UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2369
CALVERT LLEWELLYN JEREMY; JOLITA MERVINA JEREMY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge.
(8:15-cv-01632-TDC; 13-29597; 14-00310)
Submitted: February 23, 2017 Decided: March 9, 2017
Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Douglas Burns, THE BURNS LAW FIRM, LLC, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellants. H. Jason Gold, Valerie P. Morrison,
NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Washinton, D.C.; Joseph
M. Lischwe, NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Calvert Llewellyn Jeremy and Jolita Mervina Jeremy (the
Appellants) filed a Chapter 13 petition in November 2013. They
filed the underlying adversary proceeding seeking a declaration
that would allow them to bifurcate the mortgage on their primary
residence into a secured claim up to the appraised value and an
unsecured claim on the remaining balance (i.e., a “cram-down”).
The Appellants argued that, because their deed of trust provides
for supplemental collateral in the form of escrow funds,
insurance proceeds, and rent, these interests are not “real
property” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012).
The bankruptcy court disagreed and granted JP Morgan Chase
Bank’s motion to dismiss. The district court certified the
appeal to this court.
In light of our decision in Birmingham v. PNC Bank, N.A.,
846 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2017), we affirm the bankruptcy court’s
order dismissing the complaint. In Birmingham, we held that the
“reference in the Deed of Trust to escrow funds, insurance
proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds . . . constitute[s]
incidental property,” and not additional collateral, within the
meaning of § 1322(b)(2). Based on our reasoning in Birmingham,
we affirm the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing the
Appellants’ complaint. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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