In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐3277
HERNEL SILAIS,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A200‐567‐560
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 11, 2017 — DECIDED APRIL 28, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Hernel Silais, a Haitian citizen and
opposition political party member, petitioned the United
States for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration
Judge, and later the Board of Immigration Appeals (collec‐
tively, the “Agency”), denied his petition. We do the same.
2 No. 15‐3277
I. Background
On February 5, 2011, Silais arrived in the United States
without an immigrant visa or other valid entry document.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Si‐
lais with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i). In
response, Silais conceded his inadmissibility, based on his
lack of valid documents, but requested asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under CAT.
A. Removal Hearing
On April 30, 2013, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) conducted
Silais’s removal hearing. Silais testified and submitted docu‐
mentary evidence. The IJ then continued the removal hearing
to May 15, when Silais’s country‐conditions expert, Brian
Concannon, was available to testify. Concannon is a human‐
rights attorney and the director of the Institute for Justice and
Democracy in Haiti, a non‐profit organization based in Bos‐
ton.
1. Silais’s Testimony
Silais testified to the following alleged facts: He was born
in Aux Cayes, Haiti. In 2003, he joined a Haitian political party
known as the Òganizasyon Pèp Kap Lité (the “OPL”). At that
time, the OPL was one of the two largest opposition political
parties in Haiti. A group known as the Chimères, who sup‐
ported then‐President Jean‐Bertrand Aristide, often disturbed
OPL meetings that Silais had organized, beating participants,
firing guns, or throwing rocks. Although the Chimères was not
a government entity, it allegedly received benefits from vari‐
ous officials and included police officers in their ranks. Silais
No. 15‐3277 3
identified two particular Chimères members he claimed he re‐
peatedly encountered between 2002 and 2010: Ronald Felix
and Charles Bertrand.
During a soccer game in 2002 where Silais was distributing
political information, for example, both Felix and Bertrand al‐
legedly threw rocks at the spectators and asked Silais about
the papers he was distributing. They did not injure Silais at
this incident.
At a later event, however, Felix purportedly attacked Silais
in his neighborhood, pushing Silais down, placing a revolver
in his mouth, and threatening to kill him. When other people
approached them, Felix released Silais, who ran away. Felix
allegedly threw rocks at Silais as he escaped.
Silais further testified that on February 22, 2004, Felix and
Bertrand went to a political meeting Silais was attending and
began asking him about his political affiliation. Silais in‐
formed them that he only wanted to educate people, and the
Chimères did not harm him. During a Mardi Gras celebration
soon afterward, though, both Felix and Bertrand allegedly at‐
tacked Silais in his neighborhood. Consequently, he fled and
hid at his friend James Lete’s house. Silais then testified that
when the Chimères found Silais, they hit him with their hands
and a pistol and struck his leg with a machete. After Silais be‐
gan to bleed, Felix and Bertrand stopped, and Silais escaped
to another friend’s house. The Chimères then went to Silais’s
family’s house and allegedly beat certain family members.1
1 In his initial written statement, Silais had stated that he was at a “po‐
litical meeting” when Felix and Bertrand attacked him, forcing him to run
to Lete’s home. His second written statement, however, reflected that he
had encountered the Chimères “in the street.” During the hearing, Silais
4 No. 15‐3277
Silais then stated that, in September 2004, the Chimères at‐
tacked him while he was speaking at a political meeting and
forced him to run away.
According to Silais, he left Haiti in November 2004 for the
Dominican Republic, where he remained until January 2006,2
when he heard that Haiti’s condition had improved. Silais tes‐
tified that he wanted to complete his studies in Haiti on “vet‐
erinary and agricultural techniques” that required two years
of classroom work and one year of practice. He graduated
from the program in January 2007.
Afterward, he worked with an organization that he had
cofounded to assist Haiti’s orphaned children.3 Silais’s organ‐
ization hosted an event for World AIDS Day on December 1,
2009, and Felix, Bertrand, and other Chimères attended. They
allegedly questioned Silais about what he was doing there,
beat him, and forced him to leave the event.
