In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Ic.G. and Ib.G. (Minor Children) and M.G. (Mother) and B.G. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Mar 02 2017, 9:24 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT - ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
FATHER Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Mark Small Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Robert J. Henke
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT - David E. Corey
MOTHER Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Brian A. Karle
Ball Eggleston, PC
Lafayette, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the Parent- March 2, 2017
Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
54A04-1608-JT-1989
Ic.G. and Ib.G. (Minor
Children) Appeal from the Montgomery
Circuit Court
and
The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
M.G. (Mother) and B.G. Judge
(Father), Trial Court Cause Nos.
Appellants-Respondents, 54C01-1601-JT-20
54C01-1601-JT-21
v.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A04-1608-JT-1989 | March 2, 2017 Page 1 of 19
 The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

Baker, Judge.

[1] M.G. (Mother) and B.G. (Father) appeal the trial court’s order terminating their

relationship with their two children. Mother argues that the evidence does not

support the trial court’s findings on her positive drug screens or that conditions

leading to the children’s removal will not be remedied. Father argues that there

was insufficient evidence to support the termination order. Finding no error

and sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts
[2] Ic.G. was born to Mother and Father on November 11, 2008; Ib.G. was born to

Mother and Father on September 21, 2010.

[3] On October 6, 2014, the Department of Child Services (DCS) visited the

family’s home based on a report of guns, drugs, and paraphernalia being

present in the residence. The house contained bags of trash, mold-covered

food, cockroaches in the kitchen, dog feces on the floor, and paraphernalia.

The children were dirty and hungry from not having eaten that day. Ib.G. had

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 fleas in her hair, and Ic.G. had a cut on his leg covered by an old, dirty

bandage. Mother and Father were arrested and incarcerated. On November

26, 2014, the trial court determined the children to be children in need of

services (CHINS).

[4] Mother was incarcerated from October 6 through December 15, 2014. Father

was in jail from October 6 through November 13, 2014. After a December 17,

2014, dispositional hearing, the court ordered Mother and Father to participate

in individual therapy, home-based case management services, and a substance

abuse assessment, provide drug screens, and have supervised visits with the

children.

[5] Following Father’s release from incarceration, family case manager (FCM)

Charlene Colley could not find him until the dispositional hearing. Father

participated in his substance abuse assessment and visitations. He continued to

“sporadically” test positive for drugs, but he also tested negative at times. Tr. p.

152. He missed “maybe three” drug screens because of transportation issues.

Id. at 155. On February 10, 2015, he started participating consistently in

visitation with his children. On April 16, 2015, Father was arrested and

incarcerated again based on a warrant for criminal activity that took place in

July 2014. Father remains incarcerated; his earliest possible release date is

2021. While incarcerated, he is participating in a work program that may

provide a six-month time cut to his sentence. He is also participating in the

Father’s Engagement program through which he is learning how to better

interact with his children. Father has continued to see his children when

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 possible, has sent them letters and cards, and has spoken with them on the

phone.

[6] Following Mother’s release, on December 30, 2014, FCM Colley told Mother

that she would be contacted about beginning substance abuse treatment. On

February 2, 2015, Mother completed an intake evaluation. On February 26,

2015, she started participating consistently in visitation with her children. She

completed her substance abuse engagement group on March 30, 2015, and was

referred to an advanced outpatient program. She was unable to complete the

program, however, because she was arrested and incarcerated on April 16,

2015, based on a warrant for the same criminal activity as Father that took

place in July 2014. She was released from jail on October 13, 2015.1

[7] Shortly after her release, Mother went to see FCM Colley about restarting

services. On October 27, 2015, she started group therapy with therapist Rachel

Hamby; Mother attended consistently, and she was motivated and willing to

participate. After completing the first part of group therapy, she moved on to

relapse prevention, which she completed on February 16, 2016. During

Mother’s relapse prevention program, DCS reported to Therapist Hamby that

Mother had relapsed, and Hamby recommended moving her from group

therapy to intensive individual addictions treatment. Therapist Hamby and

Anna Powers, Mother’s individual therapist, both spoke with FCM Colley “due

1
We were subsequently informed that, after the termination hearing, Mother was sentenced to eight years
probation.

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 to [Mother’s] drug screens. Id. at 70. In addition to her group therapy, Mother

saw Therapist Powers for individual therapy from September 18, 2015, through

May 18, 2016, for substance abuse counseling and mental health concerns.

