[Cite as State v. Brandyberry, 2017-Ohio-4320.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2015-CA-30
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2015-CR-58
:
LANCE T. BRANDYBERRY : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 16th day of June, 2017.
...........
JANE A. NAPIER, Atty. Reg. No. 0061426, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Champaign
County Prosecutor’s Office, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
J. DAVID TURNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0017456, P.O. Box 291771, Kettering, Ohio 45429
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
TUCKER, J.
-2-
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Lance Brandyberry appeals from his conviction and
sentence, following a plea of guilty, for one count of grand theft, one count of receiving
stolen property, and one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle. He contends that the
trial court did not comply with the provisions of R.C. 2929.19(D). He further contends
that the trial court erred by including court-appointed counsel fees, fees and costs into the
post-confinement payment schedule.
{¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court made findings sufficient to comport with the
requirements of R.C. 2929.19(D). However, we conclude that the trial court did err with
regard to fees and costs. Accordingly, we hereby modify the trial court’s final judgment
entry by vacating and excising only the words “court costs” and “court appointed legal
fees” from the financial obligation payment schedule to the extent that the schedule
compels Brandyberry to make monthly payments toward his court-appointed counsel fees
and costs in connection with his criminal case. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed
as modified.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} In March 2015, Phil and Tina Cook reported the theft of five guns, jewelry
and a vehicle to the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office. An investigation revealed that
Brandyberry, Tina Cook’s son, had taken the guns, jewelry and vehicle. Brandyberry
sold some of the guns. He also sold the jewelry.
{¶ 4} On May 7, 2015, Brandyberry was indicted on five counts of grand theft
(firearm), one count of grand theft (vehicle), eight counts of receiving stolen property, one
-3-
count of theft, one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle, and one count of possession
of criminal tools. Following plea negotiations, he entered a plea of guilty to one count
grand theft (vehicle), one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle and one count of
receiving stolen property. The remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court
ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI).
{¶ 5} The trial court sentenced Brandyberry to an aggregate term of 45 months in
prison. The trial court disapproved placement in an intensive program prison. The trial
court also included court-appointed counsel fees and costs into the post-confinement
payment schedule. Brandyberry appealed.
{¶ 6} Brandyberry’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which counsel represented that
she found no potentially meritorious issues for review. Following her “no merit”
representation, counsel identified two possible issues for appellate review. As required
by Anders, we reviewed the record to determine whether these issues were “wholly
frivolous.” Id. at 744. In doing so, we found one potential assignment of error having
arguable merit that was not raised by appellate counsel. By decision and entry dated
October 21, 2016, we stated “there is a potential assignment of error having arguable
merit concerning the trial court’s inclusion of court-appointed legal fees and expenses
and court costs in the post-prison payment schedule set forth in its judgment entry.” New
appellate counsel was appointed to address that potential assignment of error along with
any other assignments of error that counsel deemed warranted. The matter has been
briefed by both parties.1
1
Counsel for Brandyberry is admonished to comply with the provisions of App.R. 19(A)
-4-
II. Intensive Program Prison
{¶ 7} Brandyberry’s first assignment of error states as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISAPPROVING INTENSIVE PROGRAM
PRISON WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC FINDINGS THAT GIVE REASONS FOR
DISAPPROVAL.
{¶ 8} Brandyberry contends that the trial court erred when it failed to make the
necessary findings, as required by R.C. 2929.19(D), to support its decision to disapprove
him for intensive program prison (IPP).
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.19(D) states:
The sentencing court, pursuant to division (I)(1) of section 2929.14
of the Revised Code, may recommend placement of the offender in a
program of shock incarceration under section 5120.031 of the Revised
Code or an intensive program prison under section 5120.032 of the Revised
Code, disapprove placement of the offender in a program or prison of that
nature, or make no recommendation. If the court recommends or
disapproves placement, it shall make a finding that gives its reasons for its
recommendation or disapproval.
{¶ 10} As noted by Brandyberry, “[w]e have previously held that a general
statement indicating that the trial court based its decision to approve or disapprove IPP
after reviewing certain parts of the record (such as criminal history, PSI, and facts and
circumstances of the offense) does not satisfy the finding requirement in R.C.
with regard to appellate brief forms.
