NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0785-14T1
BRYAN ALINTOFF,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RACHEL B. ALINTOFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
Argued May 11, 2016 – Decided May 18, 2017
Before Judges Ostrer, Haas and Manahan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-545-12.
Caryl Wolfson Leightman argued the cause for
appellant (Howard W. Bailey and Ms. Leightman,
attorneys; Mr. Bailey and Ms. Leightman, on
the briefs).
Clara S. Licata argued the cause for
respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OSTRER, J.A.D.
In this divorce case, defendant Rachel B. Alintoff appeals
from the trial court's final child custody order, pursuant to Rule
5:8-6, awarding plaintiff Bryan Alintoff primary residential
custody of the parties' son, Matt.1 The child was born in 2009,
two years after the parties married, and two years before plaintiff
filed for divorce. Defendant does not challenge the award of
joint legal custody to both parents. The custody trial, which
spanned twenty-eight days over several months, proceeded while
resolution of equitable distribution and permanent alimony was
stayed due to defendant's September 2012 bankruptcy filing.
However, defendant appeals from the trial court's order
terminating plaintiff's obligation to pay unallocated pendente
lite support to defendant, and requiring defendant to pay child
support to plaintiff. She contends the court erred in its
imputation of income to her, and violated the bankruptcy stay by
ordering her to pay child support. Defendant also appeals from
the trial court's order denying defendant's recusal motion. Having
considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and
applicable legal principles, we affirm, substantially for the
reasons set forth in Judge Linda Grasso Jones's comprehensive
written decisions.
1
We utilize a pseudonym to protect the child's privacy.
2 A-0785-14T1
I.
The trial court reviewed the facts in detail. It suffices
here to highlight the following. In September 2011, after a period
of marital difficulties, defendant vacated the marital home in New
Jersey with two-year-old Matt, many of his belongings, passport,
and other personal documents. She gave no advance notice to
plaintiff. She relocated to her parents' home in Brooklyn, and
never returned. Defendant claimed she feared for Matt's safety
if left with plaintiff since he possessed a gun.2 However, the
court concluded, upon review of the evidence, that she withheld
the child to retaliate against plaintiff, because she believed
plaintiff was having an affair and hiding assets from her with his
business partner.
Soon thereafter, plaintiff filed his divorce complaint and
an order to show cause to compel defendant to return Matt. On
September 28, 2011, the parties entered into a consent order that
provided the parties shared "joint legal and . . . physical
custody," and granted plaintiff parenting time from Friday morning
2
Plaintiff used the gun recreationally at a shooting range and
did not keep ammunition at home.
3 A-0785-14T1
to Monday morning.3 At the time, plaintiff worked away from home,
in finance, but returned home around 3:00 p.m., and defendant was
a stay-at-home caregiver. Eventually, however, plaintiff shifted
to working primarily from home; defendant moved out of her parents'
home and into her own apartment in Brooklyn, and began working
part-time.
In the months that followed Matt's removal and the
commencement of divorce proceedings, defendant took various steps
that were at odds with shared decision-making involving Matt. In
October 2011, she obtained an order of protection from a New York
court, barring plaintiff from interfering with defendant's care
and custody of Matt, but that court soon thereafter dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction.4 Defendant also threatened
litigation against the operator of a gymnastics class that
plaintiff proposed to send Matt to on Saturdays, when he had
3
The order required plaintiff to store the handgun at the shooting
range. However, after he learned he could not do so, he sold the
gun.
4
The New York court dismissed the action on October 11, 2011.
After defendant denied plaintiff his parenting time for the
weekend beginning on October 7, plaintiff obtained an emergent
order from one of Judge Grasso Jones's predecessors, which required
defendant to return Matt to New Jersey, granted plaintiff temporary
physical and legal custody, and granted defendant supervised
parenting time. We later vacated that order upon defendant's
emergent appeal and subjected the parties to the September 2011
consent order.
4 A-0785-14T1
parenting time. The parties exchanged numerous texts that the
trial court found demonstrated defendant's unwillingness to meet
plaintiff directly to discuss Matt's care. Defendant registered
multiple complaints about plaintiff with the Division of Youth and
Family Services, which ultimately found no reason for concern.
