NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 11 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLAVIO RODRIGUEZ, No. 15-56487
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
8:13-cv-00681-AG-PLA
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S MEMORANDUM *
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,*** District Judge.
Flavio Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
Department (“LASD”) and several individuals. As the parties are familiar with the
facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the LASD
because Rodriguez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
any “Friends of the Sheriff” program was the “moving force” behind the alleged
violation of his due process rights. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900
(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 action against a local
government entity under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
2. The district court also properly granted summary judgment to defendant
Sheriff Leroy D. Baca because Rodriguez failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Baca was either personally involved in or sufficiently
causally connected to the alleged due process violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652
F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth requirements for supervisor
liability).
3. In addition, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
defendants Larry Waldie and James Corbin based on qualified immunity because
Rodriguez failed to show that it was “clearly established” that the circumstances
here violated his due process rights. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552
(2017) (per curiam) (reiterating that for qualified immunity the “clearly established
law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case” (citation omitted)); Clairmont
2
v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The plaintiff bears
the burden to show that the contours of the right were clearly established.”).
4. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
defendant Stanley Toy because Rodriguez failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Toy’s disposition of the disbursed funds was
inconsistent with Rodriguez’s property rights. See Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont
Gen. Corp., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 638 (Ct. App. 2007) (setting forth elements of
conversion claim).
5. We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion by
deeming Rodriguez’s late opposition as consent to granting summary judgment, or
by relying on Rodriguez’s admissions due to his failure to timely respond to
requests for admission.
AFFIRMED.
3