J-S22002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MATHEW STEFAN MORALES,
Appellant No. 833 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001430-2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2017
Appellant, Mathew Stefan Morales, appeals from the February 16,
2016 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of
Lancaster County following a jury trial. We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court presented the facts of the crime in an
extensive fourteen-page summary of the evidence presented at trial. See
Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/16, at 2–15. Briefly, testimony established that
Manheim Township Police and Lancaster City Bureau of Police were
dispatched at 3:20 a.m. on June 21, 2014, to the area of the 1100 block of
Helen Avenue for a report by an individual on a cell phone reporting that he
had been shot. N.T., 2/8/16, 93–94, 114–115. Manheim Township Officer
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S22002-17
Kelly Spence testified that the victim, Xavier Garriga, was lying on his back
and bleeding, with a cell phone in his hand, in the 800 block of New Holland
Pike.1 Id. at 116–117. Three spent shell casings and a spent .40 caliber
bullet were also located and documented. Id. at 167, 182–191. The victim
died of a “through-and-through” gunshot wound to the chest from a bullet
that “went completely through the body, so there was no bullet within the
body.” N.T., 2/11/16, at 542. The Commonwealth presented an extensive
and exhaustive case of circumstantial evidence against Appellant. See Trial
Court Opinion, 9/2/16, at 2–15.
At the conclusion of the four-day trial, the jury convicted Appellant on
February 12, 2016, of first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). Appellant
waived a presentence investigation, and the trial court sentenced Appellant
on February 16, 2016, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
N.T., 2/12/16, at 8. On February 17, 2016, Appellant filed a post-sentence
motion requesting a new trial and asserting that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Appellant filed a second post-sentence motion on
February 24, 2016, contesting certain costs assessed against him. While
post-sentence motions were pending, Appellant filed a premature notice of
____________________________________________
1
Police and the Lancaster-Wide Communications dispatch center utilized the
pings from the cell phone to locate the victim. N.T., 2/8/16, at 93–95, 115–
117.
-2-
J-S22002-17
appeal on March 14, 2016, at Superior Court Docket Number 423 MDA 2016,
which he withdrew the next day.
The trial court denied both post-sentence motions by separate orders
on April 5, 2016. Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal on May 9,
2016, docketed in this Court at 744 MDA 2016.2 Apparently realizing his
misstep, Appellant presented a Motion to Reinstate Appellate Rights Nunc
Pro Tunc to the trial court.3 On May 18, 2016, the trial court reinstated
Appellant’s right to appeal nunc pro tunc, and Appellant filed the instant
notice of appeal on May 23, 2016. Both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, which we have
reordered for ease of disposition:
____________________________________________
2
The appeal was marked “Discontinued” on June 27, 2016.
3
The docket entries do not reveal the filing date of the motion, but it is
attached to the trial court’s order dated May 17, 2016, that was filed on May
18, 2016. There is no order quashing the appeal as untimely by this Court;
indeed, the appeal at 744 MDA 2016 was not marked as “Discontinued” until
June 27, 2016. Thus, on May 17, 2016, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s Motion to Reinstate Appellate Rights
Nunc Pro Tunc. As noted supra in note 1, however, that appeal eventually
was marked discontinued by this Court, and the trial court granted the nunc
pro tunc right to appeal. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, we
consider the appeal.
4
On July 15, 2016, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 3517, this Court dismissed the
instant appeal for Appellant’s failure to file a docketing statement. In
response to counsel’s explanatory petition, we reinstated the appeal on
August 3, 2016.
-3-
J-S22002-17
A. Whether the evid[e]nce presented at trial was insufficient to
find defendant guilty of first degree murder.
B. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that jury’s verdict was not against the weight of evidence
presented at trial.
Appellant’s Brief at 1 (full capitalization omitted).
We first address Appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119 (Pa.
2013). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v.
Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525–526 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Robertson-Dewar, 829 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super.
2003)). It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight
to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–793 (Pa.
Super. 2015). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Mucci, 143 A.3d 399, 409 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and
-4-
J-S22002-17
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v.
Rogal, 120 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Beyond reference to two cases setting forth the above standards,
Appellant’s two-sentence sufficiency argument in his brief is vague and
conclusory, and his claim is undeveloped. Appellant’s Brief at 6. Appellant
wholly fails to refer to any supporting case law. Appellant does not offer any
reason for his claim of insufficient evidence, beyond his bald assertion that
premeditation is lacking, and he does not espouse any recitation of how or
why the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant’s citation to seventy-
eight pages of notes of testimony, without any explanation, is insufficient to
support such a claim. Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 509
(Pa. 2015) (quoting Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (Pa.
2013), which stated that “where an appellate brief fails to . . . develop an
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived. It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [the]
appellant’s arguments for him.”) (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore,
we find the issue waived. However, even if the issue had been properly
preserved, we would find it lacks merit based upon the trial court’s extensive
analysis in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/16, at 19–
22.
Appellant also assails the weight of the evidence. “The weight of the
evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe
-5-
J-S22002-17
all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super.
2015). In Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme
Court set forth the following standards to be employed in addressing
challenges to the weight of the evidence:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560
Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751-[7]52 (2000);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177,
1189 (1994). A new trial should not be granted because of a
mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Widmer, 560
A.2d at 319–[3]20, 744 A.2d at 752. Rather, “the role of the
trial judge is to determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
justice.’” Id. at 320, 744 A.2d at 752 (citation omitted). It has
often been stated that “a new trial should be awarded when the
jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so
that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” Brown,
538 Pa. at 435, 648 A.2d at 1189.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented
with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard
of review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of
the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Brown, 648 A.2d at
1189. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination
that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467
-6-
J-S22002-17
Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). One of the least
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
was not against the weight of the evidence and that
a new trial should be granted in the interest of
justice.
Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321–[3]22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis
added).
Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054–1055. “Thus, the trial court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its
rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879–880 (Pa. 2008).
Appellant suggests that “no reasonable jury could conclude” that
Commonwealth witness Luis Fuentes “was credible.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Similarly, he avers that the jury could not have believed the testimony of
forensic reconstructionist Sergeant Jeffrey Jones. Id. at 5–6. Finally,
Appellant posits that in light of the testimony of forensic biologist Jennifer
Sears, the jury could not have concluded Appellant fired the shot that killed
the victim. The Commonwealth responds that the jury observed the
witnesses and their demeanor and decided the weight, if any, to accord to
their testimony. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. Moreover, all of the testimony
cited by Appellant was corroborated by other evidence presented, including
video, time-distance analysis, bullet-trajectory analysis, and the three shell
casings found at the scene. Id.
In the case at bar, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence against Appellant. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 723. It chose to believe
-7-
J-S22002-17
the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, as was its right. Id. Based
upon our review of the record, we conclude this issue lacks merit; we rely on
the thorough and detailed opinion of the Honorable Donald R. Totaro. 5 The
court weighed all of the evidence, found that it supported the verdict, and
determined that the jury’s verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice. Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/16, at 15–19. This
Court will not assume the role of fact-finder and reweigh the evidence.
Accordingly, based on the trial court’s opinion, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant relief on Appellant’s
challenge to the weight of the evidence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2017
____________________________________________
5
The parties are directed to attach the opinion in the event of future
proceedings in this case.
-8-
Circulated 04/10/2017 12:18 PM