MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Jun 20 2017, 9:23 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen M. O’Connor Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Agency Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christa Gorman, June 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1610-CR-2295
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William Nelson,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G18-1510-F6-37509
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Christa Gorman appeals her conviction for resisting law enforcement as a level
6 felony. Gorman raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether there
is sufficient evidence to support the trier of fact’s rejection of her insanity
defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 20, 2015, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Paul Watkins
responded to a dispatch regarding a female, later identified as Gorman, going
through some items in a vehicle. When Officer Watkins arrived at the scene,
the complainant pointed out the vehicle in which Gorman had left traveling
southbound on Shadeland Avenue. Officer Watkins attempted to catch up with
Gorman’s vehicle in his fully-marked police vehicle and activated its emergency
lights and siren, and Gorman pulled her vehicle to the side of the road. Officer
Watkins exited his police vehicle and walked toward Gorman’s vehicle, and
when he reached the back of it, Gorman “sped off.” Transcript Volume II at
26. As Officer Watkins pursued her with his lights and sirens activated,
Gorman traveled through a red stoplight, merged onto I-465 north, later merged
onto I-69 north, and drove off the roadway into a ditch. Officer Watkins exited
his vehicle, and Gorman looked at Officer Watkins and “took off again.” Id. at
28. Officer Watkins and another officer drove on each side of Gorman’s
vehicle in an attempt to force her to exit the interstate. Gorman exited the
interstate onto 96th Street, and at that point she became pinned in by police
vehicles and was taken into custody. Officer Watkins heard Gorman make
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statements which led him to believe she was intoxicated or on some kind of
drug.
[3] Officer Watkins met with Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Craig
Wildauer, who was assigned to the DUI unit, at Eskenazi Hospital to assist
with the investigation. Officer Wildauer observed that Gorman’s balance was
unsteady, her speech was slow, and she would speak with her eyes closed.
Officer Wildauer was not able to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on
Gorman because she could not keep her eyes open and he could not go through
the steps for the test. Gorman stated to Officer Wildauer that she had smoked
methamphetamine and taken Xanax a few days earlier. Gorman consented to a
blood draw, and the toxicology report indicated positive findings for
methamphetamine of “89 ±16 ng/mL” and for amphetamine of “39 ±7
ng/mL.” State’s Exhibit 3.
[4] The State charged Gorman as alleged in an amended information with: Count
I, resisting law enforcement as a level 6 felony; Count II, operating a vehicle
while intoxicated endangering a person as a class A misdemeanor; and Count
III, operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its
metabolite in the body as a class C misdemeanor. Gorman filed a motion for
psychiatric examination to determine her sobriety and competence to stand
trial. The trial court appointed George Parker, M.D., and Stephanie Callaway,
PsyD, to evaluate in part whether Gorman was of sound mind on the date of
the alleged offenses, both doctors filed reports with the court. Gorman also
filed a notice of defense of mental disease or defect.
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[5] In his report, Dr. Parker stated that Gorman “described her drug use in the
weeks prior to her arrest on the current charges as ‘mostly beer and smoking
dope,’ referring to methamphetamine.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at
124. Under a heading for diagnostic impression, Dr. Parker’s report stated
“[u]nspecified psychotic disorder” and also methamphetamine, alcohol, and
cannabis use disorder “in remission in a controlled environment.” Id. at 125.
The report stated that during the clinical interview Gorman’s account of the
offenses was presented dramatically in a stream of consciousness style though
apparently with different content than she provided for her attorney, and the
difference in her accounts and her dramatic style suggested the possibility of
persistent disorganization of her thought process. Dr. Parker’s report stated
that Gorman did not appear to meet the criteria for schizophrenia as her
psychosis was brief in duration, but she may be a candidate for a diagnosis of
bipolar disorder based on her elevated mood, rapid speech, and dramatic
emotions during the interview. His report also stated that Gorman’s psychosis
did not appear to be due to intoxication from drugs as she reported no use of
alcohol or drugs for two days prior to the day of her arrest, and a blood test
after her arrest was positive only for opiates which typically do not cause
agitation or psychosis. Given the limited information he had he believed the
most appropriate diagnosis was an unspecified psychosis.
