J-A03028-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
ROBERT ARTHUR SNYDER, JR.
Appellee No. 485 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No: CP-49-CR-0000286-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and DUBOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 02, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the March 21, 2016
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
(“suppression court”) granting Appellee’s, Robert Arthur Snyder, Jr.,
omnibus motion to suppress. Upon review, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for further proceedings.
Following an alleged domestic violence incident on February 4, 2015,
Appellee was arrested and brought into police custody. Prior to being
charged, Appellee was placed in an interrogation room and questioned by
officers. Appellee’s time in the interrogation room was captured on video. 1
During that time he was interrogated and was placed in an interrogation
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1
The recordings were introduced into evidence as Commonwealth Ex. 2 and
Commonwealth Ex. 3 at the suppression hearing on September 21, 2015.
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room by himself. The Commonwealth eventually charged Appellee with
criminal attempt homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, terroristic
threats, recklessly endangering another person, and simple assault. 2 On
August 7, 2015, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which included a
motion to suppress.
On September 21, 2015, the suppression court held a hearing on
Appellee’s omnibus pre-trial motion. After the hearing, the suppression
court ordered the parties to file post-hearing briefs. On March 21, 2016, the
suppression court made the following findings of fact.
1. While in custody on or about February 4, 2015, [Appellee]
made statements, both to the police and while himself
alone in the interrogation room, which could be interpreted
as being interlocutory and/or against his interest.
2. [Appellee] was in custody.
3. [Appellee] was handcuffed.
4. [Appellee] was advised of his Miranda[3] warnings and the
right to waive those warnings.
5. [Appellee] understood his rights and the right to waive
them.
6. [Appellee] indicated affirmatively that he was not waiving
his rights.
____________________________________________
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 2706(a)(1), 2705, and
2701(a)(1), respectively.
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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7. [Appellee] was advised as to the subject of the
investigation, being a domestic incident involving a gun.
He understood why he was in custody.
8. [Appellee] requested a minimum of twenty (20) times to
speak to an attorney and, in some cases, his particular
attorney.
9. In the first eighteen (18) minutes of the custodial
interrogation, he invoked his right to an attorney nine (9)
times.
10. Before being advised of his Miranda rights, [Appellee]
requested that his attorney be called. He asked the police
to please call his attorney, and he specified his attorney by
name.
11. The Troopers engaged in both questioning and conduct
reasonably intended to illicit responses from [Appellee],
this constitutes interrogation.
12. The questions asked of [Appellee] were directly related to
the underlying alleged criminal incident.
13. There was no break in the custodial interrogation,
[Appellee] remained in custody of the Troopers during the
entirety of the interrogation.
14. [Appellee], upon being questioned about his wishes,
indicated he did not believe speaking to the police would
be in his best interest.
Order, 3/21/2016, at 1-2. The suppression court granted Appellee’s motion
to suppress the video recordings and all statements made by Appellee
during his time in custody. Id. at 4.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on March 23, 2016,
certifying that the March 21, 2016 order substantially handicapped the
prosecution. On April 5, 2016, the suppression court issued an order
directing the Commonwealth to file a concise statement. On May 6, 2016,
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the Commonwealth filed a motion for leave to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement nunc pro tunc. On May 16, 2016, the Commonwealth’s motion
was granted and the Commonwealth filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on May
17, 2016. The suppression court did not issue a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,
noting that the March 21, 2016 order sufficiently addressed the issues raised
on appeal.
The Commonwealth raises two issues on appeal, which we quote
verbatim.
I. Whether the [suppression court] erred in suppressing any
and all of [Appellee’s] statements after his first request to
call his attorney, where [Appellee] was not formally
charged, was not being questioned, and which was prior to
the police advising [Appellee] of his Miranda warnings.
II. Whether the [suppression court] erred in suppressing the
video recording of [Appellee] on February 4th and 5th of
2015 and finding that police interrogated [Appellee] where
[Appellee] was not asked questions, but blurted out
incriminating statements while alone in a room.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
The Commonwealth is appealing an interlocutory order as of right
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) which provides that “[i]n a criminal case, under
the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal
as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the
Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). “Our Supreme
Court has consistently held that [Rule 311(d)] applies to pretrial rulings that
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result in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted). In the matter sub judice, the Commonwealth is appealing an
order granting a motion to suppress and the Commonwealth provided that
the order will substantially handicap the prosecution; therefore, the
Commonwealth is entitled to an interlocutory appeal as of right.
Our standard of review of a Commonwealth appeal from a suppression
order is well established. We
consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses
together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in
the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The
suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the
record supports those findings. The suppression court’s
conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 A.2d 879, 880-81 (Pa. 1998) (citations
omitted). The Commonwealth’s claims are significantly intertwined and as
such we will address them as one.
The Commonwealth first argues that the suppression court erred by
suppressing statements made after Appellee requested counsel but prior to
being read his Miranda rights. The Commonwealth further argues that the
suppression court erred by suppressing statements made after Appellee was
advised of his Miranda rights because he was not formally charged and was
not being questioned. This argument is troubling. The Commonwealth is
arguing that it arrested Appellee, handcuffed him, and placed him in an
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interrogation room with a trooper who was asking questions, and this
conduct does not constitute custodial interrogation pursuant to Miranda.