Silais finally testified that during Haiti’s 2010 presidential
election, Silais was a representative for the Repons Peyizan po‐
litical party, supporting then‐candidate Michel Martelly.
While working as a “poll watcher,” Silais witnessed Felix and
Bertrand attempt to commit voter fraud by stuffing ballots for
Jude Celestin, their preferred candidate. When Silais tried to
expressed that his first statement was incorrect. In yet another account,
Lete noted that Silais was at his “family’s home” before fleeing from the
Chimères to Lete’s home. Silais also could not recall during the hearing
whether he had hidden at Lete’s house for hours or days.
2 Silais’s written statement asserts that he had returned to Haiti in No‐
vember 2006.
3 Silais could not remember the last name of one of the other three
cofounders.
No. 15‐3277 5
stop them, Felix purportedly hit and kicked him. As Silais
tried to flee, Felix and Bertrand threw rocks at him. The police
arrived and detained Felix, but released him after Silais de‐
parted without filing a report. Silais testified that he currently
experiences lingering pain from this incident.
Silais never contacted the Haitian police to report any of
the above alleged encounters with the Chimères. After the elec‐
tion, Silais left Haiti by boat to Guatemala.4 Eventually, in
2011, Silais sought refuge in the United States.
2. Documentary Evidence
In addition to his testimony, Silais presented written state‐
ments and over twenty pieces of documentary evidence, in‐
cluding, in part, (1) documents concerning his identity, polit‐
ical party membership, employment, and education;
(2) James Lete’s declaration; (3) Dr. Nora Rowley’s affidavit
opining that Silais’s scars were consistent with his alleged
abuse; (4) Brian Concannon’s affidavit; (5) a letter of support
from Lawrence Hock, a church acquaintance; and (6) media
reports and articles concerning Haiti’s condition.
Silais also unsuccessfully attempted to enter other docu‐
mentary evidence. During the break between April 30 and
May 15, the government had submitted an unsolicited, writ‐
ten closing argument, highlighting that Silais’s testimony was
vague, inconsistent, and uncorroborated. On May 13, two
days before the hearing was scheduled to continue, Silais sub‐
mitted a response to the government’s closing and moved to
4 In his written statements, Silais claimed that there were about ten
other individuals on the boat; however, during the hearing, he claimed
that he had never reported that number because he had not counted the
boat’s passengers.
6 No. 15‐3277
submit additional evidence “since DHS ha[d] called Mr. Silais’
credibility into question.” The additional evidence included:
(1) Silais’s own amended affidavit; (2) a declaration from Si‐
lais’s brother‐in‐law addressing the chain of custody of the ev‐
idence he had collected in Haiti; (3) an affidavit from Silais’s
former attorney and interpreter discussing interpretation is‐
sues that arose in drafting Silais’s original statement; and (4) a
media account of a recent armed robbery of an OPL member
in Haiti. The IJ denied Silais’s motion to submit the additional
evidence, because DHS had only recently received the mate‐
rials and Silais had failed to make the subjects of the evidence
available for cross‐examination.
3. Brian Concannon’s Testimony
On May 15, Silais presented his country‐conditions expert,
Brian Concannon. Concannon stated that Haiti had experi‐
enced escalating conflict between 2000 and 2004. Some
groups, including a few associated with the government, had
engaged in suppression of anti‐government political activity
through intimidation, rock throwing, and gun violence.
Meanwhile, the Haitian police had struggled with issues of
discipline, corruption, and inexperience, rendering the Hai‐
tian justice system ineffective in prosecuting political killings.
Over time, however, the relationship between Concannon’s
organization and Haitian justice officials improved, and the
violence declined from previous levels. Later, however, dur‐
ing Haiti’s 2010 presidential elections, the country suffered
from incidents of voter fraud, including ballot stuffing. Mov‐
ing forward, Concannon noted, Haiti remained vulnerable to
political violence, particularly during presidential elections.
