[J-119A-2016 and J-119B-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.B.M., A MINOR : No. 84 MAP 2016
:
: Appeal from the Order of the Superior
APPEAL OF: J.P., MOTHER : Court at 1834 MDA 2015 dated May 31,
: 2016 Affirming the Order of the Court of
: Common Pleas of Franklin County,
: Orphans’ Court Division, at 42-ADOPT-
: 2014 dated September 25, 2015.
:
: ARGUED: December 6, 2016
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.D.M., A MINOR : No. 85 MAP 2016
:
: Appeal from the Order of the Superior
APPEAL OF: J.P., MOTHER : Court at 1835 MDA 2015 dated May 31,
: 2016 Affirming the order of the Court of
: Common Pleas of Franklin County,
: Orphans’ Court Division, at 41-ADOPT-
: 2014 dated September 25, 2015.
:
: ARGUED: December 6, 2016
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: March 28, 2017
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a),
appointment of counsel is mandatory for children involved in contested involuntary
termination of parental rights proceedings. However, because I believe an attorney
guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed to represent a child in these proceedings satisfies
Section 2313(a)’s mandate, I dissent.
As the majority states, this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation and
is governed by the relevant legal standards set forth in the majority’s opinion. Majority
Op., at 10-11. Further, it is undisputed that the mandatory language of the first
sentence of Section 2313(a) requires appointment of counsel in contested involuntary
termination proceedings.
§ 2313. Representation
(a) Child.--The court shall appoint counsel to represent
the child in an involuntary termination proceeding when
the proceeding is being contested by one or both of the
parents. The court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad
litem to represent any child who has not reached the age of
18 years and is subject to any other proceeding under this
part whenever it is in the best interests of the child. No
attorney or law firm shall represent both the child and the
adopting parent or parents.
23 Pa. C.S. § 2313(a) (emphasis added).
In my view, the first and second sentences of Section 2313(a) address two
entirely different situations. As the text of the statute states, the second sentence of
Section 2313(a) provides that the court may appoint counsel or a GAL in “any other
proceeding” under “this part,” this part meaning, the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-
2938. The Adoption Act encompasses voluntary relinquishment proceedings,
involuntary termination proceedings - contested and uncontested, as well as adoption
proceedings. Thus, Section 2313(a) governs representation under all Adoption Act
proceedings, and the second sentence of Section 2313(a) has no effect on the meaning
of the first sentence, stating counsel shall be appointed to represent a child in a
contested involuntary termination proceeding.
The majority notes that the “trial court chose simply to skip over the first sentence
of Section 2313(a) (which mandates counsel in contested [termination of parental rights]
cases) in favor of that provision’s second sentence which ‘gives this Court the discretion
to appoint counsel or a GAL to represent any child who has not reached 18 years and is
subject to any other proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of the
[J-119A-2016 and J-119B-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2
child.’” Majority Op., at 6, quoting Trial Court Order, 9/9/15. Conflating the two
sentences, the trial court relied on the second sentence of Section 2313(a) in support of
its appointment of the GAL attorney. Nevertheless, as the trial court noted in denying
Mother’s motion for appointment of new counsel, the children had an established
relationship with the GAL attorney, and her continued representation would best suit the
needs of the children. Id. In light of the statutory interpretation discussion above, I fail
to see how this contested involuntary termination proceeding is “any other proceeding,”
or how the GAL attorney appointed to represent the children is not “mandated counsel”
in accordance with the first sentence. Thus, the trial court’s continued appointment of
the GAL attorney from the dependency case satisfied Section 2313(a)’s mandate.
