UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4336
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL SCOTT MILLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00368-CCE-1)
Submitted: January 19, 2017 Decided: February 24, 2017
Before TRAXLER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Frank J.
Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Scott Miller pleaded guilty to making a false
statement to a bank employee in negotiating a counterfeit check,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012); aggravated identity
theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2012);
production of counterfeit currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 471 (2012); and possession with intent to use and transfer
unlawfully false identification, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a)(3) (2012), conditioned on his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his suppression motion. The district
court sentenced Miller to 75 months of imprisonment and he now
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Miller challenges the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion. “We review the factual findings underlying
a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court’s
legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d
226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). When the district court has denied a
defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. Id.
Here, officers were called to a motel after a motel
employee observed stacks of what appeared to be uncut
counterfeit currency through the window of Miller’s motel room;
upon arrival, the officers were able to see the currency as
well. One of the officers knocked on the door and announced his
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presence, after which the curtain was closed and the officers
heard mumbling and rustling in the room. An officer then
entered the room to secure it, while the other officer left to
obtain a search warrant. In denying Miller’s suppression
motion, the district court determined that the need to prevent
destruction of evidence justified the officer’s warrantless
entry.
The Fourth Amendment generally bars police from entering a
home without a warrant. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460
(2011). The expectation of privacy enjoyed by occupants of a
home extends to guests of hotel or motel rooms. See United
States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir. 2005).
Warrantless entry into a home or motel room is permitted,
however, when exigent circumstances exist, including the need to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. See United States
v. Taylor, 624 F.3d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, “where
police officers (1) have probable cause to believe that evidence
of illegal activity is present, and (2) reasonably believe that
evidence may be destroyed or removed before they could obtain a
warrant,” they may enter without a warrant. United States v.
Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In determining whether exigent circumstances exist to
support a warrantless entry, a court should consider:
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1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of
time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’
reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be
removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to
police guarding the site; (4) information indicating
the possessors of the contraband are aware that the
police are on their trail; and (5) the ready
destructibility of the contraband.
United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2013). The
inquiry focuses on the officers’ reasonable belief, and the
police need not produce concrete proof that evidence is in
danger of being destroyed. Moses, 540 F.3d at 270. Courts
making this determination “should not engage in unreasonable
second-guessing of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances
that they faced.” Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 639 (4th
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the officers had probable cause to believe that the
motel room contained evidence of illegal activity based on their
observation of the counterfeit currency through the open
curtain. When they knocked on the door to the room, someone
closed the curtain, cutting off their view of that evidence, and
rustling and mumbling could be heard. At that point, officers
knew that there was at least one person in the room and that he
was now aware the police were “on his trail.” See Yengel, 711
F.3d at 397. And because the officers could no longer see the
currency through the window and heard movement in the room, they
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had an objectively reasonable belief that the currency could be
destroyed before they could secure a warrant.
Miller also argues that if exigent circumstances existed,
the officers manufactured the exigency by knocking and
announcing their presence. Police may not rely on the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement if they have
created or manufactured the exigency. King, 563 U.S. at 461.
However, where “the police did not create the exigency by
engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction
of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” Id. at 462. There
is no police-created exigency “[w]hen law enforcement officers
who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door.” Id. at 469.
Here, the officers did no more than knock on the door and
announce their presence. This was not an actual or threatened
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Brown,
701 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing King and noting that
when police announce their presence, creating immediate fear of
detection by defendant, police may still act reasonably to
prevent destruction of evidence). We conclude, therefore, that
the police did not create the exigency.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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