No. 15‐3277 7
B. The Immigration Judge’s Decision
On January 21, 2014, the IJ denied Silais’s petition for two
alternative reasons: (1) he had not met his burden of proof,
because (a) his testimony was vague and inconsistent, and
(b) he had failed to present sufficient corroboration; and (2) he
had not established eligibility for relief on the merits.
First, the IJ highlighted Silais’s “vague and inconsistent
testimony and the lack of evidence to corroborate events cen‐
tral to his claim.” The judge then discussed a number of gaps
in Silais’s memory and inconsistencies among Silais’s testi‐
mony, his written statements, and Lete’s declaration. The IJ
found Silais credible despite these inconsistencies, but found
the substantial lack of corroboration fatal to his claim. For ex‐
ample, the IJ observed that Silais “did not submit affidavits or
statements from key parties in his case, such as his brother‐in‐
law, who currently lives in the United States and who went to
Haiti to retrieve documents for [Silais].” Silais had also failed
to present any evidence from any family members or co‐
workers to corroborate his specific claims of Chimères vio‐
lence, and had not provided any medical reports related to his
alleged injuries, despite reportedly seeking treatment. Fur‐
ther, he had not made any reasonable efforts to obtain this ad‐
ditional corroborative evidence, or explained why it would
have been unreasonable to do so. Relatedly, Concannon’s tes‐
timony, Silais’s media articles, and Dr. Rowley’s affidavit all
failed to corroborate Silais’s specific claims. In sum, the IJ con‐
cluded, Silais did “not me[e]t his burden of proof to establish
eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under
CAT.”
Alternatively, the IJ concluded that Silais was not eligible
for relief on the merits. The harms Silais alleged constituted
8 No. 15‐3277
harassment but did not rise to the level of past persecution.
Further, though the Chimères had harassed Silais, he could not
show that the Haitian government was unwilling or unable to
protect him if he were to return—Silais had never attempted
to file a police report or otherwise prompt law enforcement
officers to intervene.
C. The Board of Immigration Appeals’s Decision
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) incorporated
and affirmed the IJ’s decision in a September 29, 2015 opinion.
In its supplemental comments, the BIA pointed out inconsist‐
encies throughout Silais’s statements, criticized Concannon’s
and Dr. Rowley’s evidence as too general, and noted the lack
of testimony from Silais’s brother‐in‐law. The BIA then re‐
jected Silais’s argument that the IJ’s exclusion of the supple‐
mental evidence prevented him from presenting his case. The
BIA noted that the parties completed Silais’s direct, cross, and
redirect, and the IJ then continued the hearing only to make
time for Concannon’s testimony. The BIA further explained
that the supplemental evidence “did not independently sat‐
isfy his burden of proof and did not address the weaknesses
that the Immigration Judge identified in [Silais’s] claim;
namely, the lack of testimony and evidence from witnesses
who could corroborate the events upon which [Silais’s] claim
was based.” Specifically, the BIA repeatedly expressed its
shared concern with the IJ: Silais had “not provide[d], or ade‐
quately explain[ed] the absence of, reasonably available cor‐
roborating evidence regarding critical elements of his claim,
such as affidavits or other evidence from coworkers or family
members in Haiti.” Thus, concluded the BIA, Silais could not
show that the IJ’s actions prejudiced him.
No. 15‐3277 9
II. Discussion
“Where the Board affirms the immigration judge’s deci‐
sion and adds its own analysis, as it did here, we review the
immigration judge’s decision and the Board’s additional rea‐
soning.” Santashbekov v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir.
2016). The Agency is not required to “write an exegesis on
every contention.” Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). All it must do is “consider the issues
raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable
a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought
and not merely reacted.” Id.
