IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-2210
Filed September 27, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MONTAVIOUS KENTRELL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
Montavious Smith appeals from his sentence following entry of a guilty
plea to failure to comply with the sex offender registry, second offense.
AFFIRMED.
John W. Pilkington of Nidey, Erdahl, Tindal & Fischer, P.L.C., Marengo,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
2
MULLINS, Judge.
Montavious Smith appeals from his sentence following entry of a guilty
plea to failure to comply with the sex offender registry, second offense. Smith
claims the district court failed to state the reasons for the sentence imposed on
the record, as required in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d).
In December 2016, Smith was convicted and sentenced following a plea
agreement for failure to comply with the sex offender registry, second offense.
See Iowa Code §§ 692A.104, .105, .111 (2015).
Smith pled guilty to the failure-to-comply charge and consented to
probation revocation in a separate case in exchange for “consecutive prison
terms, five and five stacked for ten [years],” associated fines, fees, and court
costs, and the State’s agreement that no further charges would be pursued.
During the plea colloquy, the court said, “There has obviously been a plea
understanding here. Would one of you indicate for the record what it is.” The
plea agreement was recited on the record, and Smith requested immediate
sentencing.1 During the sentencing colloquy, the State repeated the plea
agreement, and Smith’s attorney said, “[S]ame recommendation.” Without
specifically reciting on the record that it was accepting the plea agreement, the
court imposed the jointly-recommended sentence. The written order states that
“the above sentence is the most likely to protect society and rehabilitate the
1
Smith alleges in a footnote he was “not adequately advised” about the preparation and
function of a presentence investigation report, but also asserts the record is inadequate
for our review of that claim on this direct appeal. We agree the record is inadequate to
consider the claim, and preserve it for a possible postconviction-relief action. See
Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245–46 (Iowa 1999).
3
defendant based on the nature of the offense, defendant’s prior record, and the
recommendation of the parties.”
Smith appeals.
We review challenges to sentences for abuse of discretion. State v.
Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999). A court abuses its discretion if it acts on
clearly untenable grounds or to an unreasonable extent. Id.
A sentencing court is required to state on the record its reasons for
imposing a particular sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d); see also Iowa Code
§ 901.5. This statement creates a basis for an appellate court to decide abuse of
discretion claims. State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983). Where a
court has no discretion in selecting a sentence, failure to state the reasons for a
sentence will not result in remand. Id. However, when a plea agreement is not
present or has limited discussion on the record, failure to give reasons for a
sentence will result in remand for the district court to examine whether the
sentence gives effect to the agreement. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 404,
409-10 (Iowa 2015).
In State v. Snyder, the Iowa Supreme Court held that when sentencing is
based on a plea agreement there has been no exercise of discretion. 336
N.W.2d at 729; see also State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756–57 (Iowa 1995).
Therefore, there is no purpose for the statement, and failure to give reasons for a
sentence is harmless. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d at 729. In State v. Cason, the court
also held that “the sentencing court was merely giving effect to the parties’
agreement” and that no abuse of discretion occurred. 532 N.W.2d at 757.
4
During the plea colloquy, the district court was aware Smith was pleading
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and asked for its terms to be read on the
record. The court asked Smith if he understood the agreement and Smith
responded that he did. At the subsequent sentencing phase of the hearing, the
court also asked for the sentencing recommendations of the parties. The State
repeated the terms of the agreement as its recommendation, and Smith’s
counsel said, “[S]ame agreement.” Smith declined to say anything in mitigation.
Without further comment, the court imposed the jointly-recommended sentence.
The order for judgment and sentence included “the recommendation of the
parties” as one of the reasons for the sentence.
The record recitations of the plea agreement and joint recommendations
of the parties, the imposition of the recommended sentence, and the reference to
the recommendation of the parties in the written order are sufficient for us to find
Smith’s sentence gives effect to the plea agreement. Thus, we find no abuse of
discretion.
AFFIRMED.