United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 29, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-41471
Summary Calendar
GUADALUPE DELEON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:01-CV-187
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Before REAVLEY, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Guadalupe DeLeon appeals from the district court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of
DeLeon’s application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. This court’s review of the
Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner used proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence
and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
See Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-41471
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DeLeon first alleges that the administrative law judge (ALJ)
failed to give proper consideration to the opinions of her
treating and examining physicians. In his decision, the ALJ
conducted a detailed analysis of the record and set forth
substantial evidence that, inter alia, the opinions offered by
DeLeon’s treating and examining physicians were contrary to
substantial evidence. Among the conflicts noted by the ALJ was
the fact that DeLeon’s subjective complaints to her treating and
examining physicians often were inconsistent with the objective
medical findings and the observations made by the physicians.
Because they were inconsistent internally and with other
substantial evidence in the record, the opinions of DeLeon’s
treating and examining physicians were not entitled to any
specific weight in the ALJ’s decision. See Greenspan v. Shalala,
38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994).
DeLeon next contends that the ALJ failed, in assessing her
residual functional capacity (RFC), to comply with controlling
law and regulations. In making his RFC assessment, the ALJ
discussed DeLeon’s functional limitations and work-related
abilities on a function-by-function basis. Moreover, in his
decision, the ALJ considered and evaluated, inter alia, the state
examiner’s RFC assessment, the medical evidence, and DeLeon’s
hearing testimony. In so doing, the ALJ correctly applied the
relevant legal standards when determining DeLeon’s RFC.
No. 04-41471
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Finally, DeLeon asserts that the ALJ failed to (a) discover
conflicts between the testimony of the vocational expert (VE) and
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT); and (b) address such
conflicts. Specifically, DeLeon contends there are unresolved
conflicts between the VE’s and the DOT’s classifications of three
jobs which the VE testified that DeLeon could perform: hand
packager, security guard, and small products assembler II. Even
if the ALJ erred by failing to discover and address such
conflicts, DeLeon is not entitled to relief unless she can
establish that she has been prejudiced by the alleged error. See
Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
the judgment should not be vacated unless the substantial rights
of a party are affected).
The VE concluded that DeLeon had the RFC to work as an
agricultural produce sorter, a light exertional and unskilled
position, or as a stuffer, a sedentary and unskilled position.
See DOT 529.687-186, 731.685-014. On appeal, DeLeon has not
argued that there is a conflict between the VE’s testimony and
the DOT with respect to these two positions. Therefore, there
was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding
that DeLeon had the RFC to perform, at least, two jobs identified
by the VE, and DeLeon was not prejudiced by any purported error
related to other jobs identified by the VE.
Having carefully reviewed the record of this case and the
parties’ respective briefing, and for the reasons set forth
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above, we conclude that the ALJ used the proper legal standards
to evaluate the evidence and that substantial evidence existed to
support the ALJ’s decision. Therefore, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.