She also alleged, but failed to prove, plaintiff had an alcohol
problem.5
In December 2011, the court granted in part defendant's motion
for pendente lite support, ordering plaintiff to cover defendant's
schedule B automobile expenses, and pay $1157 in unallocated
support to defendant.6 In the same order, the court granted
plaintiff's motion to enjoin either party from enrolling Matt in
a school or activity without the other's written consent.
Questions arose regarding Matt's development and whether
certain interventions were warranted. Defendant obtained the
evaluation of a speech therapist without plaintiff's
participation. With plaintiff's consent (conveyed by his
attorney), the therapist then treated Matt for six months. In
5
In particular, she alleged plaintiff had an emergent, alcohol-
related hospital admission in New York. Plaintiff retained an
expert who confirmed that none of the over thirty hospitals in New
York had any records of the alleged admission.
6
The court designated the entire amount as non-deductible to
plaintiff and non-taxable to defendant.
5 A-0785-14T1
early 2013, defendant unilaterally obtained evaluations of Matt
from a New York City Board of Education contractor, OMNI Childhood
Center of Brooklyn. Without consulting with plaintiff or notifying
the court, defendant enrolled Matt in a Brooklyn pre-school geared
for children with special needs, which provided occupational,
physical and speech therapy. After learning of his enrollment
from Matt, plaintiff consented to his son's continued
participation rather than disrupt it. In the summer of 2013,
defendant also enrolled Matt in a summer school without consulting
plaintiff.
Plaintiff invited defendant to attend an evaluation of Matt
by a New Jersey licensed occupational therapist plaintiff
selected, Ursula Shah. Defendant appeared at the therapist's
office as scheduled, but instead of participating, she objected
to the session proceeding. Plaintiff had to obtain a court order
to enable the evaluation to proceed.
Other evaluations were performed during the course of the
litigation, some specifically for the purpose of trial. The
parties jointly retained Patricia Baszczuk, Ph.D., who completed
a 162-page custody evaluation in January 2013, based on a more
than year-long process that included numerous interviews of the
parties; observations of each party with Matt; psychological
testing; questionnaires of numerous friends and family members;
6 A-0785-14T1
and review of Matt's records, communications between the parties,
and videotapes of their interactions when transferring Matt. The
trial court found Dr. Baszczuk's report and testimony credible and
helpful.
After evaluating the statutory factors, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, Dr.
Baszczuk opined that it would serve Matt's best interests to grant
plaintiff primary residential custody.7 Among other things, Dr.
Baszczuk concluded that defendant was less willing or able to
compromise and coparent than plaintiff. She tended to make
unsupported accusations. Tension arose when she transferred Matt
to plaintiff and she exposed Matt to her anger. She was consumed
by the divorce-related conflict, and her family members were
actively engaged in her cause.
Dr. Baszczuk opined that plaintiff was better able to separate
himself from the litigation and focus on parenting strategies.
Dr. Baszczuk recommended the appointment of a parenting
coordinator. She also recommended that plaintiff attend sessions
with a therapist to deal with his anger. She recommended that
defendant "undergo a neuropsychological evaluation to investigate
possible underlying conditions for her emotionally charged and
unregulated behavior toward [plaintiff]; tendencies toward cyclic
7
Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought pendente lite implementation of
Dr. Baszczuk's recommendations.
7 A-0785-14T1
emotional outbursts; [and] recurring and problematic information
processing issues."
Defendant also obtained her own custody expert, Maria
Salvanto, Ph.D., who opined that defendant should receive primary
residential custody. However, the court gave no weight to Dr.
Salvanto's opinion because, among other reasons, she did not comply
with the Specialty Guidelines for Psychologists Custody/Visitation
Evaluations promulgated by the New Jersey Board of Psychological
Examiners.8
In the midst of the trial, the parties jointly retained
neurologist, Judith Bluvstein, M.D., to provide a litigation
opinion after a pediatric neurologist, Yuri Brosgol, M.D.,
diagnosed Matt with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or Asperger's
syndrome.9 Dr. Bluvstein opined that Matt's "constellations of
symptoms . . . are more indicative of frontal lobe dysfunction
than ASD/Asperger's." She diagnosed Matt with frontal lobe and
8
The court was critical of the expert's failure to address all
the factors in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), her minimal contacts with
plaintiff, and her failure to review all relevant documents.
