Gloria Swanson v. Baker & McKenzie

NONPRECEDENTIAL  DISPOSITION   To  be  cited  only  in  accordance  with  Fed.  R.  App.  P.  32.1       United States Court of Appeals   For  the  Seventh  Circuit   Chicago,  Illinois  60604   Submitted  March  30,  2017*   Decided  April  3,  2017       Before     DIANE  P.  WOOD,  Chief  Judge     FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge     DAVID  F.  HAMILTON,  Circuit  Judge       No.  17-­‐‑1069   Appeal  from  the  United   States  District  Court  for   GLORIA  E.  SWANSON,   the  Northern  District  of     Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellant,   Illinois,  Eastern  Division.       v.   No.  16  C  7890   BAKER  &  MCKENZIE,  LLP,  and  CHANEL  JOHNSON-­‐‑ Virginia  M.  Kendall,   BELL,   Judge.     Defendants-­‐‑Appellees.         Order       In  2013  this  court  held  that  an  ex-­‐‑employer’s  temporary  inability  to  confirm   the  employment  of  someone  who  worked  there  more  than  a  decade  ago  could   *  This  successive  appeal  has  been  submitted  to  the  original  panel  under  Operating  Procedure  6(b).   We  have  unanimously  agreed  to  decide  the  case  without  argument  because  the  briefs  and  record   adequately  present  the  facts  and  legal  arguments,  and  argument  would  not  significantly  aid  the   court.  See  Fed.  R.  App.  P.  34(a)(2)(C).   No.  17-­‐‑1069     Page  2       not  reasonably  be  understood  as  defamatory,  discriminatory,  or  retaliatory.   Swanson  v.  Baker  &  McKenzie,  LLP,  No.  13-­‐‑1740  (7th  Cir.  Aug.  21,  2013)   (nonprecedential  disposition).       Early  in  2016  Swanson  again  had  third  parties  ask  Baker  &  McKenzie  to   verify  her  employment,  and  history  repeated  itself.  The  law  firm’s  representative   again  could  not  immediately  tell  the  inquirer  whether  Swanson  had  worked  for   it  between  1990  and  1995,  but  after  more  searching  was  able  to  verify  that   employment  and  confirm  it,  sending  Swanson  a  letter  that  she  can  use  in  future   searches  for  employment.  Dissatisfied,  Swanson  again  sued,  accusing  the  law   firm  of  defamation,  discrimination,  and  retaliation.  The  district  court  granted   summary  judgment  against  her—largely  on  the  basis  of  our  2013  decision,  but   for  other  reasons  as  well,  including  the  fact  that  Swanson  had  not  filed  a  new   charge  of  discrimination  with  the  appropriate  state  or  federal  agencies.  2016  U.S.   Dist.  LEXIS  172979  (N.D.  Ill.  Dec.  14,  2016).       Swanson’s  appellate  brief  contends,  as  she  had  in  2013,  that  a  temporary   failure  to  confirm  an  ex-­‐‑employee’s  years  of  service  must  be  understood  as   defamatory,  discriminatory,  and  retaliatory.  That  contention  amounts  to   disagreement  with  our  2013  decision  and  is  blocked  by  principles  of  issue   preclusion.  We  affirm  the  district  court’s  judgment  for  that  reason  and  the  others   given  by  the  district  judge’s  careful  opinion.       Swanson  has  become  a  frequent  litigant,  and  the  district  judge  observed  that   many  of  her  contentions  are  weak  if  not  frivolous.  The  judge  warned  Swanson   that  continuation  of  this  campaign  of  litigation  will  lead  to  sanctions.  Instead  of   taking  that  warning  to  heart,  Swanson’s  appellate  brief  accuses  the  district  judge   of  defamation.  Blaming  the  judge  is  not  a  satisfactory  response;  the  judge’s   warning  was  designed  to  help  Swanson  avoid  sanctions.  She  must  understand   that  further  litigation  of  this  kind  will  be  penalized  by  the  district  court  under   Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  11  and  by  this  court  under  Fed.  R.  App.  P.  38.     AFFIRMED