[6] Dr. Parker’s report further stated “[i]t is my opinion, with reasonable medical
certainty, that [Gorman] did have a mental disease . . . at the time of the alleged
offenses” and “[i]t is further my opinion, with reasonable medical certainty,
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that [Gorman] did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her behavior at the time
of the alleged offenses.” Id. at 128. His report stated that, based on her
account, it appears Gorman developed paranoid delusions before leaving
Logansport, began to experience grandiose delusions and ideas of reference
while driving around Indianapolis, and ultimately began to experience auditory
hallucinations. His report further stated that, though Gorman initially behaved
appropriately by responding to the police car behind her, this rational thinking
and behavior was easily overwhelmed by her disorganized and paranoid
delusional thinking which overrode her initial reaction and caused her to drive
away from the officer. His report further stated “[i]n addition, though her
thinking and behavior were clearly impaired on the day of the alleged offense,
this was primarily due to her psychotic and delusional thought processes, and
not to voluntary intoxication.” Id. at 129.
[7] In her report, Dr. Callaway stated that, based on the toxicology report and
Gorman’s self-report, Gorman likely used methamphetamine within one to two
days prior to the offense. Dr. Callaway’s report stated:
It is my opinion, with a reasonable degree of psychological
certainty, that she was most likely experiencing substance-
induced psychosis and/or the residual effects of this substance. It
is also my opinion that she did not meet criteria for a mental
disease or defect (e.g., Schizophrenia or Bipolar Disorder) and
she could appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions during the
alleged offense.
Although the toxicology report indicated she was not acutely
psychotic, she was likely experiencing the residual effects and/or
withdrawing from this substance. Officers observed that Ms.
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Gorman seemed impaired and observed that she had slow
speech, poor balance, she was closing her eyes while talking, and
she did not know the date. Therefore, her behavior and thinking
during the alleged offense was likely influenced by her recent use
of and/or withdrawal from this substance.
Although possible, it is unlikely that she was experiencing
symptoms of a mental illness. Ms. Gorman has no prior history
of a diagnosis of psychosis. She reported one prior incident when
she experienced “a full blown hallucination,” but it is unclear if
she was under the influence of illicit substances at that time.
During this evaluation, she showed no overt signs of a mental
illness and she was not taking psychoactive medications.
Id. at 136. Dr. Callaway concluded:
Regarding sanity, it is . . . my opinion that [Gorman] was most
likely experiencing substance-induced psychosis and/or the
residual effects of methamphetamines at the time of the alleged
offense. It is my opinion that she did not have a mental disease
or defect that rendered her unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of her actions during the alleged offense.
Id. at 136-137.
[8] At trial, Dr. Parker testified that based on his examination and the sources he
reviewed, it was his opinion that Gorman did not appreciate the wrongfulness
of her actions at the time. Dr. Parker indicated that the toxicology report
showed a presence of a certain level of methamphetamine and amphetamine in
Gorman’s blood and he wrote his report prior to having knowledge of the lab
report results. He also testified that Gorman’s psychosis persisted longer than
her intoxication and he “chose to call it unspecified psychosis,” that “[y]ou
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could make an argument that it could be called psychosis due to use of
methamphetamine. It’s describing the same situation,” that “[e]verybody is
different. Their tolerance, there’s the way people react to drugs. It varies,” and
“I made a decision that I thought after two days it was no longer directly due to
the intoxication.” Transcript Volume II at 82.
[9] Dr. Callaway testified that she concluded “that the impairments that were going
on were related to her recent drug use. Residual effects of that,” “she didn’t
have a mental disease or defect at that time,” and “she could appreciate the
wrongfulness of her actions.” Id. at 86. Dr. Callaway also testified she
reviewed Gorman’s history of symptoms and concluded there was no
indication she had a severe mental illness, and that her symptoms on the day of
the incident related to her substance use.
[10] In closing, the prosecutor argued “[w]e have multiple conclusions,” “[o]ne
doctor says that this was the effect of methamphetamine,” and “[t]he other
doctor says it was an unspecified psychosis. However, in doing that he also
indicated that . . . the secondary factor psychosis is methamphetamine use.” Id.
at 100. Gorman’s defense counsel argued in closing that Gorman had proven
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence by Dr. Parker’s testimony and
“[o]bviously the Court has to determine which expert witness is more reliable.”
Id. at 101. Defense counsel also argued Dr. Parker is a medical doctor who had
done over two thousand forensic interviews.