9
Both parties attended Dr. Brosgol's evaluation of Matt, which
was not performed for litigation purposes, but was conducted while
the trial was ongoing. He found that Matt presented "features
[that] fit the criteria for autistic spectrum disorder" and "[h]is
high cognitive functioning skills and peculiar rigid
preoccupations . . . resemble what was previously known as
Asperger's syndrome."
8 A-0785-14T1
executive function deficit, language development disorder, and an
immature self-regulatory system. She recommended Matt have an MRI
and conduct a Video EEG Monitoring Test (VEEG) at a sleep center.
Dr. Bluvstein's report was admitted into evidence by consent.
In her ninety-page written decision, Judge Grasso Jones
considered each of the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.
[1] the parents' ability to agree, communicate
and cooperate in matters relating to the
child; [2] the parents' willingness to accept
custody and [3] any history of unwillingness
to allow parenting time not based on
substantiated abuse; [4] the interaction and
relationship of the child with its parents and
siblings; [5] the history of domestic
violence, if any; [6] the safety of the child
and the safety of either parent from physical
abuse by the other parent; [7] the preference
of the child when of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an
intelligent decision; [8] the needs of the
child; [9] the stability of the home
environment offered; [10] the quality and
continuity of the child's education; [11] the
fitness of the parents; [12] the geographical
proximity of the parents' homes; [13] the
extent and quality of the time spent with the
child prior to or subsequent to the
separation; [14] the parents' employment
responsibilities; and [15] the age and number
of the children.10
The court recognized that truly shared residential custody
was impractical, given defendant's plan to remain in Brooklyn and
10
We utilize the numbering adopted by the trial court.
9 A-0785-14T1
plaintiff's plan to remain in New Jersey (factor 12). Thus, the
court had to designate one parent as the primary residential
parent.
Many of the factors did not favor either party. The court
found that both parents deeply loved their son, had a close and
loving relationship with him (factor 4), and were willing to accept
custody (factor 2). Both parties were active and involved parents
before the separation; the judge found that plaintiff, even when
he worked outside the home, returned by 3:30 p.m. (factor 13).
Although the court noted that plaintiff now worked from home, and
defendant worked outside the home, neither parent's employment
responsibilities interfered with their ability to serve as the
parent of primary residence (factor 14).
There was no history of domestic violence (factor 5), and
neither posed a safety risk (factor 6). The court noted
plaintiff's sale of his handgun and rejected defendant's claims
of substance abuse. The court found that Matt had special needs,
although the trial evidence did not disclose a definitive diagnosis
(factor 8). Plaintiff was slower than defendant to recognize
Matt's needs for therapy, yet the court found that both parties
would meet his needs. The court noted that plaintiff recognized
the value of Matt's pre-school program and consented to it after
learning about it after-the-fact, and defendant was a "wonderful
10 A-0785-14T1
champion for the child in seeking out educational and therapeutic
opportunities." Matt's age did not favor one parent over the
other (factor 15). Although defendant had already enrolled Matt
in a Brooklyn kindergarten program to commence in the school year
following trial (factor 10), the court found that Matt did not
need to remain enrolled for continuity or quality reasons. He
would be graduating from his pre-school in any event.11
What tipped the balance in favor of plaintiff was the court's
finding that if granted primary residential custody, plaintiff was
more likely than defendant to coparent and work cooperatively.
The court reviewed the parties' voluminous text messages and their
parental performance during the pendente lite period. The judge
found that neither parent was blameless. She did not withhold
criticism of certain communications made by plaintiff. Yet, with
respect to their "ability to agree, communicate and cooperate"
(factor 1), the judge found:
Husband is more likely to reach out to Wife
to try and resolve matters. Based upon the
evidence presented, Wife has not exhibited
that willingness. The court finds that Wife
will not work with Husband toward a negotiated
resolution on issues concerning the child.
Wife behaves as if she is entitled to "make
the call" on all issues having to do with the
child. She does not respect Husband's rights
11
Other factors were irrelevant, such as the preferences of the
child (factor 7) — he was too young to express one — and his
relationship with siblings (factor 4) — he had none.
