. 84, 89-90, 700 A.2d 915,
917 (1997)). “Where a fatal defect or irregularity is
apparent from the face of the record, the
prothonotary will be held to have lacked the
authority to enter [a] default judgment and the
default judgment will be considered void.” Id.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919, 920-921 (Pa.Super. 2010).
Where a complaint contains averments sufficient to sustain an action,
a petition to strike a judgment must be denied. Kazanjian v. Cohen, 103
A.2d 491, 493 (Pa.Super. 1954). If the truth of the factual averments
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contained in the record is disputed, then the recourse is a petition to open
the judgment not to strike. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne
Assocs., 683 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1996).
Here, averments were contained in the complaint that Regional
Resources Management, Inc., was also known as Regional Resources Energy
Group and that Simone was a party to the contract and enjoyed the benefits
of the contract. Further, the complaint contained averments that all of the
named defendants were unjustly enriched as they all used and enjoyed the
services without paying appellee the amount owed of $152,339. This
challenge to the factual averments of the complaint is not properly raised in
a motion to strike as it does not challenge a defect on the face of the record.
See Green Acres Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261,
1271 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Similarly, appellants’ claim that it is improper for appellee to obtain a
judgment against Regional Resources Management, Inc., and the additional
“also known as” names attacks the factual averments made in the
complaint. As appellants failed to answer the complaint and challenge these
averments, they are now taken as true. Id. Once again, appellants failed to
allege a defect on the face of the record. The trial court did not err when it
denied the motion to strike.
Appellants next contend that the trial court erred when it denied the
petition to open the default because appellants presented their argument at
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the opening of the execution proceedings and as soon as they were able to
afford representation, they presented a meritorious defense of lack of
contractual privity, and the facts in question were sufficient to present to a
jury.
A petition to open judgment is an appeal to the equitable powers of
the court. First Seneca Bank & Trust Co. v. Laurel Mountain Dev.
Corp., 485 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Pa. 1984):
[The grant or denial of a motion to open
judgment] is committed to the sound discretion of
the hearing court and will not be disturbed absent a
manifest abuse of that discretion. Ordinarily, if a
petition to open a judgment is to be successful, it
must meet the following test: (1) the petition to
open must be promptly filed; (2) the failure to
appear or file a timely answer must be excused; and
(3) the party seeking to open the judgment must
show a meritorious defense. However, where the
party seeking to open a judgment asserts that
service was improper, a court must address this
issue first before considering any other factors. If
valid service has not been made, then the judgment
should be opened because the court has no
jurisdiction over the defendant and is without power
to enter a judgment against him or her. In making
this determination, a court can consider facts not
before it at the time the judgment was entered.
Thus, if a party seeks to challenge the truth of
factual averments in the record at the time judgment
was entered, then the party should pursue a petition
to open the judgment, not a petition to strike the
judgment.
Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (citations omitted).
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The timeliness of the petition is “measured from the date that the
notice of the entry of default judgment is received.” Castings
Condominium Assoc. v. Klein, 663 A.2d 220, 223 (Pa.Super. 1995).
Here, default judgment was entered on April 10, 2015. Appellants
filed the petition to open on November 19, 2015, over seven months after
the entry of judgment. While there is no bright line as to what constitutes a
“promptly filed petition,” the trial court noted that prompt and timely filings
are generally less than a month. The trial court did not err when it ruled
that the petition to open, filed more than seven months after entry of the
default judgment, was not promptly filed.2
Appellants next contend that the trial court abused its discretion when
it failed to issue a rule to show cause under Rule 206.6 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted by the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County. Specifically, appellants assert that the trial court
abused its discretion by not holding a hearing or at least ordering
depositions.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 206.4(a)(1) provides, “[e]xcept
as provided by subparagraph (2), a petition shall proceed upon a rule to
show cause, the issuance of which shall be discretionary with the court as
provided by Rule 206.5 unless the court by local rule adopts the procedure
2
Because the petition was not timely filed, this court need not address the
remaining two prongs of the test for granting a petition to open a default
judgment.
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of Rule 206.6 providing for issuance as of course.” Pa.R.C.P. 206.4(a)(1).
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County adopted Local Rule 206.4
which adopted the procedure of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 206.63
for all petitions filed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 206.1 et seq., such that upon the
filing of a petition, the motion court clerk shall issue a rule to show cause on
behalf of the court.
Here, no rule to show cause was issued, but appellee was directed to
file an answer and did so. Although appellants argue that they were entitled
to discovery to determine whether there was the unjust enrichment claimed
by appellee and were entitled to discovery on the “a/k/a” allegation that,
they claim, was the heart of appellee’s case, this court does not agree. The
trial court could and did determine that the petition to open was untimely
without the benefit of a hearing or discovery. It would make no sense for
the trial court to prolong the proceedings by granting a discovery request
when the underlying petition is untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2017
3
This rule states that a rule to show cause should be issued as of course and
shall direct that an answer be filed to the petition within twenty days.
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