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[11] The trial court heard Dr. Parker’s statement, when asked to distinguish between
an unspecified psychosis and substance abuse induced psychosis, that “you can
call this methamphetamine induced psychosis,” and it stated that “[s]o with
that respect he was kind of agreeing with Dr. Callaway.” Id. at 103. The court
found that it was “going to weigh toward Doctor Callaway’s report and find
[Gorman] did not meet the burden of showing insanity at the time of the
offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 103-104. It found Gorman
guilty of resisting law enforcement as a level 6 felony under Count I and
operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite
in her body as a class C misdemeanor under Count III and found her not guilty
of operating a vehicle while intoxicated under Count II. The court sentenced
Gorman to 730 days with 612 days suspended to probation for her conviction
under Count I and to 118 days for time served for her conviction under Count
III, to be served concurrently. The court also stated that it would reduce the
level 6 felony under Count I to a misdemeanor if Gorman did everything she
was supposed to do, mainly a substance abuse evaluation and treatment.
Discussion
[12] The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trier of fact’s
rejection of Gorman’s insanity defense.1 When reviewing a trier of fact’s
verdict which rejected the defense of insanity, we will not reweigh evidence,
1
Gorman does not challenge her conviction for operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled
substance or its metabolite in her body as a class C misdemeanor under Count III.
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reassess witness credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of
fact. Robinson v. State, 53 N.E.3d 1236, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Myers
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ind. 2015)), trans. denied. A finding that a
defendant was not insane at the time of the offense warrants substantial
deference from reviewing courts. Id. Thus, when a defendant claims that an
insanity defense should have been successful, the conviction will be set aside
only “when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that
the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Id. (citation
omitted).
[13] Gorman contends that she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her
conduct and requests this court to reverse her conviction for resisting law
enforcement. She argues that, although the evidence of insanity was not
without conflict, she proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she
suffered from a mental disease, defect, or unspecified psychosis which was not
the result of voluntary intoxication. She argues that her methamphetamine use
was secondary to psychotic impairment because her use two days prior was far
enough out that she was no longer intoxicated, and her psychosis persisted
longer than one would reasonably expect intoxication to last.
[14] The State argues that Dr. Callaway’s testimony was unequivocal, finding that
Gorman’s behavior the day of the offense was due to an isolated incident of the
effects of methamphetamine use, and that consequently Gorman’s mental state
was due to voluntary intoxication and she was able to appreciate the
wrongfulness of her actions. The State also argues that Dr. Parker’s conclusion
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that Gorman was insane at the time of the offense was equivocal at best and
that Dr. Parker testified there was a fine line between unspecified psychosis and
substance abuse induced psychosis and that everyone has a different tolerance.
The State maintains the evidence does not lead to the single conclusion that
Gorman was insane when she committed the offense.
[15] To be convicted of a criminal offense, the State must prove each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson, 53 N.E.3d at 1241 (citing Myers,
27 N.E.3d at 1074-1075 (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(a))). Criminal
responsibility can be avoided if the defendant can successfully raise and
establish the “insanity defense.” Id. (citing Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1075). To
successfully assert this defense, an individual must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence: (1) that he or she suffers from a mental illness and (2) that the
mental illness rendered him or her unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
or her conduct at the time of the offense. Id. (citing Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1075).
Thus, proof of mental illness alone is insufficient. Id.
[16] Gorman asserted an insanity defense, and the court rejected it and found her
guilty of resisting law enforcement. Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(b) provides that “the
burden of proof is on the defendant to establish the defense of insanity (IC 35-
41-3-6) by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a) provides
that “[a] person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if,
as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-
6(b) provides that “mental disease or defect” means “a severely abnormal
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mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person’s perception,
but the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
unlawful or antisocial conduct.” “It is for the trier of fact to determine whether
the defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the
offense.” Robinson, 53 N.E.3d at 1241 (citing Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1075 (citing
Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004))). The defendant is in the
position of having to appeal a negative judgment. Id. “A reviewing court will
reverse only when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the
conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Id.
(citing Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1075). The reviewing court will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the
evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable and logical
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
[17] “In addition, mental disease or defect, for purposes of the insanity statute, does
not include temporary mental incapacity that results from voluntary
intoxication.” Bloomfield v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1234, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted) (citing Townsend v. State, 45
N.E.3d 821, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied), trans. denied. Ind. Code §
35-41-2-5 provides that “[i]ntoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of
a mental state that is an element of the offense unless the defendant meets the
requirements of IC 35-41-3-5.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-5 states that intoxication is
a defense only if the intoxication resulted from the introduction of a substance
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in a person’s body without the person’s consent or when the person did not
know that the substance might cause intoxication.