We review the decisions to deny Silais’s requested relief
“under the highly deferential version of the substantial evi‐
dence test.” Mansour, 230 F.3d at 905 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this standard of review, we
must affirm the Agency’s decisions if they are “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole, and reverse when the evidence is so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution.” Id. at 905 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d
412, 416 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “To win a reversal
under this deferential standard, [the petitioner] must show
not merely that the record evidence supports a conclusion
contrary to that reached by the BIA but that the evidence com‐
pels that contrary conclusion.” Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540
F.3d 555, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bradvica v. INS, 128 F.3d
1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1997)).
10 No. 15‐3277
On appeal, Silais challenges the Agency’s denial of his pe‐
tition for asylum and withholding of removal.5 To qualify for
asylum, Silais must show “a well‐founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par‐
ticular social group, or political opinion” upon return to Haiti.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Silais’s
eligibility for withholding of removal hinges on whether his
“life or freedom would be threatened” in Haiti due to his po‐
litical opinion, among other things. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). “A finding of past persecution creates a
rebuttable presumption of future persecution.” Stanojkova v.
Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16(b)(l)(i), 1208.16(b)(l)(i)). Bad acts by private individ‐
uals may constitute persecution only if the foreign govern‐
ment was complicit in those acts or was unable or unwilling
to take steps to prevent them. N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425,
440 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675
(7th Cir. 2013)).
Silais argues that the Agency (1) ignored or misconstrued
various arguments and evidence; (2) violated his statutory
and due‐process right to present evidence; and (3) incorrectly
concluded that the alleged violence did not amount to past
persecution. We address each contention in turn.
5 Silais did not contest, and thus waived any right to challenge, the
Agency’s conclusion that he was ineligible for relief under CAT. See Tandia
v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although [petitioner’s]
opening brief in this court mentions his claims for withholding of removal
and CAT relief, he does not set forth any arguments in support of these
claims, so they are waived.”) (citation omitted).
No. 15‐3277 11
A. Agency Handling of Arguments and Evidence
Silais makes various arguments that the Agency abused its
discretion by ignoring or misconstruing certain arguments
and pieces of evidence. We have explained that “completely
ignoring an argument” constitutes legal error, Iglesias v.
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2008), as does ignoring
evidence or failing to address necessary elements of a legal
analysis, Jawad v. Holder, 686 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2012). If,
however, the record reveals that the Agency did not ignore an
argument or evidence (e.g., if “the IJ described [the] testimony
[at issue] in detail and evaluated its relevance,” id.), there is
no error. Id. In those instances, the IJ’s findings of fact are con‐
clusive unless a “reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also
Santashbekov, 834 F.3d at 839.
First, Silais contends that both the IJ and BIA ignored
Concannon’s testimony and Dr. Rowley’s affidavit. He relat‐
edly asserts that the BIA misconstrued his argument that the
IJ had ignored this evidence—incorrectly understanding his
argument to be that the IJ had erred by ascribing the evidence
little weight. Neither the IJ nor the BIA, however, ignored
Concannon’s testimony or Dr. Rowley’s affidavit. The IJ spent
nearly two pages describing Concannon’s testimony in detail.
In the end, however, the IJ concluded that “[w]hile there is no
reason to doubt the credibility of Concannon’s testimony and
affidavit, he does not know the respondent personally and
could not attest to any specific facts of his claim.” Likewise,
the IJ “considered … [the] Affidavit and Curriculum Vitae of
Dr. Nora Rowley” and referenced “a statement from Dr. Nora
Rowley about [Silais’s] claimed trauma and its likely causes.”
12 No. 15‐3277
Again, however, the IJ took issue with the evidence, highlight‐
ing that “Dr. Rowley did not testify, she was not available for
cross‐examination on her assertions, and she was not quali‐
fied as an expert by the court.” The BIA made the same find‐
ings. Apart from incorporating the IJ’s findings of fact, the BIA
also added the following regarding Concannon: “While [Si‐
lais’s] evidence of country conditions, including [Concan‐
non’s] testimony, do provide some support for the plausibility
of his claim, such evidence is general in nature and does not
address the specific incidents he allegedly endured.” (citation
omitted). Continuing to Dr. Rowley’s affidavit, the BIA con‐
cluded, “[T]he medical evidence [Silais] submitted was cre‐
ated years after the alleged incidents, not at the time of the
events in question, and the doctor was not made available for
cross‐examination.” So the Agency evaluated the evidence at
issue and simply found that it was insufficient to corroborate
Silais’s specific claims of harm. As such, Silais’s argument that
the Agency ignored or misconstrued Concannon’s and Dr.
