MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 11 2017, 7:01 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffery A. Earl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of J.S. (Minor May 11, 2017
Child) and A.S. (Mother); Court of Appeals Case No.
32A01-1611-JC-2652
A.S. (Mother), Appeal from the Hendricks
Appellant-Respondent, Superior Court
The Honorable Karen M. Love,
v. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
The Indiana Department of 32D03-1512-JC-119
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
May, Judge.
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[1] A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating J.S. (“Child”) a
Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). She argues the evidence was insufficient
to support the court’s conclusion that the court’s coercive intervention was
necessary. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Mother and Jo.S. (“Father”) 1 on March 4, 2009. On
November 26, 2015, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
received a report alleging Child was a victim of neglect. Specifically, the report
alleged Mother had taken Child to the Hendricks Regional Hospital Emergency
Room (“ER”) because Mother believed Child had been poisoned with opiates
on her pizza. (App. Vol. II at 14-15.) Upon arriving at the hospital, Child
reported “someone put drugs on her pizza.” (Id.) Medical staff at the hospital
determined Child had a urinary tract infection and pneumonia, but she tested
negatively for opiates.
[3] At the time the report was filed, Mother and Father were separated and
undergoing divorce proceedings. Mother and Child had moved out of the
marital home in July 2015 and had been living at a shelter since then. The
report also alleged Mother had recently pulled Child from her Catholic school
1
Father does not participate in this appeal.
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and was homeschooling Child because Mother believed the school was
“poisoning their pepperonis.” (Tr. at 14.)
[4] Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Brown met with Mother during an
unannounced visit on November 30, 2015. Mother indicated on November 26,
2015, Thanksgiving Day, “she was distracted doing a friend’s nails so she [did
not] know what was in the pizza.” (App. Vol. II at 15.) Mother stated Child
asked “eight times to go to the hospital because her chest was feeling tight and
she didn’t feel well.” (Id.)
[5] On December 11, 2015, DCS received another report Mother had taken Child
to the ER because Child started having a tantrum and hyperventilating, and
Mother believed Child was having trouble breathing. The reporting source
stated that, while at the hospital, Child was not actually having seizures, but
pretended to have seizures, and Mother was “all over that.” (Id.) That same
day, FCM Brown reviewed records from Cummins Behavioral Health, which
indicated Mother was diagnosed with Delusional Disorder.
[6] On December 15, 2015, FCM Brown contacted Father, who stated he was
“very worried about [Child’s] well-being,” (id.), and stated Mother “has a lot of
influence over [Child].” (Id.) FCM Brown also contacted Amy Watts, a
Clinical Service Specialist, who opined “[Mother’s] paranoia, recent trips to the
ER, her comments to the ER staff and her daughter’s reactions to [Mother]
cause her alarm and lead her to believe Mother is unable to care for her child in
a safe and appropriate manner.” (Id.) Watts further opined “even though
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[Mother] was participating in treatment, she still does not appear to be thinking
in a rational and safe manner.” (Id.) Watts indicated Child’s reactions to
Mother indicate “learned behaviors of how to get Mother’s attention.” (Tr. at
16.) That same day, DCS removed Child from Mother’s care on an emergency
basis and placed Child with Father. DCS requested permission to file a CHINS
petition, and the court granted DCS permission.
[7] On December 16, 2015, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS. The
court held an initial detention hearing that same day and found it was in Child’s
best interest to be removed from Mother’s care. The court granted DCS
temporary wardship of Child and authorized Child’s placement with Father to
continue. The court set a fact-finding hearing for February 10, 2016.
[8] At the February 10 hearing, Mother, Father, DCS, each party’s counsel, and
Child’s GAL appeared. The parties agreed to continue the fact-finding hearing
until April 6, 2016, because Mother was scheduled to undergo a psychological
evaluation on February 19 and 22, 2016, and the parties agreed the report of the
evaluation would be useful to the fact-finding hearing.
[9] On April 6, 2016, the court held a contested fact-finding hearing on DCS’s
CHINS petition. The court heard testimony from FCM Brown, FCM Ariel
Irwin-Peel, and Ramona Guthrie, a caseworker at the shelter where Mother
and Child had stayed. On September 26, 2016, the court entered the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
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6. Mother has a history of intermittent mental health care.
Exhibit A is the psychological evaluation of Mother performed
by Dr. Sarah J. Szerlong in February 2016. Mother has a long
history of seizures beginning at age 15. Mother has been
hospitalized 5 times for seizures.
7. Mother was previously diagnosed with personality disorder,
schizotypal, paranoid, obsessive compulsive, narcissistic features,
as well as rule out diagnosis of psychotic disorder due to medical
condition (seizure disorder) and delusions. Mother’s self-report
supports a diagnosis of major depression disorder.
8. On December 10, 2015, [Child] was admitted to Hendricks
Regional Health. [Child] was hyperventilating and the child
stated “I’m having seizures like my mother.” No seizure activity
was found by medical personnel. Mother wanted [Child] tested
for poisoning. Mother claims that [Child] was poisoned at
Sheltering Wings and at school. Medical personnel did not find
any indication that [Child] was poisoned.
9. On November 26, 2015, Mother brought [Child] to the
Emergency Room at Hendricks Regional Health because Mother
thought someone was poisoning [Child]. Mother accused Father
of poisoning [Child]’s food multiple times.
10. Ramona Guthrie is a case manager at the protected location
where Mother and [Child] lived. Ramona interacted with
Mother and [Child] daily. Mother makes accusation[s] about
being poisoned a lot. Mother accused Father of molesting
[Child]. None of Mother’s allegations were ever substantiated.
