NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN MICHAEL PLOOF, No. 16-15239
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00946-DGC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of the
Arizona Department of Corrections; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Jonathan Michael Ploof appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-
Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
Summary judgment on Ploof’s deliberate indifference claim was proper
because Ploof failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether delays
in receiving treatment and medication caused further injury to his heart condition
and could be attributed to defendants’ alleged failure to implement policies to
ensure the timely provision of health care services. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296
F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (a prisoner alleging that the delay of medical
treatment evinces deliberate indifference to a serious medical need must show that
the delay led to further injury); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“Supervisory liability exists . . . if supervisory officials implement a policy so
deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the
moving force of the constitutional violation.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
To the extent that Ploof alleged that the failure to provide him with a cardiac
diet evinces deliberate indifference to his heart condition, the district court
properly granted summary judgment because Ploof failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Ploof’s diet was inadequate or the result of any
policy or practice implemented by defendants. See Mendiola–Martinez v. Arpaio,
836 F.3d 1239, 1259 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eighth Amendment requires only that
2 16-15239
prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ploof’s motion to
continue summary judgment and request for additional time to conduct discovery
because Ploof did not “show[] by affidavit or declaration” that he was unable to
“present facts essential to justify” his opposition to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see also Tatum v. City & County of San
Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that the party seeking a continuance must identify the “specific
facts that further discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts would
preclude summary judgment”).
We reject as without merit Ploof’s contention that the district court erred in
declining to consider Ploof’s incorporation by reference of entire documents in his
opposition to summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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