Mother attended eighteen of her thirty-one scheduled appointments; she either

cancelled or missed the other thirteen. As part of that intensive treatment,

Therapist Powers told Mother that she preferred to see her twice a week to

provide extra support; Mother said that she wanted to but “there was always

something that just kind of came up.” Id. at 76. Therapist Powers was aware

of one relapse Mother had with Tramadol, a prescription drug for which

Mother did not have a prescription; Mother also told Therapist Powers that she

had tested positive for methamphetamine.

[8] On January 18, 2016, Mother secured and has maintained gainful employment.

On May 20, 2016, Mother suggested to FCM Colley that she go to Half Way

Home, a rehabilitation facility. Mother was accepted to the Half Way Home,

but as of the time of the termination hearing, she had not entered the home.

Mother told FCM Colley about her drug use “on every occasion” that FCM

Colley and Mother met. Id. at 86. Mother admitted to FCM Colley that she

used methamphetamine between March 30 and May 23, 2016.

[9] When Mother and Father were arrested on October 6, 2014, the children were

removed and placed with their maternal grandmother. In December 2014, they

were moved into foster care. They have both experienced difficulties since their

removal and exhibited disruptive behaviors. Ib.G. would walk off with

strangers, and Ic.G. was aggressive toward his foster siblings and dog. Ib.G.

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 was diagnosed with Disinhibited Social Engagement Disorder and Ic.G. was

diagnosed with Conduct Disorder Childhood Onset based on destructive

behaviors, hitting others, damaging property, and lying.

[10] On January 27, 2016, DCS filed its termination petitions. On August 25, 2016,

the trial court granted DCS’ petition for termination of parental rights of both

Mother and Father. The court found that there was a reasonable probability

that the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal would not be

remedied, noting that when the parents were in jail for extended periods of time

after the children’s removal, they were not able to participate in services or visit

with their children during that time, and that even when Mother was not in jail,

she failed to consistently participate in services or to refrain from using drugs.

The court found that termination was in the best interests of the children

because neither parent was in a better position to provide the children with

appropriate care, supervision, or a safe, nurturing and stable home than they

were at the beginning of DCS’s involvement with the family. Mother and

Father now separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision
[11] Mother argues that the trial court erred by making findings of fact concerning

her positive drug screens and by finding that there was a reasonable probability

that the conditions that led to the children’s removal would not be remedied.

Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination

order.

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 I. Standard of Review
[12] Our standard of review with respect to termination of parental rights

proceedings is well established. In considering whether termination was

appropriate, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility.

K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). We will

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom in support of the judgment, giving due regard to the trial court's

opportunity to judge witness credibility firsthand. Id. Where, as here, the trial

court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the

findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. In making that

determination, we must consider whether the evidence clearly and convincingly

supports the findings, and the findings clearly and convincingly support the

judgment. Id. at 1229–30. It is “sufficient to show by clear and convincing

evidence that the child's emotional and physical development are threatened by

the respondent parent's custody.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children,

839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005).

[13] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires that a petition to terminate

parental rights for a CHINS must make the following allegations:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

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 (ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31–34–21–5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description of
the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a local office or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

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 DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.

II. Termination Between Mother and Children

A. Evidence of Drug Screens
[14] Mother argues that the trial court erred because it made findings of fact and

conclusions concerning drug use by Mother even though DCS did not admit

her drug screen test results into evidence at the termination hearing. She

challenges the following factual findings:

 “Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, THC and heroin.”
 “Mother continued to test positive for controlled substances on a regular
basis in 2016, specifically Tramadol for which she did not have a
prescription.”
 “Mother tested positive for methamphetamine use in May, June and July
2016.”
 “Mother tested positive for methamphetamine use on July 6, 2016.”
 “[Mother] tested positive for methamphetamine use in May, June and
July 2016 with her last positive screen for methamphetamine occurring
just eight days before the Termination fact-finding hearing.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 42, 46. Mother argues that the evidence on which

these findings was based was inadmissible because a proper foundation was not

made; FCM Colley, who testified about Mother’s drug screens, was not an

expert witness qualified to testify about them; Mother did not have an

opportunity to cross-examine an appropriate witness concerning the drug

screens; and FCM Colley’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Mother

objected to this evidence, and the trial court sustained her objections.

