In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 16-‐‑3236 & 16-‐‑3713
RANDY JOSEPH NETZER,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION and MATTHEW F. ANICH,
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 16-‐‑cv-‐‑175-‐‑wmc — William M. Conley, Chief Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED MARCH 8, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2017
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Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Randy Netzer, a debtor in
bankruptcy, asked the court to discharge a debt to Wiscon-‐‑
sin’s Office of Lawyer Regulation. Bankruptcy Judge Furay
concluded in this adversary proceeding that the approxi-‐‑
mately $9,200 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin imposed as
costs in a disciplinary proceeding against a member of the
state’s bar is a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” under 11 U.S.C.
2 Nos. 16-‐‑3236 & 16-‐‑3713
§523(a)(7) and therefore is not dischargeable. 545 B.R. 254
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2016).
The bankruptcy court entered its decision on February 3,
2016, and Netzer had 14 days to appeal. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
8002(a)(1). He took 41, filing a notice on March 15. He asked
the district judge to excuse his tardiness, contending that un-‐‑
til a few days earlier he had not known of the bankruptcy
court’s decision. But the district court dismissed the appeal
as untimely. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84260 (W.D. Wis. June 29,
2016), reconsideration denied, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129476
(Sept. 22, 2016). The judge stated that he lacks authority to
extend the time on equitable grounds, because the 14-‐‑day
period is jurisdictional.
In re Sobczak-‐‑Slomczewski, 826 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2016),
holds that the 14-‐‑day period in Rule 8002(a)(1) is jurisdic-‐‑
tional, and Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2007),
holds that there cannot be equitable exceptions to jurisdic-‐‑
tional rules. The grant of review in Hamer v. Neighborhood
Housing Services of Chicago, 835 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, No. 16–658 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2017), which poses the
question whether Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C) sets a jurisdic-‐‑
tional time limit, suggests that the Supreme Court may soon
decide how far rules about the times for appeal, as opposed
to statutory limits, can affect a court’s jurisdiction. See also
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (time limit in Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 4004 is not jurisdictional); Eberhart v. United States,
546 U.S. 12 (2005) (time limit in Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a) is not
jurisdictional); United States v. Neff, 598 F.3d 320 (7th Cir.
2010) (time limit in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) is not jurisdictional).
We need not hold these appeals for Hamer, however, or
revisit the issue resolved in Sobczak-‐‑Slomczewski. For whether
Nos. 16-‐‑3236 & 16-‐‑3713 3
or not a given rule is “jurisdictional” it is still a rule, and
when invoked it must be enforced. Appellees have claimed
the benefit of the 14-‐‑day limit for bankruptcy appeals. Bank-‐‑
ruptcy Rule 9022(a), which requires bankruptcy courts to no-‐‑
tify litigants of judicial orders, also provides: “Lack of notice
of the entry does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or
authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal
within the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 8002.”
This takes us to Rule 8002(d), which specifies the conditions
under which a bankruptcy judge may extend the time for
appeal. Rule 8002(d)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to allow
a belated appeal if application is made within 35 days after
the order’s entry. Netzer missed that deadline—and, even if
he had asked in time, still the power to decide would have
belonged to the bankruptcy judge, not to the district judge or
the court of appeals.
Courts lack an “equitable” power to contradict the bank-‐‑
ruptcy statutes and rules. Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014);
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004). Rule
9022(a) says that lack of notice authorizes additional time
only to the extent allowed by Rule 8002, and Rule 8002(d)(1)
sets a limit of 35 days from the decision for such a request to
be made. Those rules promote expeditious resolution of
bankruptcy appeals. Litigants have only to check the court’s
electronic docket once a month in order to protect their in-‐‑
terests; this step will ensure that, even if notice miscarries, a
request for additional time can be made within the 35 days
allowed by Rule 8002(d)(1).
AFFIRMED