NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LILIYA WALSH, No. 15-16072
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02077-MCE-
KJN
and
PETER WALSH, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Walsh’s
request for oral argument, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.
Lililya Walsh appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from her seventy-two-hour mental health hold
under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Walsh’s § 1983 claims because, even
assuming state action, Walsh failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
procedural due process claim. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are to
be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state
a plausible claim for relief); Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981)
(upholding a district court’s finding that a seventy-two-hour detention under Cal.
Welf. & Inst. Code section 5150 is justified as an emergency measure, provided a
probable cause hearing is held shortly thereafter).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice
Walsh’s claims against defendant Paxton because Walsh failed to serve the
summons and complaint on Paxton in a timely manner. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
(90-day time limit to effect timely service absent a showing of good cause); see
also In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 511-12 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review and
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requirements for good cause).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Walsh’s state law claims because it had dismissed
all of Walsh’s federal claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001
(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” (citation omitted)); see
also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir.
2010) (standard of review).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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