I believe that the majority is mistakenly reading the first and second sentences in
conjunction with each other, which has the effect of changing the meaning of the first
sentence. The General Assembly chose in the second sentence to say “counsel or a
[GAL],” noting in the comment that the GAL need not be an attorney. Thus, in all “other
proceedings” under the Adoption Act, the General Assembly contemplated the
possibility that a child might not be represented by counsel at all. Contrary to the
majority’s suggestion, the inclusion of an option to solely appoint a non-attorney GAL in
other proceedings does not necessarily render the appointment of a GAL attorney a
violation of the Section 2313(a)’s appointment of counsel clause. Our review in this
case is limited to whether appointment of a GAL attorney satisfies Section 2313(a)’s
mandate that counsel be appointed in contested involuntary termination of parental
rights proceedings. I conclude it does.
I also am troubled by the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he plain language of
Section 2313(a) requires the trial court to appoint a separate, independent attorney to
represent a child’s legal interests in a [termination of parental rights] case.” Majority
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Op. at 1 (emphasis added). The majority adopts the position that Section 2313(a)
specified that appointed counsel would solely be representing the child’s legal interests,
and not best interests, without citation to where the term “legal” was added to Section
2313(a). I do not disagree with the majority’s citation to Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile
Court regarding the role of a GAL attorney in dependency hearings, or the distinct legal
and best interests which they must represent. See Majority Op. at 2, citing Pa.R.J.C.P.
1154. However, even in the dependency context, Rule 1154 specifically anticipates the
potential for a conflict between a child’s wishes - the child’s legal interest, and a child’s
best interests, and that in such a case separate legal counsel in addition to the GAL
attorney may be appointed. Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154 cmt.1 This does not necessitate that a
GAL attorney can only advocate a child’s best interest, or that the General Assembly
intended to preclude a GAL attorney from representing a child under Section 2313. Nor
does it mandate two attorneys must be appointed in the absence of a conflict of interest
on the part of the GAL attorney. The statute as drafted solely provides that “the court
shall appoint counsel.” 23 Pa.C.S. 2313(a). The appointment of a GAL attorney
certainly satisfies this requirement.
Further, as the majority concedes, Section 2313(a) is the only requirement the
General Assembly imposed, and “no other statutory provision speaks to the
appointment of counsel or a GAL in an involuntary termination of parental rights
proceeding.” Majority Op. at 3. The majority correctly notes that in custody cases when
counsel is appointed, counsel “shall represent the child’s legal interests and zealously
represent the child as any other client in an attorney-client relationship[, and] . . . shall
not perform the role of guardian ad litem or best interests attorney.” Pa.R.C.P.
1
The comment to Rule 1154 notes “[i]f there is not a conflict of interest, the guardian ad
litem represents the legal and best interests of the child[.]” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154 cmt.
[J-119A-2016 and J-119B-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 4
1915.11(a). And that on the contrary, in dependency cases, a GAL attorney “shall be
charged with representation of the legal interests and the best interests of the child at
every stage of the proceedings.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311(b). The first sentence of Section
2313(a) does not differentiate between representing the child’s best interests or legal
interests in mandating the appointment of counsel in contested termination of parental
rights cases.2 It is not the duty or role of this Court to inject such differentiation into
Section 2313(a) that is not derived from the statutory language.
In support of its position that a Section 2313(a) attorney should only represent
the child’s legal interests, the majority quotes In re Adoption of Hess, 562 A.2d 1375
(Pa. Super. 1989) for the proposition that “[t]he purpose of 2313(a) is to ensure that the
needs and welfare of a child will be actively advanced by an advocate who owes loyalty
only to the child.” Majority Op. at 11, n. 11, quoting id. at 1381 (emphasis in original).
The next sentence of Hess, however, makes clear that although the court’s intent was
to appoint counsel that owed a loyalty to the child, it did not intend to limit counsel to
advocate solely for the child’s legal interests. Indeed, the court was very much
concerned with the child’s best interests and stated,
Where, as in the present case, there are competing
allegations of the best interests of the child, and where the
court, without conducting a hearing by which it could receive
evidence so that it could make a fully informed determination
of the BEST interests of the child, summarily dispenses with
one of the competing allegations of the child's best interests,
and where no counsel has been appointed to represent
exclusively the child's interests, we cannot conclude that the
BEST interests of the child have necessarily been advocated
and determined.