Rowley’s evidence amounts to nothing more than frustration
with the IJ’s factual findings. Without more, we see no reason
to disturb them.
Mansour does not change this outcome. There, we held
that the BIA’s reference to the petitioner and his family as
“Syrian Christians”—when they were actually “Assyrian
Christians”—was a potentially critical mistake: According to
the evidence, Assyrians were non‐Arab Christians, while Syr‐
ians were largely Muslim. 230 F.3d at 908. This mistake car‐
ried with it the potential for serious repercussions for the pe‐
titioner’s religion‐based torture claim, and forced us to ques‐
tion whether the BIA had adequately addressed that claim; so
we remanded. Id. at 909. Silais argues that the Agency’s mis‐
interpretation of his arguments and evidence is analogous to
No. 15‐3277 13
the mistake in Mansour. We cannot, he concludes, be sure the
BIA understood his claim. In Mansour, however, the BIA’s mis‐
take was so fundamental to the petitioner’s torture claim that
the Board had effectively ignored it, which is a legal error.
Here, the BIA made no such mistake. Far from misunder‐
standing Silais’s claim or evidence, both the BIA and the IJ
dealt extensively with Concannon’s testimony and Dr. Row‐
ley’s affidavit and simply found them insufficient.
Second, Silais maintains that the BIA failed to address his
argument that the IJ had incorrectly summarized Concan‐
non’s testimony. The IJ concluded that “the [Haitian justice]
system ha[d] gradually been getting better” since 2006. Silais
argues, however, that Concannon had testified that his team’s
relationship with Haitian justice officials was getting better.
Again, this is simply a factual disagreement. After detailing
Concannon’s testimony, the IJ understood the Haitian justice
system to be gradually improving. And there was evidence to
support this conclusion: Concannon testified in part that
armed groups in Haiti had recently been less organized and
less directly tied to political leaders, and, at the time, the level
of violence in Haiti was lower than it was in 2004. Nothing in
the record compels us to disagree.
Finally, Silais argues that the Agency abused its discretion
by misrepresenting the 2010 election incident. He claims that
the Agency erroneously considered only that the Haitian po‐
lice had detained the Chimères who had attacked Silais and
that he had fled the scene without filing a police report. In
doing so, Silais concludes, the Agency ignored the fact that
the police had released the Chimères soon afterward—a mis‐
take, he argues, that we found determinative in Chitay‐Pirir v.
INS, 169 F.3d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1999). There, however, we
14 No. 15‐3277
observed that the BIA’s assertion that four assailants were ar‐
rested and two of them were convicted of murder “ha[d] no
support in the record,” which showed that the police had only
detained and quickly released the four assailants, and then
detained two of them a second time. Id. at 1081 (emphasis
added). Here, the Agency’s assertions were supported by the
record. And, although the Agency did not mention that the
police had released Felix, the Agency relied on this incident
as another example of how Silais had failed to avail himself of
police protection. The fact that the police eventually released
the assailant after no incident report or charges were filed
does not detract from that conclusion.
B. Right to Present Evidence
Silais also argues that the Agency violated his right to pre‐
sent evidence. “A petitioner’s claim that the immigration hear‐
ing was procedurally insufficient is reviewed de novo.” Pron‐
sivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted).
According to Silais, the Agency violated both his statutory
and constitutional due‐process right to present evidence by
denying his request to submit supplemental materials during
the removal hearing. We have stated that “[n]on‐constitu‐
tional arguments always come first; constitutional conten‐
tions must be set aside until their resolution is unavoidable.”
Boyanivskyy v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 2006) (cita‐
tions omitted, alteration in original).
