IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0374
Filed April 5, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CORVELLE BEEKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D. J. Stovall (jury trial)
and Peter A. Keller (sentencing), Judges.
A defendant appeals his conviction asserting counsel provided ineffective
assistance. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vogel, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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VOGEL, Judge.
Corvelle Beeks was charged with possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) as an habitual offender and
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), second offense. Following a
jury trial, he was convicted on count one of the lesser-included offense of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and convicted on
count two of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), second offense,
both in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2014). He appeals claiming
his attorney provided ineffective assistance in allowing the jury to be instructed
on lesser-included offenses on count one.
To prove counsel was ineffective, Beeks must show counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and he was prejudiced as a result. See State v.
Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2016). Our review of the claim is de novo,
but when such claim is made on direct appeal, we must determine whether the
record is adequate to address the claim. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 704
(Iowa 2016).
Beeks claims counsel was ineffective in not pursuing an all-or-nothing
defense because he admitted on the witness stand at trial to having the
methamphetamine in his possession; he simply denied he intended to distribute
it. He claims because he admitted to the elements of the lesser-included offense
at trial, it was a prejudicial error for counsel to allow the jury to be instructed on
the lesser-included offense.
Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(3), it is the court’s duty to
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses that the accused could be found
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guilty of under the indictment and evidence presented at trial. A defendant can
waive the submission of lesser-included offenses. State v. Wallace, 475 N.W.2d
197, 199, 201 (Iowa 1991) (noting a defendant does not have to prove the waiver
of lesser-included instructions is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; “[c]ounsel’s
professional statement to the trial court that the defendant waives such
instructions is enough”). However, “[t]he State also may have a legitimate
interest in having a lesser-included offense, which satisfies the statutory
elements test, submitted to the jury. . . . The State should not be forced to
accept that result because of a unilateral election by the defendant.” State v.
Greer, 439 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1989). Thus, the State must consent to a
defendant’s waiver of jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. Wallace, 475
N.W.2d at 199.
As the State points out in this case, we do not know whether counsel
discussed the all-or-nothing defense with Beeks, and if so, what advice was
given. We also do not know whether the State would have opposed the
defense’s request to waive lesser-included charges, if such a request had been
made. Because we conclude the record on appeal is not adequate for us to
address this claim, we preserve it for postconviction-relief proceedings. See
State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Iowa 2008) (“Even a lawyer is entitled to
his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is impugned.”
(citation omitted)).
We affirm Beeks’s convictions and sentence.
AFFIRMED.