Hess, 562 at 1381(emphasis in original).
2
I maintain the second sentence does not pertain to contested involuntary termination
of parental rights proceedings.
[J-119A-2016 and J-119B-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5
The majority also disapproves of the Superior Court’s reliance on In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012), overruling the pertinent holding in that case. Therein, the
Superior Court concluded the language of Section 2313(a) was not clear and
unambiguous as applied to circumstances where the GAL was an appointed attorney.
Majority Op., at 8. Like the majority in this case, the K.M. court also focused on the
meaning of the second sentence of the statute in relation to the first sentence, but
nevertheless concluded that the statute did not preclude a GAL attorney from serving as
legal counsel for the children. Upon reflection, I believe K.M.’s focus on the second
sentence was unnecessary. Ultimately, however, the outcome of K.M. was correct as
the appointment of a second attorney when the child was represented by a GAL
attorney would be superfluous.
Based on my conclusions regarding the statutory interpretation of Section 2313,
it is unnecessary to further elaborate on the ability of a GAL attorney to represent a child
in a contested termination of parental rights matter. Nevertheless, there are two points I
wish to make. First, as noted, the appointment of additional counsel following the
appointment of a GAL attorney is superfluous. In this matter the GAL attorney
represented the children’s interests throughout dependency proceedings. Under the
majority’s interpretation, in addition to the GAL attorney, it would have been necessary
to appoint an attorney for the first termination hearing when CYS petitioned to
involuntarily terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father.3 At that hearing,
Father’s rights were involuntarily terminated, but Mother’s rights were not. Once the
petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s rights was denied, the Section 2313(a)
appointed legal counsel would no longer be involved in the matter, and the GAL
3
As noted by the majority, at this hearing the GAL attorney represented the children
and neither party objected.
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attorney would resume her sole advocacy on behalf of the children during the
permanency proceedings. At the commencement of the second termination hearing, it
would again be necessary to appoint Section 2313 legal counsel, possibly the same
attorney that represented the children at the first termination hearing, perhaps a new
attorney. This legal counsel would represent the children alongside the GAL attorney
throughout the termination hearing. It is my view such dual representation is both
unnecessary and taxing to the system, and undermines continuity of representation for
the children.
Second, the only concern articulated by the majority regarding the appointment
of a GAL attorney appears to be a conflict of interest between advocating the child’s
best interests and legal interests simultaneously. Majority Op. at 10. As previously
noted, the GAL attorney must do this in the dependency actions, and Rule 1154
provides a procedure for appointing separate legal counsel from the GAL attorney if a
conflict of interest between the child’s wishes and best interests arise. I see no basis for
concluding that a GAL attorney would be incapable of being held to the same standard
in contested involuntary termination of parental rights cases. Further, in cases involving
young children or children with limited capacity, the child may be unable to express a
separate legal interest to an independent attorney appointed in addition to the GAL
attorney, but would nevertheless be required to have one appointed under the majority’s
interpretation. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the GAL attorney
cannot represent the child in a contested termination hearing.
In conclusion, by writing separately I am in no way discounting the importance of
the child’s interests or diminishing the mandate of Section 2313(a)’s requirement of
appointment of counsel. A contested involuntary termination hearing is a proceeding
with the highest level of finality, and no child should proceed into one absent
[J-119A-2016 and J-119B-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 7
representation by an attorney. I write separately because I believe appointment of a
GAL attorney satisfies the mandates of Section 2313(a) and ensures the needs and
welfare of the child will be adequately advanced. In my opinion, a remand for the
appointment of a second attorney in this matter, when a GAL attorney already
represented the children in accordance with Section 2313(a), is unnecessary.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Justice Baer joins this dissenting opinion.
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