Silais’s right to a reasonable opportunity to present all rel‐
evant evidence at an impartial hearing is protected by statute
and regulation. Id. at 292–93 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B)
(“the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity … to present
No. 15‐3277 15
evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to cross‐examine wit‐
nesses presented by the Government”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c)
(“The immigration judge shall receive and consider material
and relevant evidence, rule upon objections, and otherwise
regulate the course of the hearing.”)). Thus, we evaluate the
IJ’s action for compliance with these provisions rather than
with constitutional due process. Id.6 “[T]he appropriate char‐
acterization of the IJ’s action is, in essence, a matter of degree.
In the end, we must determine whether, given the totality of
circumstances, the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity
to put on [his] case.” Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529,
538 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
Courts, however, “do not set aside agencies’ decisions un‐
less mistakes cause prejudice.” Rehman v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d
506, 509 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To prevail, Silais
must show “prejudice such that the IJ’s mistake impacted the
outcome of the proceedings.” Pronsivakulchai, 461 F.3d at 907
(citation omitted). In other words, Silais must “produce some
concrete evidence indicating that the violation of a procedural
protection actually had the potential for affecting the outcome
of … deportation proceedings.” Shahandeh‐Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d
1384, 1389 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis removed); see also Roman
v. INS, 233 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2000). He stresses that the
6 We would reach the constitutional inquiry only if Silais had com‐
plained that the procedures outlined in the statutes and regulations were
constitutionally deficient. Boyanivskyy, 450 F.3d at 292 (citation omitted);
see also Pronsivakulchai, 461 F.3d at 907 (cautioning against “leading with
an open‐ended due process argument” and advising petitioners to “stick
with claims based on the statutes and regulations unless they believe that
one of these rules violated the Constitution or that lacunae in the rules
have been filled with defective procedures”) (citation omitted). Silais
makes no such claim.
16 No. 15‐3277
Agency denied Silais’s “asylum claim because he did not pro‐
vide the very evidence the IJ rejected.” It is true that the
Agency denied his claim in part due to inconsistencies across
his written and oral testimony and a lack of corroborating ev‐
idence from his brother‐in‐law, who retrieved certain docu‐
mentary evidence from Haiti. And some of the rejected evi‐
dence arguably would have addressed these issues. Yet, none
of the supplemental proffer addressed the Agency’s repeated
concern: the lack of evidence specifically corroborating the in‐
cidents of violence about which Silais testified. Silais pro‐
vided no medical‐treatment records related to his own al‐
leged injuries and no testimony from family or co‐workers
who were also allegedly beaten and threatened. Likewise, he
failed to demonstrate to the Agency that obtaining such evi‐
dence would have required unreasonable efforts. These omis‐
sions alone were sufficient to preclude Silais from receiving
relief. As none of the additional evidence would have filled
this gap, Silais cannot show that the outcome would have
been different had the IJ admitted his supplemental evidence.
Silais maintains that the Agency erred by neither warning
him that specific corroborating evidence was necessary nor
giving him an opportunity to supplement the record. In
Darinchuluun v. Lynch, however, we stated that no such prior
notice or later opportunity is required, because the REAL ID
Act itself informs petitioners that the IJ may require corrobo‐
rating evidence—even if, as here, they are found to be credi‐
ble. 804 F.3d 1208, 1216 n.21, 1216–17 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530
(7th Cir. 2008)); see also Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626, 633
(7th Cir. 2011). Silais asserts that Darinchuluun was incorrectly
decided and must be overturned; but he waives this argument
by failing to support it in any way. See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 15‐3277 17
675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing the well‐estab‐
lished principle that arguments that are “underdeveloped,
conclusory, or unsupported by law” are waived).
Next, relying on Boyanivskyy, 450 F.3d at 291, Silais argues
that the IJ’s rejection of the supplemental evidence prejudiced
him by essentially manufacturing an underdeveloped record.
