J-A07027-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID FINK
Appellant No. 1431 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-SA-0001452-2016 TR 624-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 08, 2017
Appellant, David Fink, appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence
entered on September 26, 2016 following a trial de novo before the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. Upon review, we affirm.
The underlying facts and procedural history are undisputed. The trial
court adequately summarized both the facts and the procedural history.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/16, at 1-2. Briefly, at the de novo trial, Sergeant
Matthew DeLallo of the Brentwood Borough Police Department stopped
Appellant after seeing him traveling through a steady red light, in violation
of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3112.1 At the conclusion of trial, Appellant was
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Section 3112, in relevant part, provides:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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adjudicated guilty and ordered to pay a $25 fine, in addition to court costs.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues: (i) the trial court prevented
him from presenting evidence; (ii) the evidence offered by the
Commonwealth at the de novo trial was insufficient to support his conviction
of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3112(a)(3)(i) (relating to traffic-control signals,
steady red indication). We find that relief must be denied.
In Commonwealth v. Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d 249 (Pa. Super. 2002),
this Court held:
Our standard of review from an appeal of a summary
conviction heard de novo by the trial court is limited to a
determination of whether an error of law has been
committed and whether the findings of fact are supported
by competent evidence. Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793
A.2d 949 (Pa. Super. 2002). “The adjudication of the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Parks, 768 A.2d
1168, 1171 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Id. at 251.
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(Footnote Continued)
(i) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall stop at
a clearly marked stop line, or if none, before entering the
crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then
before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until
an indication to proceed is shown except as provided in
subparagraph (ii) [not applicable here].
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3112(a)(3)(i).
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Regarding Appellant’s first claim (i.e., the trial court prevented
Appellant from presenting evidence), we note that upon the Commonwealth
finishing questioning its main witness (Sergeant DeLallo), the trial court
offered Appellant the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.2 Appellant
repeatedly declined to do so. N.T. Summary Appeal, 9/26/16, at 6-7.
Rather Appellant attempted to introduce a Google map. Id. at 7. The trial
court informed Appellant that he could proceed with the introduction of the
evidence if he could it do properly. Id. After a few unsuccessful attempts,
Appellant declined to proceed any further with the introduction of the map.
Id. at 8. Finally, the trial court asked Appellant to make an argument in
response to the evidence offered by the Commonwealth; Appellant declined.
Id. Appellant, therefore, had the opportunity to make his case but decided
not to do so. It seems, therefore, Appellant is simply unhappy with the trial
court’s unwillingness to give him, as a pro se litigant, a free pass on
complying with the rules of evidence. Despite the trial court’s willingness to
help Appellant make his case, the trial court is not Appellant’s counsel See
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (“pro se status confers
no special benefit upon a litigant, and a court cannot be expected to become
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2
The witness testified that he saw Appellant run through a red light. N.T.
Summary Appeal, 9/26/16, at 6. As noted infra, Appellant did not challenge
the testimony of the officer.
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a litigant’s counsel”). Therefore, the trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion in holding Appellant to the rules of evidence.
Regarding Appellant’s second claim (i.e., sufficiency of the evidence),
we note that: 1) Appellant did not challenge in any form the
Commonwealth’s version of the facts, see N.T. Summary Appeal, 9/26/16 at
6-8; see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/16, at 2 (Appellant “did not cross
[the Commonwealth witness] nor offer any testimony”); 2) the trial court
believed the Commonwealth’s version of the facts, Trial Court Opinion,
10/28/16, at 2 (the trial court “found the testimony of [the Commonwealth
witness] to be credible”); and 3) the evidence proffered was legally sufficient
to prove the crime of which Appellant was found guilty as charged, see N.T.
Summary Appeal, 9/26/16 at 4-6; see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/16,
at 2 (“The uncontroverted testimony presented at the hearing satisfied the
Commonwealth’s burden of proving that [Appellant] drove his vehicle
through the steady red traffic signal”).
Upon review, therefore, we conclude that no error of law has been
committed and that the findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/8/2017
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