IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1528
Filed May 3, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES PAUL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Daniel P.
Wilson, Judge.
A defendant appeals the sentences imposed by the district court following
his pleas of guilty. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Brenda J. Gohr, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.
James Smith asks to be resentenced following entry of judgment on his
guilty pleas to four crimes. Because the district court adequately explained its
reasoning on the record, we find no abuse of discretion in its sentencing
decision. Accordingly, we affirm.
In the first six months of 2016, the State charged Smith with multiple
crimes arising out of three different incidents. Smith eventually pleaded guilty to
forgery, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 715A.2(1) and
715.2(2)(a) (2016); second-degree theft, a class “D” felony, in violation of
sections 714.1–.3; domestic-abuse assault while displaying a dangerous
weapon, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of section 708.2A(1) and
(2)(c); and assault on a peace officer, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of
sections 708.1 and .3A(3). In exchange for Smith’s pleas of guilty, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.
The prosecutor detailed the agreement on the record at the plea hearing.
For punishment, the parties agreed Smith would serve two indeterminate two-
year prison terms for the aggravated misdemeanors, to be run concurrently, and
two indeterminate five-year prison terms for the felonies, to be run concurrently.
The two-year sentences would run consecutively to the five-year sentences.
Per Smith’s request, the court proceeded with sentencing immediately and
imposed terms in accordance with the plea agreement. Smith now argues the
district court failed to provide sufficient reasons on the record for the chosen
sentences.
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Our review is for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d
269, 272 (Iowa 2016). “A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its
discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id.
We consider a district court’s sentencing decision “untenable when it is not
supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous
application of the law.” See id. (quoting State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 8
(2014)).
At sentencing, the district court is required to “weigh all pertinent matters
in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the
attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or
chances for reform.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 476 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1991)); see also Iowa
Code § 907.5(1). In addition, the court must state on the record its reasons for
selecting the particular sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d); see also Hill, 878
N.W.2d at 275 (“Sentencing courts should also explicitly state the reasons for
imposing a consecutive sentence . . . .”). The reasons “need not be detailed,
[but] at least a cursory explanation must be provided to allow appellate review of
the trial court’s discretionary action.” State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 828
(Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000)).
Even assuming the district court was required to provide reasons beyond
giving effect to the parties’ agreement, see Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 410,1 we find
1
Thacker discussed the principle from State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa
1983), and State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756–57 (Iowa 1995), that a statement of
reasons for the sentence is not required where the decision to impose a prison term
“was . . . not the product of the exercise of trial court discretion but of the process of
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the court’s on-the-record rationale sufficient here. First, the court explained it
had considered its sentencing options under Iowa Code section 901.5 and then
stated: “The sentence I’m about to impose in each of these counts or cases is
that which I hope will eventually help lead towards your rehabilitation while at the
same time protecting the community from further offenses by you and others.”
Second, after admitting a document detailing Smith’s criminal history—
which spanned over twenty years and included convictions for assault, stalking,
harassment, operating while intoxicated, and burglary—the court continued: “I
have considered the information in the files that relates to your age, employment,
family, education, and other background and circumstances. I have considered
your prior criminal record, Mr. Smith, which as you know is rather extensive. It’s
reflected in State’s Exhibit 1.”
Finally, the court specified its reasons for imposing consecutive
sentences, see Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 275, citing the agreement of the parties as
well as the specific facts of the case—particularly the short span during which
Smith committed the crimes and the number of victims involved.
Contrary to Smith’s contention, this language was not “boilerplate.” See
State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304–05 (Iowa 2001) (holding boilerplate
language—specifically, “a pre-printed ‘Prison Order’ which included the following
statement: ‘The Court has determined that this sentence will provide reasonable
giving effect to the parties’ agreement.” 862 N.W.2d at 408–09 (quoting Snyder, 336
N.W.2d at 729). Thacker advised that if a district court is merely giving effect to the
parties’ agreement and exercising no other discretion in sentencing, it must make the
particulars of the plea agreement part of the sentencing record. Id. at 410. Our
supreme court’s analysis in Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 274, concerning reasons for consecutive
sentences, does not appear to undermine this principle from the Thacker-Snyder-Cason
line of cases.
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protection of the public. Probation is denied because it is unwarranted.’”—was
insufficient to satisfy what is now rule 2.23(3)(d)). Rather, the district court
articulated reasons particular to Smith’s circumstances for the sentences it
imposed. See id. (remanding when written sentencing order did not include
reasoning “relating to this offense, and this defendant’s background”). The
district court’s on-the-record statements adequately explained its reasoning, and
we find no abuse of discretion in its sentencing decision. Accordingly, we affirm
Smith’s sentences.
AFFIRMED.