-5-
2929.19(D).” State v. Stapleton, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2016-CA-6, 2016-Ohio-7806,
¶ 14, citing State v. Matthews, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26405, 2015-Ohio-3388, ¶ 4-5,
14 and State v. Allender, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24864, 2012-Ohio-2963, ¶ 13-14, 23,
26. “However, in State v. Johnson, 2016–Ohio–5160, 69 N.E.3d 176 (2d Dist.), we
recently held that the finding requirement in R.C. 2929.19(D) was satisfied where the trial
court stated at the sentencing hearing that it disapproved IPP ‘[a]fter reviewing the nature
and circumstances of [defendant's] offense, [defendant's] conduct while on bond, the
[PSI], [defendant's] criminal history, [defendant's] prior service of imprisonment, and
[defendant's] conduct while residing at the Tri–County Regional Jail’ and also set forth
facts in the record that supported the trial court’s rationale for the disapproval. Id. at
¶ 22-23, 28-29.” Stapleton at ¶ 15.
{¶ 11} At the sentencing hearing in this case, the trial court took statements from
counsel as well as Brandyberry. The court questioned Brandyberry about his drug use
and his extensive criminal history. The trial court noted that it had reviewed the PSI.
The court then made numerous specific findings regarding the nature and circumstances
of the current offenses, Brandberry’s prior criminal offenses, and his conduct while on
community control sanctions.
{¶ 12} The court noted that Brandyberry’s juvenile record indicated a progression
in the seriousness of the offenses: (1) truancy charges in 2001 and early 2007; (2)
criminal mischief in 2007; (3) no driver’s license, fictitious plates and false information to
a police officer in March 2008; (4) criminal damaging in August 2008; (5) chronic truancy
in 2009; and (6) a 2010 burglary that would constitute a second degree felony if
Brandyberry were an adult.
-6-
{¶ 13} The trial court also discussed Brandyberry’s criminal history as an adult
which included: (1) unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in 2010; (2) falsification in 2011;
(3) theft in 2011; (4) assault in January 2013; (5) criminal damaging in June 2013; and (6)
misuse of credit cards in 2014. The court noted that Brandyberry had probation
violations related to four of the six adult offenses. The trial court noted that it had
considered the principles and purposes of sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well
as the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.
{¶ 14} The trial court made all of the appropriate findings as related to sentencing,
and it then effectively referred back to those findings when it made its general statement
disapproving IPP. Thus, we conclude that this record demonstrates that the trial court
complied with R.C. 2929.19(D).
{¶ 15} The first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Court Costs and Attorney Fees
{¶ 16} Brandyberry’s second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INCLUDING COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
FEES AND COSTS INTO THE COURT’S POST-CONFINEMENT PAYMENT
SCHEDULE.
{¶ 17} Brandyberry contests, and the State concedes error, regarding the portion
of his sentencing judgment that provides:
Defendant shall pay court costs, fine, restitution and court-appointed legal
fees at a minimum of $50.00 per month beginning the second month after
release from confinement and due the 28th of each month thereafter.
-7-
Clerk shall apply monies collected to restitution, court costs, fine, and court-
appointed legal fees in that order.
{¶ 18} This court has held that it is improper to include costs and appointed-
counsel fees within a post-confinement payment schedule. State v. Johnson, 2016–Ohio–
5160, 69 N.E.3d 176, ¶ 41-43 (2d Dist.).2
{¶ 19} The second assignment of error is sustained.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 20} Brandyberry’s first assignment of error is overruled and his second
assignment of error is sustained. His second assignment of error being sustained, we
hereby modify the trial court’s final judgment entry by vacating and excising only the words
“court costs” and “court appointed legal fees” from the financial obligation payment
schedule to the extent that the schedule compels Brandyberry to make monthly payments
toward his court-appointed counsel fees and costs in connection with his criminal case.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified.
.............
HALL, P.J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
2
We are likewise concerned that the post-prison payment schedule for restititution and
fines is of no effect because after completion of a prison sentence the trial court has no
authority to impose additional sanctions and no authority to enforce monetary obligations
except through civil enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio
St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d 512 (trial court had no authority to impose a post-
release no-contact order between offender and the victim.) However the efficacy of that
part of the court's order was not specifically challenged in this appeal.
-8-
Copies mailed to:
Jane A. Napier
J. David Turner
Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio