[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 05-12568 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 8, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 99-00084-CR-B-M
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ELIZABETH DIANNE BEASON,
a.k.a. Elizabeth Beason,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 8, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Elizabeth Dianne Beason appeals her sentence imposed upon revocation of
her supervised release. Beason asserts the district court erred by failing to consider
all of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it sentenced her to 24 months’
imprisonment, instead of to a reasonable sentence within her advisory guideline
range. Beason concedes the district court does not have to make specific findings
as to each factor, but asserts “it must articulate at least enough of its reasoning to
permit an informed appellate review.” She contends the district court’s judgment
constituted plain error because: (1) the district court erred by deviating from the
requirements of § 3553(a); (2) this error was plain, since it constituted a violation
of the law; and (3) her substantial rights were affected, since the district court
would have imposed a different sentence if it had taken all of the § 3553(a) factors
into consideration. The district court did not plainly err, and we affirm.
Where, as here, a defendant raises a sentencing argument for the first time
on appeal, we review for plain error only. United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d
1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000). Under the plain error standard, we may not correct an
error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there is (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id.
Upon finding a defendant violated a condition of supervised release, a court,
after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7),
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may “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the
offense that resulted in such term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Some of the factors listed in § 3553(a) include: (1) the need for the sentence
imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed medical care; and (2) in
the case of a violation of supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We
recently stated “nothing in [United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)] or
elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Scott, __ F.3d __, No. 05-11843, 2005 WL 2351020, at
*4 (11th Cir. Sept. 27, 2005).
The Sentencing Guidelines applying to revocation of probation, which
appear in chapter seven, “are merely advisory, and it is enough that there is some
indication the district court was aware of and considered them.” Aguillard, 217
F.3d at 1320. The district court may impose any sentence within the statutory
maximum, and a sentence in excess of the chapter seven range is permitted so long
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as it is within the range imposed by Congress. United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d
357, 362–63 (1996).
Beason’s assertion her sentence must be vacated due to the district court’s
failure to consider all of the factors listed in § 3553(a) is without merit. Although
the district court did not (1) explicitly state it had considered each of the § 3553(a)
factors, or (2) detail the weight that it had accorded to each factor, it was not
required to do so. See Scott, 2005 WL 2351020, at *4. In any event, the district
court indicated it had considered some of the factors listed in § 3553(a), including
the need for the sentence imposed to punish Beason for her criminal conduct, deter
her from future criminal conduct, and provide her with mental health services. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Additionally, the district court explicitly stated it had
taken the policy statements into consideration in imposing Beason’s sentence. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); Aguillard, 217 F.3d at 1320. Accordingly, the district
court did not plainly err by not explicitly stating it had considered each of the
§ 3553(a) factors, and we affirm Beason’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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