NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAHID RANA; SABINA RANA, No. 14-15640
husband and wife,
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00581-NVW
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MARY CATHERINE SCHNEIDER; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Shahid Rana and Sabina Rana appeal pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing the Ranas’ action alleging federal and state law claims arising
from the Arizona Department of Revenue’s attempts to levy and collect state taxes.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO Local
2152 v. Principi, 464 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006), and for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d
1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, Cardenas v. Anzai, 311 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Ranas’ constitutional claims because the Tax Injunction Act
bars taxpayers from challenging the validity of a state tax in federal court where
there is an adequate remedy available in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(“[D]istrict courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy
may be had in the courts of such State.”); Comenout v. Washington, 722 F.2d 574,
575-77 (9th Cir. 1983) (the Tax Injunction Act applies to claims for injunctive,
declaratory, and monetary relief); see also A.R.S. § 42-1251, et seq. (process for
challenging state tax assessments).
Dismissal of the Ranas’ claim for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
was proper because the Ranas failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. See
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” (citation omitted)); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP,
584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing elements of claim under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2(b)).
The district court properly concluded that the Ranas’ state law claims were
barred by Arizona’s Public Entity Notice of Claim Statute because the Ranas failed
to file a notice of claim containing “a specific amount for which the claim can be
settled.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01(A); Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v.
Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 492 (Ariz. 2007) (requiring strict compliance with the
statutory requirements of § 12-821.01(A)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United
States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir.1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.
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