11 A-0785-14T1
to participate in important decisions
concerning the child. If this was the
behavior only when this litigation began, it
would not be of such concern, but the parties
have been separated for three years, and
Wife's behavior has not changed; if anything,
she has taken even greater steps in forcing
Husband out of the picture in making decisions
concerning the parties' child.
The court considered defendant's tendency to act
unilaterally, in connection with Matt's educational needs (factor
10). Although she was a "staunch advocate" for Matt, the court
found she "parents as if she is the only parent." Notwithstanding
that both parties had stable home environments (factor 9), the
court expressed concern that defendant's immediate family did not
support coparenting.12 The court was also critical of defendant's
interference with plaintiff's exercise of parenting time in the
early stages of the litigation (factor 3), although the court
recognized that the both parties subsequently abided by the
parenting time order.13 With respect to each parties' fitness to
12
The court cited defendant's brother's attempt, in a meeting with
plaintiff, to get plaintiff to drop his request for custody; and
a letter from defendant's father to plaintiff's former attorney,
threatening to bring charges against him.
13
The court noted that plaintiff voluntarily returned Matt on
Sunday nights, forfeiting his Sunday overnight parenting time,
rather than force Matt to awake very early Monday morning for the
return trip to Brooklyn and 8:30 a.m. drop-off. Defendant rejected
plaintiff's request to alter his parenting time period to Thursday
evening to Sunday evening.
12 A-0785-14T1
serve as the primary residential parent (factor 11), the court
reviewed in detail the evidence concerning plaintiff's alleged
substance abuse and found the allegation unsupported. On the
other hand, the court found that defendant was willing to sabotage
plaintiff's efforts — such as her opposition to Matt's gym class
and Dr. Shah's evaluation — even if contrary to Matt's interests.
The court designated plaintiff as the parent of primary
residence; defendant as the parent of alternative residence; and
granted defendant parenting time three out of every four weekends,
from the end of the Friday school day until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.,
plus Wednesday afternoon parenting time. Summer vacation time was
to be divided equally and the parties would alternate significant
holidays. Consistent with Dr. Baszczuk's recommendation, the
court ordered plaintiff to attend therapy "to address recurrent
issues and allegations of anger management[,]" and defendant was
required to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation, and attend
individual therapy. The parties were required to retain a
parenting coordinator and to utilize a specified calendaring
system, to assure they were informed of Matt's activities,
appointments and events.
Pending defendant's appeal, and pursuant to a limited remand,
the court later granted plaintiff's motion to terminate his
pendente lite unallocated support obligation to defendant and
13 A-0785-14T1
awarded plaintiff child support. The court averaged plaintiff's
income over a multi-year period, and imputed an income of $70,000
to defendant after finding defendant was voluntarily
underemployed, and set child support at $124 a week. The court
also denied defendant's recusal motion, which was based on her
filing a federal civil rights suit against the judge and others.
Defendant subsequently was permitted to amend her notice of appeal
to include this order.
II.
In a custody dispute, the trial court's "primary and
overarching consideration is the best interest of the child."
Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317 (1997). A trial judge is
obliged to consider the factors identified in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and
other relevant factors, and set forth its reasons for its decision
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(f). See id. at 316-17; see also Hand
v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) ("Custody issues
are resolved using a best interests analysis that gives weight to
the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).").
In considering defendant's challenge to the court's custody
order, we are mindful of our limited scope of review. We defer
to the trial judge's fact-findings, and shall not disturb them
unless convinced "they are so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible
14 A-0785-14T1
evidence as to offend the interest of justice." Abouzahr v.
Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 151 (App. Div.) (quoting
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 34 (2003). "That deference is
especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial
and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon,
191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998)). Our deference is also rooted in our respect for the
Family Part's special expertise in family matters. Cesare, supra,
154 N.J. at 411-12. Absent compelling circumstances, we are not
free to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, which
has become familiar with the case. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 68 N.J.
Super. 223, 232 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 143 (1961).