11. Father filed for divorce in Grant County and that Court has
not decided custody.
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*****
21. DCS has proved by a preponderance of the evidence [that]
[Child]’s mental health is seriously impaired or seriously
endangered, as a result of Mother’s delusions and accusations.
[Child] mimics some symptoms of seizure but she did not have a
seizure. [Child] at age 6 has learned how to get her Mother’s
attention and the attention of others by faking symptoms of
seizures.
22. Mother’s delusions have caused [Child] to be in fear of being
poisoned according to Ms. Guthrie. Court finds Ms. Guthrie
credible.
23. [Child] is only six years old.
24. Mother’s supervision of [Child] is not appropriate and is
unlikely to change without the coercive interaction [sic] of the
court.
(App. Vol. II at 29-32.)
[10] On October 26, 2016, the court held a dispositional hearing. 2 Mother contested
Child was a CHINS and maintained she was “mentally and physically capable
of taking care of [Child].” (Tr. at 92.) FCM Irwin-Peel testified Mother was
consistently participating in supervised visits with Child twice-weekly and was
attending services at the shelter. Child was still living with Father. The court
2
The court also held a dispositional hearing on October 19, 2016, at which Father appeared, but Mother did
not appear.
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entered a dispositional order adjudicating Child a CHINS and formally
removing her from Mother’s care. The court also entered a parental
participation order for Mother to complete psychological and
neuropsychological evaluations and follow all treatment recommendations,
continue to participate in supervised visits, and follow all terms of the
dispositional decree. Although the court noted Mother’s sexual abuse
allegations against Father were unsubstantiated and Child was permitted to
remain in Father’s care, the court ordered Father to undergo a domestic
violence assessment per DCS’s request. The court further ordered Father not to
allow Mother to visit Child without DCS’s supervision.
Discussion and Decision
[11] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s CHINS
determination, we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied. Instead,
we consider only the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision and any
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. at 1287.
[12] Here, the trial court entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions of law in
arriving at its determination Child was a CHINS, which is not expressly
required by statute. See id. (“no statute expressly requires formal findings in a
CHINS fact-finding order”). As to these findings, “we apply the two-tiered
standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and second whether the
findings support the judgment.” Id. However, when, as here, a party
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challenges the judgment but does not challenge the findings of fact as
unsupported by the evidence, we look only to the findings to determine whether
they support the judgment. Smith v. Miller Builders, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 731, 734
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
[13] “Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the
juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010); Ind. Code § 31-34-
12-3. Under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, the State had to prove:
(1) Child is less than eighteen years of age;
(2) Child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or
seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to
supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, education, or supervision; and
(3) Child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is
not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted
without the coercive intervention of the court.
In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105.
[14] We note the trial court’s CHINS adjudication establishes no culpability on the
part of Mother. See In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105 (“Only when the State moves
to terminate a particular parent’s rights does an allegation of fault attach.”).
“[A] CHINS adjudication is simply that – a determination that a child is in
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need of services.” Id. A CHINS intervention in no way challenges the general
competency of a parent to continue a relationship with her child. Id.
[15] Here, Mother concedes DCS proved the first two elements under Indiana Code
Section 31-34-1-1. Mother solely argues the evidence was insufficient to
support the trial court’s conclusion Child would unlikely be provided the
needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation without coercive intervention of the
court.
[16] In this case, the basis of DCS’s CHINS petition was its concern Mother’s
mental health was endangering Child. As the trial court found, Mother has
previously been diagnosed with Personality Disorder, Schizotypal Disorder,
paranoia, and Delusional Disorder. Additionally, the trial court noted its
review of Dr. Szerlong’s psychological evaluation of Mother from February
2016, which reported Mother has had seizures since the age of fifteen.
[17] The court’s findings reflect its recognition that Mother’s delusions were
seriously impairing Child’s mental condition and Mother’s supervision of Child
was unsafe and inappropriate. Following this finding, the court noted when
Mother took Child to the ER on December 10, 2015, Child stated she was
“having seizures like [her] mother,” (App. Vol. II at 29), and that at the young
age of six, Child has learned how to get Mother’s attention and the attention of
others by faking symptoms of seizures. The trial court noted Mother’s
delusions have, according to Guthrie, caused Child to be in fear of being
poisoned. The trial court noted Guthrie is the case manager at the shelter
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where Mother and Child stayed, and Guthrie interacted with Mother and Child
daily from July 2015, when they began staying at the shelter, until December
15, 2015, when the court removed Child from Mother. The court explicitly
found Guthrie credible.
[18] Mother claims the coercive intervention of the court is not necessary because, at
the time the court entered its dispositional order removing Child from her care,
Mother was seeking mental health treatment at Cummins and attending other
counseling services offered by the shelter. We acknowledge and commend
Mother for taking the initiative to improve her mental health and to begin
addressing the concerns that led DCS to file a CHINS petition in this case.
However, Mother’s participation in services alone is not sufficient to find the
trial court’s conclusion was erroneous, because the trial court’s findings support
its conclusion that Mother’s supervision of Child is still inappropriate without
the court’s intervention. We cannot say the court erred. See In re Des.B., 2
N.E.3d 828, 838-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming trial court’s CHINS
determination where facts most favorable to judgment supported court’s
conclusion).
Conclusion
[19] The court’s unchallenged findings support its conclusion Child is a CHINS.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s CHINS adjudication.
[20] Affirmed.
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Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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