FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 16 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIE HARRIS, No. 15-17360
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00971-CKD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Carolyn K. Delaney, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
**
Submitted February 9, 2017
Before: NELSON, TROTT, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Julie Harris appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Harris’s application for disability
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. Harris alleged disability due to fibromyalgia, anxiety, and
depression. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) provided specific, clear and
convincing reasons for finding that Harris’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible. First,
the ALJ properly found that Harris’s statement that she was only able to walk
twenty minutes before having to rest, was contradicted by the medical evidence
where no physician concluded that Harris had limitations consistent with disability,
and examining physician Dr. John Simmonds concluded that Harris could walk or
stand for six hours per day. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that an ALJ may consider a lack of medical evidence supporting
claimant’s allegations, but this factor cannot form the only basis for discounting
subjective symptom testimony).
Second, the ALJ properly found that Harris’s statement that she used a
computer to play games on a daily basis was inconsistent with her claim that her
impairments limited her ability to use a computer. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d
2 15-17360
661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that when weighing credibility, an ALJ may
consider a claimant’s daily activities).
Third, the ALJ properly found a specific inconsistency in testimony when at
Harris’s hearing she stated that she did not use cocaine, but during her psychiatric
evaluation Harris self-reported cocaine use and addiction. Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that claimant’s inconsistent statements
about drug usage properly diminished her credibility).
Accordingly, the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons in
finding that Harris was not entirely credible, and thus did not err in concluding that
Harris was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-17360