Nonetheless, we owe no special deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
On appeal, defendant revisits and reinterprets evidence in
the record; challenges the court's reliance on Dr. Baszczuk's
expert opinion, whom defendant attempts to discredit with ad
hominem attacks and questions of her impartiality; and asks us to
reach conclusions different from the trial court with respect to
defendant's willingness to coparent and cooperate with plaintiff,
and to secure the educational and therapeutic programs that Matt
15 A-0785-14T1
needs. In short, defendant asks us to substitute the trial court's
judgment with our own.
That we shall not do. Given our standard of review and having
carefully reviewed defendant's contentions with respect to the
award of primary residential custody, we affirm substantially for
the reasons set forth in Judge Grasso Jones's comprehensive written
opinion. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court's decision
to credit Dr. Baszczuk. See Fox v. Twp. of W. Milford, 357 N.J.
Super. 123, 131 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 279 (2003).
We are satisfied that substantial credible evidence supports Judge
Grasso Jones's credibility findings, her findings with respect to
the statutory factors, and her ultimate conclusion regarding the
custodial arrangement that will best serve Matt's interest.
We briefly address defendant's assertion that the court
committed reversible error by barring the testimony of proposed
experts and the admission of certain reports regarding Matt's
disabilities. These include: two undated reports of Candace
Toussie, the speech language pathologist; the OMNI evaluation
(consisting of a summary report); the social history report
prepared by a licensed clinical social worker, Lea Mendelsohn,; a
psychological evaluation of Matt by Shulamis Frieman, Psy.D.; a
progress report by Matt's special education teacher at Special
16 A-0785-14T1
Sprouts, Lauren V. Zunde; and Dr. Brosgol's neurologic
evaluation.14
First, we discern no error in the court's use of discretion
to bar Toussie's reports and the OMNI evaluation, as well as its
decision to bar the Special Sprouts witnesses from testifying as
experts — since they were not properly disclosed as such in
discovery. See State v. Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 414-15
(App. Div. 2011). The court also barred Dr. Brosgol's report
because it was not prepared for litigation purposes. However, the
court did not bar these professionals from testifying as fact
witnesses and defendant did not avail herself of this option.
Furthermore, the court permitted defendant to call an expert
witness to rebut Dr. Bluvstein's opinion, which was obtained in
the midst of trial. She declined.
Defendant misplaces reliance on Kinsella, supra, for the
proposition that the court was obliged to relax rules of evidence
to admit these reports. We recognize that "[o]ne consequence of
the special role of the courts in custody disputes is that
14
We granted defendant's post-argument motion to expand the record
to include these documents, which defendant proffered before the
trial court. We also permitted defendant to supplement the record
with documents that were not even offered at the trial court,
including subsequent Special Sprouts progress reports and Matt's
Individualized Education Plan, prepared by the New York City
Department of Education.
17 A-0785-14T1
evidentiary rules that are accepted as part of the adversarial
process are not always controlling in child custody cases."
Kinsella, supra, 150 N.J. at 318. The trial court necessarily
relies on mental health and other experts to ascertain the child's
best interests. Id. at 319-20. Yet, in Kinsella, the Supreme
Court also recognized the significant limitations in utilizing the
opinions of treating psychologists, as opposed to evaluations
prepared by litigation experts. Id. at 320-21. Notably,
"[e]valuators are more likely than treating psychologists to be
objective." Id. at 320. Therefore, the Court held that "the
first source of information about the parents' mental health should
be the independent experts appointed by the courts or hired by the
parties for the purpose of litigation, rather than the
professionals who have established relationships with the
parties." Id. at 328. Although the treating professionals here
relate to the child's health, not the parents', the principle in
Kinsella still applies. The trial court's decision to bar expert
opinions that were not solicited for litigation purposes and that,
in some cases, were solicited without plaintiff's participation,
was not at odds with Kinsella.
