IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1933
Filed June 7, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL SCOTT SHECKLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Robert J.
Richter, District Associate Judge.
Michael Sheckles appeals from his convictions for domestic abuse assault
(second offense), driving while barred, and eluding. AFFIRMED.
Taryn R. Purcell of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A woman’s live-in boyfriend assaulted her in her truck and led police on a
high-speed chase before crashing the vehicle. A jury found Michael Sheckles
guilty of domestic abuse assault (second offense), driving while barred, and
eluding. Sheckles contends (I) the district court should have granted his new trial
motion, alleging the State failed “to meet its burden of proving that he was the
assailant,” and (II) his trial attorneys were ineffective in “failing to address the
issue of the trial judge’s conflict of interest.”
I. New Trial Motion
Several witnesses saw a man beating a woman inside a vehicle and saw
the woman exit the vehicle with a bloodied face. One witness identified the
assailant as Sheckles and also identified him as the person who drove off in the
vehicle, but her trial testimony was impeached with her inconsistent prior
statement that she could not recall the assailant’s identity.
After the jury found Sheckles guilty, Sheckles moved for a new trial. He
asserted the witness’s “testimony was, at best, inconsistent with her prior sworn
statement,” “[n]one of the [other] witnesses was able to identify [him] as the
assailant,” and “[t]here was no credible evidence that [he] was the assailant
and/or driver.” The district court denied the motion.
On appeal, Sheckles contends the district court abused its discretion in
denying the motion. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998) (noting
district courts have wide discretion in ruling on new trial motions challenging the
weight of the evidence). He characterizes the record as containing “just one
identifying witness with varying version[s] of events.” Based on this
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characterization, he argues “there was not more credible evidence in favor of a
guilty verdict than there was for a not-guilty verdict.”
A verdict is indeed contrary to the weight of the evidence where “a greater
amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the
other.” See id. at 658 (quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 38 (1982)). On
appeal of a district court ruling addressing a weight-of-the-evidence challenge,
we are not called upon to review the underlying question of whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. See State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 203
(Iowa 2003). We simply review the exercise of discretion by the district court. Id.
With that principle in mind, we begin with the district court’s findings, which are at
odds with Sheckles’ characterization of the record.
The court determined the demeanor and testimony of the arguably
inconsistent witness “was actually more consistent with other evidence
submitted” and her deposition testimony “was more likely the testimony that [was]
questionable given the previous contacts and contextual pressures of testifying
against a neighbor.” The court found this witness’s trial testimony “credible.”
The record supports the court’s determination that the inconsistent witness
was not the only person to identify Sheckles. Although she was the only person
who named him, several other witnesses testified to facts that left little doubt the
assailant was Sheckles and that the driver of the vehicle involved in the chase
was also Sheckles.
Police officers testified they responded to the girlfriend’s house following
three 911 reports of an assault. They found and spoke to the bleeding and
crying girlfriend. According to a corporal with the Dubuque police department,
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she said she “and her live-in boyfriend, Mr. Sheckles, had been involved in an
argument in the back seat of her vehicle” and “[Sheckles] took her keys during
the argument and then threw them at her causing the laceration underneath her
eye.” Another Dubuque police officer corroborated this conversation. Sheckles’
girlfriend denied the conversation at trial, but the district court found this portion
of her testimony “marred by long pauses and a less than confident tone.” We will
not second-guess this assessment. See State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180,
216 (Iowa 2013) (stating appellate court does not sit to judge credibility of
witnesses).
As for the facts underlying the remaining charges, a witness other than the
challenged witness testified Sheckles “jump[ed] into” the truck and took off.
Several witnesses other than the challenged witness described the ensuing
chase.
In sum, other witnesses effectively identified Sheckles as the assailant
and eluder, if not by name then by surrounding events. In light of this evidence,
we conclude the district court’s determination that the evidence did not
“preponderate heavily against the verdict” was not “a clear and manifest abuse of
discretion.” See id. We affirm the court’s denial of Sheckles’ new trial motion.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Conflict of Interest
Sheckles states the trial judge “served as assistant county attorney”
before becoming a judge and, in that capacity, prosecuted him on a prior
domestic assault charge. He claims the judge’s involvement “creat[ed] the strong
potential for bias.” He asserts he raised the issue with his trial attorneys but they
did not pursue it. After the court pronounced sentence, he “took it upon himself
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to address the issue of the conflict of interest with the Court.” He informed the
judge, “You also were prosecuting attorney on a prior domestic. I think this
should have been a change of venue. I don’t think this is right at all.” The district
court responded, “Well, Mr. Sheckles, you didn’t bring any of that up, so that’s my
sentence today.”
On appeal, Sheckles claims the attorneys’ failure to pursue a conflict-of-
interest claim amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail,
Sheckles must show (1) counsel breached an essential duty and (2) prejudice
resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see State v.
Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). We generally preserve ineffective
assistance claims for postconviction relief where the record is inadequate to
resolve the claim on direct appeal. See State v. Toles, 885 N.W.2d 407, 408
(Iowa 2016) (concluding record was “inadequate to determine whether
[defendant’s] counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for recusal at the
sentencing hearing”).
We find the record inadequate. Accordingly, we preserve Sheckles’
conflict-of-interest claim for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.