NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL ANTHONY HOLLEY, No. 16-16012
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01077-VC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
E. EVANS, Captain; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince G. Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Joel Anthony Holley appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his safety and due process violations. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson
v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Holley’s
deliberate indifference claim because Holley failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
Holley’s safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (the prison
official must both be aware there are facts to support a serious threat to an inmate’s
safety and infer there is an actual threat).
To the extent that success on Holley’s due process claims stemming from his
disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary
proceeding, Holley’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), because Holley failed to allege facts demonstrating that his disciplinary
sentence has been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48
(1997) (extending Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings where good time credits
have been forfeited). To the extent that success on Holley’s due process claims
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, the
district court properly granted summary judgment because Holley failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of a cognizable
liberty interest. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (due
process procedural protections “adhere only when the disciplinary action
2 16-16012
implicates a protected liberty interest”); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance
procedure.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Holley’s request to
continue summary judgment for further discovery or his motion to compel
additional discovery because Holley failed to show how additional discovery was
necessary to preclude summary judgment. See Blough v. Holland Realty, Inc., 574
F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (denial of continuance to conduct further
discovery is appropriate when the district court considers the merits of the motion
and concludes there is no point in pursuing the requested discovery); Tatum v. City
& County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2006) (requirements
for obtaining additional discovery under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)).
AFFIRMED.
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