Martha Jo Peters v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARTHA JO PETERS, No. 14-55375 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:13-cv-01735-JGB-DTB v. MEMORANDUM* WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 11, 2017** Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Martha Jo Peters appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Peters’ action because Peters failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder Ninth Circuit precedent, incidental third-party beneficiaries may not enforce consent decrees . . . .”); see also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). All pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 18 and 21) are denied. AFFIRMED. 2 14-55375