NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YAN SUI; PEI-YU YANG, No. 14-56929
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 8:13-cv-01776-JAK-AJW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
2176 PACIFIC HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2017**
Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Yan Sui and Pei-Yu Yang appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and for lack of subject matter
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195
(9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Sui’s takings claims because Sui lacks
standing to pursue claims that are property of his bankruptcy estate. See Canatella
v. Towers (In re Alcala), 918 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1990) (causes of action which
accrued before a chapter 7 petition is filed are part of the estate vested in the
trustee); see also Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Super. Ct. Case
Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (bankruptcy code
endows bankruptcy trustee with exclusive right to sue on behalf of estate).
The district court properly dismissed Yang’s takings claims as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because the claims were based on the same primary right
asserted in prior state court actions. See Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City
of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To determine the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment federal courts look to state law. . . . California’s res
judicata doctrine is based on a primary rights theory.” (citation omitted)); In re
Estate of Dito, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 286 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Under the doctrine of
res judicata, all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a
single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date.” (citation
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and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention that res judicata does not apply because
defendants obtained the state court judgment through extrinsic fraud, plaintiffs did
not allege any facts showing that defendants “prevent[ed] [Yang] from presenting
[her] claim[s] in [state] court.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th
Cir. 2004).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2) because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants conspired against plaintiffs based on their membership in a protected
class. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(elements of a § 1985 claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ request
for default judgment against defendant McIntyre because McIntyre joined a
successful motion to dismiss filed by several defendants which established the
insufficiency of plaintiffs’ complaint. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-
72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and factors for determining
whether to enter default judgment).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
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not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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