J-S24028-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: D.T.H. A/K/A D.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
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APPEAL OF: K.H., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 1788 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree October 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000017-2016
IN RE: D.R.H., JR., A/K/A D.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.H., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 1789 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree October 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No: TPR No - CP-02-AP-0000018-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2017
K.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered October 26, 2016, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily
terminated her parental rights with respect to her minor daughter, D.T.H.,
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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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born in April 2013, and her minor son, D.R.H., Jr., born in May 2014
(collectively, “the Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm.
Mother first came to the attention of Allegheny County Children, Youth
and Families (“CYF”) in February 2014, after CYF learned that two of her
older children, who are not involved in this appeal, “held down a four-year-
old’s hand on a radiator and caused a burn.” N.T., 10/26/2016, at 68. As a
result of this incident, Mother was charged with endangering the welfare of
children. Id. at 72. In addition, Mother tested positive for cocaine at the
time of D.R.H., Jr.’s, birth in May 2014. Id. at 75. CYF provided in-home
services to Mother, but services closed unsuccessfully in August 2014 due to
her failure to participate. Id. at 69, 75.
On September 9, 2014, during a dependency hearing for one of
Mother’s older children, Mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.
Id. at 69, 71. That same day, Mother was arrested for failing to appear at a
hearing relating to her endangering the welfare of children charge. Id. at
77. CYF obtained emergency custody authorizations for both of the
Children. Id. at 72. The Children were adjudicated dependent by orders
dated October 8, 2014, and CYF placed the Children with their current pre-
adoptive foster mother, Q.J. (“Foster Mother”). Id. at 73-74.
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The decrees also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s putative
father, D.H., and the parental rights of any unknown father that the Children
may have. Neither D.H., nor any unknown father, has appealed the
termination of his parental rights.
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Following the adjudication of dependency, Mother failed to complete
her court-ordered reunification objectives. Most critically, Mother failed to
comply with drug and alcohol treatment, and failed to attend a majority of
her random urine screens. Id. at 79, 81. Mother attended only twenty-
three out of the sixty-six requested screens between September 9, 2014 and
October 6, 2016. Id. at 81. Five of the screens that Mother did attend were
positive, including Mother’s most recent screen on August 6, 2016, which
was positive for THC. Id. at 99, 127.
CYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to
the Children on February 2, 2016. The orphans’ court conducted a
termination hearing on October 26, 2016. Following the hearing, the court
entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother
timely filed notices of appeal on November 22, 2016, along with concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal.
Mother now raises the following claim for our review. “Did the
[orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in
concluding that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would serve the
needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(b)?”
Mother’s brief at 19.
We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
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by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide as follows.
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
On appeal, Mother concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing
evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section
2511(a). Mother’s brief at 23 (“CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and
convincingly establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(a)(2).”). Thus, we need only consider whether the
orphans’ court abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(b). The requisite analysis is as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-
interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
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importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, Mother argues that her visits with the Children are appropriate,
and that the Children are bonded to her. Mother’s brief at 26. Mother
argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion by focusing on her
failings as a parent, rather than the Children’s emotional well-being, when
deciding to terminate her parental rights. Id.
In its findings of fact, the orphans’ court found that the Children have
a bond with Mother, but that their primary bond is with Foster Mother.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/21/2016, at 9 (Findings of Fact ¶ 31, 33). The
court found that the Children’s need for a permanent home outweighs their
bond with Mother, and that terminating Mother’s parental rights would serve
their needs and welfare. Id.
Our review of the record supports the findings of the orphans’ court.
During the termination hearing, CYF presented the testimony of
psychologist, Patricia Pepe, Ph.D. Dr. Pepe testified that she conducted
interactional evaluations of the Children and Mother on November 19, 2014,
March 30, 2016, and August 18, 2016. N.T., 10/26/2016, at 7, 15-16, 23,
35, 41. In addition, Dr. Pepe conducted interactional evaluations of the
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Children and Foster Mother on March 30, 2016, and August 18, 2016. Id. at
12, 21, 41.
Based on these evaluations, Dr. Pepe opined that the Children have a
positive attachment to Mother. Id. at 33, 51. The Children were obviously
familiar with Mother and were comfortable in her presence. Id. at 24. The
Children also referred to Mother as “mommy.” Id. at 47. Dr. Pepe
described this attachment as follows: “It was more not in the sense of day-
to-day kind of experiences, but in terms of visiting with their mother. They
knew who she was, they could identify her, and they were relaxed and
comfortable in her presence.” Id. at 17-18.
Nonetheless, Dr. Pepe opined that the Children’s primary attachment
is to Foster Mother. Id. at 23, 33. Dr. Pepe acknowledged that the
Children’s behaviors were similar with both Mother and Foster Mother. Id.
at 48. The Children were very happy and relaxed in the presence of Foster
Mother, and they also referred to her as “mommy.” Id. at 22, 44.
However, the Children displayed a greater degree of familiarity with Foster
Mother. Id. at 51. Dr. Pepe provided the following description: “The
[C]hildren were happy with their mother, but there was a greater sense of
harmony, a kind of give and take, a familiarity of connection with [Foster
Mother] than there has been with [Mother], although it was positive with
[Mother].” Id. at 48.
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Dr. Pepe further opined that terminating Mother’s parental rights
would not cause irreparable harm to the Children. Id. at 33. Dr. Pepe
explained,
I think they might miss her and they might question her. I
certainly feel that [Foster Mother] is capable of addressing those
issues with her, and, you know, I just feel . . . that the children
have such a positive connection with [Foster Mother], that they’ll
be able to move on.
Id. Ultimately, Dr. Pepe recommended terminating Mother’s parental rights
so that the Children may be adopted and provided with permanency. Id. at
33-34, 61.
Thus, the record supports the finding of the orphans’ court that the
Children’s primary bond is with Foster Mother, rather than Mother. Further,
the record supports the court’s finding that the Children will not suffer
irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. It was within
the court’s discretion to accept Dr. Pepe’s opinions and recommendations,
and to conclude that the benefits of a permanent home with Foster Mother
would outweigh any emotional distress that the Children might experience if
their relationship with Mother is ended.
In addition, we reject Mother’s claim that the orphans’ court placed an
undue emphasis on her failings as a parent. Mother is correct that Section
2511(b) focuses on the welfare of the Children, and not on Mother’s parental
incapacity. However, it is beyond cavil that Mother’s incapacity, and the
likelihood that she will never remedy that incapacity, is an important
consideration when determining what is best for the Children. See C.D.R.,
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111 A.3d at 1220 (citing In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276
(Pa. Super. 2003)) (“Clearly, it would not be in Child’s best interest for his
life to remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that Mother will one day be able
to act as his parent.”).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not
abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
We therefore affirm the court’s October 26, 2016 decrees.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/17/2017
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