FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 09 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTINE LORRAINE HARRIS, No. 15-15537
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-01584-BAM
v. MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and GORDON,***
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
Appellant Christine Harris appeals from the district court’s order affirming
the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits. We affirm.
A. Any error the ALJ made in questioning the vocational expert is not a ground
for reversal.
Harris’s primary argument is that the ALJ erred by relying on tainted
testimony from a vocational expert. Harris contends that the ALJ improperly
asked the expert to give an opinion based on a hypothetical person who could lift
up to and including ten pounds when the ALJ found that Harris could lift less than
ten pounds. Harris’s argument fails because evidence in the record supports the
ALJ’s hypothetical to the expert. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 757 (9th
Cir. 1989) (“The limitation of evidence in a hypothetical question is objectionable
‘only if the assumed facts could not be supported by the record.’”) (citations
omitted). In addition, there is no evidence that the alleged error Harris points to
was material to the expert’s opinion or the ALJ’s decision—so it would be a
harmless error anyway. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886–88 (9th Cir.
2011).
B. The ALJ’s credibility determination was adequately supported by the record.
The ALJ gave significant weight to Harris’s subjective testimony. To the
extent that the ALJ found some of her testimony less than completely credible, the
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ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence in the
record. First, the ALJ noted that some of Harris’s allegations were inconsistent
with the objective medical evidence in the record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
947, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, the ALJ pointed to the fact that for years
Harris received relatively conservative treatment. Third, evidence of Harris’s daily
activities contradicted the extent of her complaints. Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015).
C. Harris waived her other arguments.
Harris also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to make additional findings
about her limitations and by failing to consider her explanations for adverse
evidence in the record. Because Harris raises these arguments for the first time on
appeal, they are waived. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158 n.7 (9th Cir
2001). But even if they were not waived, there is no indication that these errors
would be prejudicial; thus they are not grounds for reversal. McLeod, 640 F.3d at
886–88.
AFFIRMED.
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