Second, and more importantly, based on our examination of the
precluded reports, the exclusion of the documents was not "of such
a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust
18 A-0785-14T1
result." R. 2:10-2. As discussed above, the factor that tipped
the balance in favor of designating plaintiff as the primary
residential parent was the court's finding that he was more likely
to cooperate and coparent than defendant. The court found that
both parents recognized Matt had special needs. Plaintiff
recognized the value of the Special Sprouts program and consented
to Matt's attendance, notwithstanding defendant's failure to
consult with him. Although Dr. Bluvstein questioned Dr. Brosgol's
assessment of ASD and Asperger's, Dr. Bluvstein nevertheless
discerned significant issues of concern, identified a frontal lobe
dysfunction, and recommended a MRI and an overnight VEEG exam. In
short, the excluded documentary evidence does not undermine the
court's findings that Matt has special needs; both parents
recognize that, and are prepared to address them; and plaintiff
is more likely than defendant to do so in a cooperative effort,
if granted primary residential custody.
We also shall not disturb the trial court's order on limited
remand, compelling defendant to pay child support that was
calculated based on defendant's imputed annual income of $70,000
and plaintiff's four-year averaged annual income of $152,000. We
review the court's determination for an abuse of discretion, see
Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990), and we find none.
19 A-0785-14T1
We reject defendant's procedural arguments. First, the
automatic stay imposed by defendant's bankruptcy filing did not
bar the court from awarding child support. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (automatic stay does not stay "the commencement
or continuation of a civil action . . . for the establishment or
modification of an order for domestic support obligations"); Henry
J. Sommer & Margaret Dee McGarity, Collier Family Law and the
Bankruptcy Code ¶ 5.03[3] (Matthew Bender); cf. Clark v. Pomponio,
397 N.J. Super. 630, 642-43 (App. Div.) (addressing alimony),
certif. denied, 195 N.J. 420 (2008). Second, the court did not
exceed the scope of our limited remand; we authorized the court
to address the "issue of pendent[e] lite support," which
encompassed pendente lite child support.
We also discern no error in the court's finding that
defendant, a college graduate with a prior history of full-time
employment, was voluntarily underemployed as a part-time waitress
working two nights a week. Defendant argues that the figure
imputed to her was excessive. At a subsequent plenary hearing on
the parties' financial issues, defendant will have an opportunity
to present additional competent evidence of her skills,
employability and earning capacity. Upon such a showing, a
downward adjustment of the $70,000 imputed figure may be warranted.
See Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8, 12 (App. Div. 1995)
20 A-0785-14T1
(noting that pendente lite support is typically decided on a
limited record). However, in the absence of a full record, we
shall not disturb the trial court's imputation of income based on
average wages of persons in New York City performing jobs related
to her past lines of work. See Sternesky v. Salcie-Sternesky, 396
N.J. Super. 290, 307-08 (App. Div. 2007) (stating that
"[i]mputation of income is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge based on the evidence presented").
Finally, we discern no merit to defendant's contention that
Judge Grasso Jones was obliged to recuse herself once defendant
decided to file suit against her in federal court. Defendant does
not even include in the record a copy of the complaint that she
contends justified recusal. We need not try to review an issue
"when the relevant portions of the record are not included." Cmty.
Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. Blume Goldfaden, 381 N.J. Super. 119, 127
(App. Div. 2005); see R. 2:6-1(a) (stating appellant must include
in the appendix "such other parts of the record . . . as are
essential to the proper consideration of the issues").15
15
Based on the trial court's decision rejecting defendant's
recusal motion, we understand that defendant also named the entire
Monmouth County judiciary, and included bizarre allegations that
the defendants were guilty of racketeering, "operat[ed] a cottage
industry and Star Chamber for profit and sadism," and engaged in
"a seditious conspiracy to undermine and usurp the Federal
government, through a calculated system of fraud, eugenics, and
21 A-0785-14T1
In any event, based on what has been presented before us, no
"reasonable, fully informed person [would] have doubts about the
judge's impartiality[.]" State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601, 606 (2015).
Here, defendant filed a lawsuit against the judge days before a
hearing on plaintiff's motion to terminate pendente lite support
and then immediately called for her disqualification. As such, a
"reasonable, fully informed person" would suspect the filing was
intended to "manipulate the judicial system and engage in forum
shopping," id. at 607, particularly in light of defendant's past
unsuccessful efforts to litigate her dispute in New York.16
To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining points
lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
social engineering; and dealing in obscene matters of human
trafficking, child pornography and child prostitution . . . ."
16
In addition to her failed effort to secure an order of
protection, defendant also filed an unsuccessful motion to change
venue before trial.
22 A-0785-14T1