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[15] During the termination hearing, Mother objected “to any testimony [the FCM]

might give about positive tests. She can talk about what [Mother] told her,

but . . . she’s not able to testify about potential drug screens or lab tests.” Tr. p.

86. However, Mother did not object to the following testimony, which was

based on statements Mother made to FCM Colley, Therapist Hamby, and

Therapist Powers:

 After the March 30, 2015, review hearing, the court found that Mother
had not maintained her sobriety since her release from jail on December
15, 2014. The court’s order was admitted into evidence at the
termination hearing. DCS Ex. 7; Tr. p. 99-100.
 At the March 16, 2016, review hearing, the court found that Mother
“continues to test positive for [T]ramadol without a prescription.” The
court’s order was admitted into evidence at the termination hearing.
DSC Ex. 10; Tr. p. 95.
 Therapist Hamby testified that DCS reported to her that Mother had
relapsed. Therapist Hamby allowed her to complete relapse prevention
in February 2016. Id. at 68-69.
 Therapist Hamby testified that she and Mother’s individual counselor
spoke with FCM Colley “due to her drug screens.” Id. at 70.
 Therapist Powers testified that “there was one relapse I was aware of
with the Tramadol,” and that “I believe I was aware of another screen
that came back another that she told me about another relapse that she
had gotten I think she tested positive for meth.” Id. at 75.
 Therapist Powers testified that Mother told her she had tested positive for
methamphetamine, and that Therapist Powers discussed her positive test
with her on May 13, 2016. Id.
 When asked what issues Mother identified for maintaining sobriety,
Therapist Powers testified that “in terms of issues for maintaining
sobriety I think a big one was just the addiction itself, just
struggling . . . .” Id. at 76. Therapist Powers testified that “I think it was
heroin that was her drug of choice.” Id.

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  FCM Colley testified that Mother told her about her drug use “on every
occasion,” and FCM Colley discussed Mother’s drug use with her. Id. at
86.
 FCM Colley testified that after Mother was released from jail, “[s]he
admitted to Tramadol use.” Id. at 88. “She admitted to taking her
mother’s Tramadol and did not want [her FCM] to tell her mother.” Id.
 During the time Mother was in substance abuse treatment, she admitted
to FCM Colley that she was using drugs. Id. at 97.
 FCM Colley testified that Mother’s use of Tramadol was concerning
because she was taking someone else’s prescription, and that even with
help in place, “she still continues to use that’s an issue as a drug addict,
she is an addict.” Id. at 100.
 FCM Colley testified that Mother admitted to FCM Colley to using
methamphetamine between March 30 and May 23, 2016. Id. at 101.
 FCM Colley testified that because of Mother’s continued drug use, DCS
changed the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and
adoption. Id.
 FCM Colley testified that on July 6, 2016, she had a discussion with
Mother about her methamphetamine use. Id. at 105.
 FCM Colley testified that Mother “informed me she’s getting some of
the drugs from [her employer’s] employees.” Id. at 113.

[16] Additionally, during the termination hearing, Mother testified as follows:

 When asked whether, in “the last couple of months,” she has “admitted
in that time that you have been struggling with methamphetamine since
the beginning of May or so,” she said “Yes ma’am.” Id. at 64-65.
 She tested positive for Tramadol in either November or December. She
was using Tramadol “[b]ecause of my teeth.” Id. at 135-36.
 Her job “had me at south plant and that’s where you don’t want to be
when it comes to drugs. I work at north plant regularly, there’s no drugs
there.” Id. at 139. “They sent me over there [to the south plant] and it
was a major trigger for me. I actually called my boss and told him you
can’t let me work here and he had me back at the north plant the next
week.” Id. at 144. She admitted to using methamphetamine when
working at her job. Id.
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[17] We agree with Mother that the trial court erred when it based some of its

findings on evidence for which it sustained Mother’s objections. However, we

find the error harmless because the specific findings of facts were used as

examples to show that Mother continued to struggle with her addiction,

including in the months leading up to the termination hearing—a struggle to

which Mother, FCM Colley, Therapist Hamby, and Therapist Powers all

testified without objection. The cumulative evidence outlined above provides a

sufficient basis for the trial court’s conclusions that Mother failed to overcome

her drug addiction or maintain her sobriety. As a result, any error in the trial

court’s findings of fact was harmless.