One such example of the line of questioning Appellee faced was when a
Trooper stated
I have one side of the situation. I got one side from your wife. I
spoke to your wife, I sat down with her. I talked to her about it.
I don’t know your side of it yet so this is your opportunity to give
me that. If you want to talk to me, you can talk to me, again
you can stop answering questions anytime you wish, I cannot
force you to continue.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/21/15, at Commonwealth Ex. 3 (“Comm. Ex.
3”). The Commonwealth argues that Appellee’s Sixth Amendment rights
were not violated when he was interrogated. This statement is correct
because Appellee’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated. In order for
Miranda rights to be implicated, an individual must be subject to custodial
interrogation. Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1240 (Pa.
Super. 2015). There is no question that Appellee was in custody when he
was arrested, in handcuffs, and placed in the interrogation room.
The Commonwealth, however, argues that there was no interrogation.
Interrogation is defined as “police conduct calculated to, expected to, or
likely to evoke admission.” Commonwealth v. Umstead, 916 A.2d 1146,
1152 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
[T]he term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter
portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions
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of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus
reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to
vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection
against coercive police practices, without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But,
since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of
interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of
police officers that they should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
The Commonwealth argues that because Appellee anticipatorily invoked his
right to an attorney, the Fifth Amendment does not apply. “The Fifth
Amendment right to counsel cannot be invoked anticipatorily outside of the
context of custodial interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982
A.2d 483, 500 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Romine, 682 A.2d 1296 (Pa. Super. 1996)). Thus, the Commonwealth’s
argument fails because Appellee was subject to custodial interrogation when
he first requested an attorney. The Commonwealth’s argument taken t
o its logical conclusion suggests that as long as the police do not inform an
individual in custody of their Miranda rights, the rights do not exist, and the
individual can be interrogated freely.
Further, the Trooper’s statement
I have one side of the situation. I got one side from your wife. I
spoke to your wife, I sat down with her. I talked to her about it.
I don’t know your side of it yet so this is your opportunity to give
me that. If you want to talk to me, you can talk to me, again
you can stop answering questions anytime you wish, I cannot
force you to continue.
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which occurred after Appellee requested counsel, is a clear attempt to elicit a
response from Appellee. See Comm. Ex. 3. Moreover, the Commonwealth
argues that Appellee’s statement “I did not pull the trigger” was self-serving
and therefore should not be suppressed pursuant to Miranda. “[T]he
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.” Innis, 445 U.S. at 297 (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). The Commonwealth’s argument fails.
Upon review of the record, Appellee clearly requested an attorney
immediately upon being placed in the interrogation room. See Comm. Ex.
3. Moreover, after being read his Miranda rights, he again indicated that he
wanted an attorney. During the first interview, the Trooper repeatedly made
statements intended to evoke an admission from Appellee. Id. As Appellee
was in custody and was subject to interrogation after he clearly requested
counsel, Appellee’s Miranda rights were violated and all statements made
as a result of the questioning by the Troopers were correctly suppressed.
However, the suppression court’s blanket suppression of the video
recordings and all statements made by Appellee went too far.
The Commonwealth’s next argument is that the trial court erred in
suppressing the second video recording of Appellee wherein he made
statements alone in a room without being questioned. As discussed above,
custodial interrogation has two components, custody and interrogation.
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When Appellee was sitting alone in the interrogation room, he was not
subject to interrogation. For example, Appellee says “I’m going to fucking
kill you. She’s fucking dead” at 1:01:45 of the second video while he is
alone in the interrogation room. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/21/15, at
Commonwealth Ex. 2 (“Comm. Ex. 2”). Therefore, any statements made by
Appellee during that time do not implicate Miranda and should not have
been suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 421 A.2d 147,
153 (Pa. 1980) (It is “well-established that a statement which is
spontaneously volunteered is admissible notwithstanding a prior assertion of
constitutional rights.”) (citations omitted). Further, we note there are
multiple instances where Appellee was not alone in the interrogation room
during the second video and was making statements to troopers. Appellee
initiated some of these conversations with the troopers. The statements
made by Appellee that were not the result of an interrogation should not
have been suppressed. The trial court is directed to evaluate the individual
statements made by Appellee and whether they were the result of
interrogation by the troopers.
At numerous times during this second video, Appellee initiates
conversation with the troopers. See Comm. 2. For example, at
approximately 1:38 of the second interview, Appellee makes an admission
not subject to interrogation. Id. Appellee stated that “I’m not guilty, I
didn’t try to do anything other than try to fucking kill myself. My wife
grabbed the gun and the gun went off.” Id. The trooper responded “I didn’t
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ask you that.” Id. Appellee responded “I didn’t ask you to ask me that, I
just told you that.” Id. The suppression court’s blanket suppression of both
videos and all statements made by Appellee is overbroad as there are
multiple admissions, such as his statement “I’m going to fucking kill you.
She’s fucking dead” that do not violate Appellee’s Miranda rights.
Therefore, we reverse the order of the trial court regarding the second
video and remand for further proceedings to determine which statements of
Appellee in the second video were the result of police interrogation and
which were spontaneously made by Appellee. The trial court is to suppress
those statements that were the result of police interrogation and permit
introduction into evidence those statements that Appellee made
spontaneously.
Order affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for further
proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/2/2017
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