FILED
MAY 2, 2017
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 34398-7-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
SCOTT HOWARD GREGER, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Scott Greger appeals from his conviction for taking a motor
vehicle, challenging the standard reasonable doubt instruction and the imposition at
sentencing of a $200 assessment for the criminal filing fee. He did not object to either of
these actions at trial. Since the arguments are ones we have repeatedly rejected in recent
months, we summarily affirm without significant discussion.
Unless the issue presents a manifest question of constitutional law, typically an
argument cannot be raised on appeal if it was not presented to the trial court. RAP
2.5(a)(3). Thus, to present his challenge to the reasonable doubt instruction, which in this
case followed standard WPIC 4.01, Mr. Greger must demonstrate that it is
unconstitutional. He has not met that burden.
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No. 34398-7-111
State v. Greger
There is a long history of rejecting challenges to the standard reasonable doubt
instruction. See State v. Harras, 25 Wash. 416,421, 65 P. 774 (1901); State v.
Thompson, 13 Wn. App. 1, 5,533 P.2d 395 (1975). Challenges to modem formulations
of the instruction repeatedly have been rejected in recent years. State v. Kalebaugh, 183
Wn.2d 578, 585-586, 355 P.3d 253 (2015); State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 165 P.3d
1241 (2007); State v. Jenson, 194 Wn. App. 900, 378 P.3d 270 (2016); State v. Osman,
192 Wn. App. 355,375,366 P.3d 956 (2016); State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App. 530,
567,364 P.3d 810 (2015); State v. Kinzle, 181 Wn. App. 774,784,326 P.3d 870 (2014);
State v. Fedorov, 181 Wn. App. 187,200,324 P.3d 784 (2014). Although Mr. Greger
emphasizes different language than that challenged in some of the earlier cases, merely
challenging different language fails to address the context of the whole instruction. Mr.
Greger's contention is without merit.
He also argues that the $200 criminal filing fee is discretionary and, therefore, the
trial court was required to conduct an inquiry into his ability to pay it prior to imposing
the fee. See State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). This argument has
been rejected before. State v. Lundy, 176 Wn. App. 96, 102, 308 P.3d 755 (2013). RCW
36.18.020(2) mandates that the clerk of court "shall collect the following fees ... (h)
upon conviction or plea of guilty ... an adult defendant in a criminal case shall be liable
for a fee of two hundred dollars."
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No. 34398-7-III
State v. Greger
This language is mandatory. The clerk shall collect the fee and the defendant
shall be liable for it. It is difficult to see how the legislature could be much clearer in its
directive. The court did not err in imposing the $200 mandatory criminal filing fee.
Affirmed. 1
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
1
Mr. Greger having complied with our General Order concerning indigency and
appellate costs, and the record revealing that he was on public assistance at the time of the
offense and has significant debt, including previous legal financial obligations totaling
nearly $20,000, we grant his request to waive appellate costs.
3