B. Conditions That Led to Children’s Removal
[18] To determine whether the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal will

not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4

N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). The court first identifies the conditions that led to

removal and then determines whether there is a reasonable probability that

those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts

to judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into

consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing any recent

improvements against “habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there

is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id.

[19] The children were removed as a result of the condition of Parents’ home and

substance abuse. Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusion that “while

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 Mother did have stable employment for six months at the time of the fact-

finding hearing, she still did not have independent housing so she was not able

to show that she had acquired sufficient skills to provide the children with

stable, clean, and safe living conditions.” Mother’s App. Vol. II p. 46.

[20] Mother first asserts that there was no evidence in the record to support the trial

court’s conclusion. Mother testified that “[m]e and my mother we don’t get

along very well, she’s very negative with me.” Tr. p. 139. FCM Colley testified

that Mother “does not have stability, she doesn’t even have her own place.” Id.

at 103. FCM Colley testified that in July 2016, “I found out [Mother] was

staying with some guy. She was supposed to go [to the Half Way Home on]

July first, she’s staying with some guy I cannot say living because she swears

she’s not living with him.” Id. at 104-05. FCM Colley also testified that “I

don’t believe she’s living in the same place sir, but I can’t testify to that as to

why.” Id. at 113. This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion.

[21] Mother also contends that it was inappropriate for the trial court to require a

parent to obtain “independent housing” to avoid termination of parental rights.

The trial court did not require her to obtain independent housing, but rather

considered her unstable housing situation as one factor in determining whether

she could provide stability to her children. The trial court concluded that

Mother “has not been able to demonstrate sufficient progress toward the goal of

reuniting with her children: she has not maintained her sobriety, she has not

participated in services consistently to make progress on parenting skills or

independent living.” Mother’s App. Vol. II p. 46. In Bester v. Lake County Office

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 of Family and Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 150-51 (Ind. 2005), our Supreme Court

found that, although the father did not establish himself as independent or

obtain his own residence, there was no causal connection between his living

arrangements and any adverse impact those arrangements may have had on his

child. Here, however, because the trial court was able to consider testimony

that questioned where Mother was actually living, as well as her ongoing

substance abuse, its conclusion supported a reasonable inference that her living

arrangement could pose a threat to the well-being of her children and that there

was a reasonable probability that it would not be remedied.

[22] As for Mother’s substance abuse, Mother states that she understands that she is

suffering from addiction and “wants to do whatever work is necessary to cope

with her addiction.” Mother’s Br. p. 16. She concedes that her children should

not have been in her custody at the time of the termination hearing. Mother’s

Br. p. 17. It is well established that “the trial court must consider a parent’s

habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial

probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152. The

“trial court should judge a parent’s fitness to care for his child as of the time of

the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed

conditions.” Id.

[23] We recognize that Mother loves her children and has not missed any visits with

them. We laud her for recognizing that she has a problem with addiction and

for working to overcome that addiction. However, her acknowledgement of the

problem does not negate the fact that since her release from jail, she has

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 continued a pattern of substance abuse, despite the availability of multiple

services to aid her in her struggle. She admitted that she has struggled with her

addiction to methamphetamine and used Tramadol. At least at one point, her

job “was a major trigger” for her. Tr. p. 139. Considering her habitual pattern

of substance abuse, and the fact that she was using drugs in the months leading

up to the termination hearing, the trial court did not err when finding that there

was a reasonable probability that this condition, which led to the children’s

removal, would not be remedied.

C. Best Interests of the Children
[24] Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the

Children’s best interests. Clear and convincing evidence does not need to show

that “the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child’s

very survival.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Instead, it is sufficient for the clear and convincing evidence to show

that “the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by the

respondent parent’s custody.” Id.