In that case, however, the IJ knowingly scheduled the hearing
for a day it knew the petitioner’s three crucial witnesses could
not testify, and seemingly forced the petitioner to prematurely
rest his case. Id. The IJ then highlighted the lack of corrobora‐
tion as a principal reason for denying the petitioner’s claim.
Id. We determined that the IJ’s actions had prejudiced the pe‐
titioner, as the witnesses were crucial to his claim and likely
would have altered the outcome. Id. at 294. Here, the IJ al‐
lowed Silais to testify fully, to submit over twenty pieces of
documentary evidence, and to present a country‐conditions
expert. And even if the IJ had admitted the extra materials at
issue, Silais’s case still would have lacked corroborating evi‐
dence of the specific incidents of harm and violence to him
and his family. Further, this is not evidence that Silais had un‐
successfully tried to submit, as occurred in Boyanivskyy; ra‐
ther, Silais did not present or reasonably try to obtain it. Given
this omission in the record, Silais cannot demonstrate preju‐
dice.
Silais finally posits that the Agency should have consid‐
ered and admitted the supplemental evidence given that we
have required them to do so in the motion‐to‐reopen context.
See, e.g., Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 738–40 (7th Cir. 2013).
This comparison is inapt. The Agency cannot adequately con‐
sider whether there is good cause to reopen a case without
reviewing evidence relevant to the question. This logic does
18 No. 15‐3277
not map neatly onto submissions of evidence during a hear‐
ing, where the IJ receives evidence, rules on admissibility, en‐
forces deadlines and adheres to considerations of procedural
efficiency. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c) (“The immigration judge
shall … regulate the course of the hearing.”); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.31(c) (“If an application or document is not filed within
the time set by the Immigration Judge, the opportunity to file
that application or document shall be deemed waived.”).
C. Past Persecution
Lastly, Silais challenges the Agency’s conclusion that the
alleged harm he had experienced did not amount to past per‐
secution. The evidence of his and his family’s harm, while dis‐
turbing, was uncorroborated and does not compel us to con‐
clude differently. In addition, Silais failed to successfully
demonstrate that the Haitian government was unable or un‐
willing to protect him—a required showing given that Silais’s
claim was based on the violent acts of the Chimères. See N.L.A.,
744 F.3d at 440 (citing Cece, 733 F.3d at 675). As the Agency
stressed, Silais did not report any of the alleged incidents of
harm to the Haitian police to give them an opportunity to in‐
tervene. While he challenged the Agency’s conclusion tangen‐
tially by arguing that the Agency had ignored related evi‐
dence, we have rejected those arguments.7 This leaves the
Agency’s finding otherwise undisturbed.
In any event, the primary case upon which Silais relies,
Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2007), reflects harms
on a wholly different level than what he was forced to endure.
7 Silais did not explicitly contest the fact that he had never filed a po‐
lice report, but his assertions that the Agency ignored or improperly re‐
jected related arguments and evidence suffice to raise the issue on appeal.
No. 15‐3277 19
There, the petitioner was brutally attacked while riding his
motorcycle: He was knocked unconscious, broke his jaw, re‐
quired twenty stitches in his head, had his lips stitched to‐
gether, spent over a week in the hospital, and suffered from
memory loss. Id. at 750. After he returned home from the hos‐
pital, his attackers broke down his door, ransacked his house,
set fire to his curtains, pushed him and his wife to the ground,
and placed large knives at their throat, threatening to kill
them. Id. at 750–51, 754. His family was also attacked on mul‐
tiple occasions (e.g., having their head, arms, and tongues
sliced with knives; getting robbed; having guns pointed at
their heads), and one of his relatives was murdered. Id. at 751.
Moreover, unlike Silais, the petitioner in Gomes was able to
corroborate these attacks with medical records, dental rec‐
ords, letters from witnesses, and newspaper articles of the
specific incidents. Id. at 750–51.
In sum, while we do not intend to downplay what Silais
allegedly experienced in Haiti, we hold that the record does
not compel us to reject the Agency’s decision.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review of the
Board’s decision is DENIED.