[25] FCM Colley testified that adoption was in the children’s best interests because

they needed to be in a “drug free, stable and structured home environment for

them where their needs are met.” Tr. p. 109. FCM Colley also testified that

“they need someone that can devote that time to them that’s not going to be a

drug addict and they don’t have to be scared that their needs aren’t going to be

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 met.” Id. The children’s court appointed special advocate also recommended

that Parents’ parental rights be terminated.

[26] Mother cites her positive relationship and consistent visits with her children, her

steady job and home, and her good faith efforts to participate in all reunification

services. Mother testified that “I’ve made my fair share of mistakes and I will

have a hard time forgiving myself for them, but I can do this I know I can. I

think I just need a little more stability and a little more positivity in my life.” Id.

at 144. Mother conceded that she struggles with addiction, promised that she

will work to cope with her addiction, and said that “she demonstrated a

willingness and an ability to improve and do what is necessary to eventually get

her children back. Mother does not contend that the children should have been

in her custody at the time of the fact-finding hearing.” Mother’s Br. p. 17.

[27] The trial court recognized Mother’s love for her children and her consistent

visits with them but also that Mother was not in a better position to provide her

children with the appropriate care, supervision or home than she was nearly

two years earlier when DCS first became involved with the family. Mother’s

testimony and argument on appeal suggests that she also recognizes that she is

not prepared to provide her children with the stability and substance-free

environment that they need. It is unclear if Mother will ever be prepared to

provide for them. Accordingly, we find that the evidence supports the trial

court’s conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests.

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 III. Termination Between Father and Children
[28] Father does not specifically challenge any of the elements that DCS is required

to prove to effectuate a termination, but rather claims generally that there was

insufficient evidence to support the termination order. We infer from his

argument that he intended to focus on two statutory elements: the children’s

best interests and DCS’s plan for the children’s care and treatment.

A. Best Interests of the Children
[29] In challenging the termination, Father relies on the fact that no evidence was

presented at the termination hearing that Father was convicted of any charge

arising from his arrest on October 6, 2014, when the children were moved from

his home. Father was initially arrested on October 6, 2014, based on a report of

guns, drugs, and paraphernalia being present in the family’s home. He was

released on November 13, 2014. Immediately following his release, FCM

Colley could not locate him for over a month until he attended the dispositional

hearing on December 17, 2014. Father participated in substance abuse

assessment, during which he “sporadically” tested positive for drugs and on at

least several occasions missed his drug screens. Tr. p. 152. Starting February

10, 2015, three months after his release, he participated in visitations with his

children. His visits stopped when he was arrested and incarcerated on April 16,

2015, based on criminal activity from July 2014; he will remain incarcerated

until 2021 if he does not receive any time cuts to his sentence.

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[30] After Father was released, he tested positive for drugs and missed some of his

drug screens. When asked whether he thinks he needs help handling his

substance abuse, he said, “Oh yeah, there’s no question about it.” Id. at 157.

He conceded that he needs classes that involve “teaching me how to stay sober,

how better to keep myself strong enough to stay sober, how to correctly love my

children and provide for them, to be the strong father and man that they need

me to be.” Id. This testimony supports the trial court’s finding that, nearly two

years later, Father is not in a better position to provide his children with

appropriate care and housing than he was when DCS first became involved

with the family.

[31] This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that

termination is in the children’s best interests. We cannot say that the trial court

erred in determining that this element required for termination was met.

B. Satisfactory Plan for the Care and Treatment of the
Children
[32] Father also seems to challenge whether there is a satisfactory plan for the care

and treatment of his children. Beginning in January 2016 and through the time

of the termination hearing, the children were living with a foster family. In

January, Ib.G. was anxious and she would throw fits; Ic.G. would get upset

with his foster family. Both children improved during their time with their

foster family and have developed routines. The foster mother testified that she

and her husband were willing to adopt the children.

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[33] Parents want their children in a relative’s home, and FCM Colley testified that,

at Father’s request, she was going to evaluate Father’s sister and another

relative to determine whether they could adopt the children. At the time of the

termination hearing, FCM Colley did not yet have contact information for

Father’s relatives. Although DCS was still exploring different options for the

children’s placement, its plan was for the children to be adopted. Adoption is a

“satisfactory plan” for the care and treatment of children under the termination

of parental rights statute. In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App.

2009). Therefore, Father’s implication that the trial court erred by not

considering whether there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of

his children fails.

[34] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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