[18] In Berry v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether, considering
the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, it was contrary to law
for the trial court to have concluded that the defendant’s psychotic symptoms
were the result of his voluntary abuse of alcohol and not a mental disease or
defect. 969 N.E.2d 35, 39 (Ind. 2012). The defendant had been hospitalized
multiple times for a combination of symptoms related to his drug and alcohol
abuse and bipolar disorder. Id. at 36. The Court stated that, when temporary
mental incapacity is the result of voluntary intoxication, it does not fit within
the definition of “mental disease or defect.” Id. at 38 (citing Jackson v. State, 273
Ind. 49, 52, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980) (“Temporary mental incapacity, when
induced by voluntary intoxication, normally furnishes no legal excuse for, or
defense to, a crime.”)). The Court further stated that, on the other hand,
Indiana recognizes situations where “the ingestion of intoxicants, though
voluntary, has been abused to the point that it has produced mental disease.”
Id. at 42 (citing Jackson, 273 Ind. at 52, 402 N.E.2d at 949). It stated that “[t]his
type of mental disease is now commonly referred to as ‘settled’ or ‘fixed’
insanity” and that “[i]n cases where a defendant’s conduct is caused by his or
her ‘settled’ or ‘fixed’ insanity, the defendant would be able to meet the mental-
disease prong of Indiana’s insanity statute.” Id.
[19] The Berry Court observed that the expert witnesses disagreed as to what caused
the defendant’s behavior, with two experts attributing his behavior to his
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bipolar disorder and a third expert opining that the defendant’s symptoms were
caused by the voluntary abuse of alcohol and not his bipolar disorder. Id. The
Court also noted that none of the experts suggested that the defendant suffered
from settled or fixed insanity and that in fact all of the experts ruled out
“delirium tremens,” a type of settled insanity caused by the chronic abuse of
alcohol. Id. The Court observed:
The intersection of voluntary intoxication and insanity is murky
at best. Certainly, not all chronic alcoholics have destroyed their
mental faculties to the point where they suffer from a mental
disease as defined in Indiana’s insanity statute. On the other
hand, consumption of alcohol prior to committing an offense
does not automatically rule out the insanity defense, as the
underlying cause of a defendant’s behavior could be a mental
disease. Ultimately, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether
the accused’s conduct was the result of a diseased mind—
regardless of the source of the disease—or was the result of
voluntary intoxication.
Id. at 42-43 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that,
while one of the expert witnesses could not give an exact label to the
defendant’s condition, the expert did conclude that the defendant’s behavior
was caused by his voluntary abuse of alcohol. Id. at 43. It held that the trial
court, as the trier of fact, was within its province to accept the expert’s
testimony at trial, draw reasonable inferences from it, and discredit conflicting
testimony. Id. It held that a reasonable inference from the expert’s detailed
testimony on the subject was that the defendant’s behavior was due to either
voluntarily induced alcohol intoxication or voluntarily induced alcohol
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withdrawal. Id. The Court also noted that the lay testimony regarding the
defendant’s post-intoxication behavior buttressed the expert’s conclusions. Id.
It noted the highly deferential standard of review and affirmed the trial court’s
rejection of the defendant’s insanity defense. Id. at 43-44.
[20] Here, the court was able to consider the testimony of the officers and the
testimony of Dr. Parker and Dr. Callaway, each of whom were questioned by
the court and the parties. Gorman does not argue that Dr. Parker or Dr.
Callaway concluded that she suffered from settled or fixed insanity caused by
the chronic use or abuse of alcohol or drugs. To the extent reasonable minds
could interpret a conflict in the evidence regarding Gorman’s sanity at the time
of the offense, the trial court as the trier of fact could determine based upon the
expert testimony presented that Gorman did not establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her
conduct of resisting law enforcement at the time of the offense, and “it is not
the role of the court on appeal to reweigh the evidence presented at trial and
make a determination as to which of those inferences the trial court should have
made.” Robinson, 53 N.E.3d at 1242 (citing Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1078).
[21] Based upon the record and our highly deferential standard of review, we
conclude that the trial court made a reasonable inference that Gorman was able
to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct at the time of the offense and to
reject her insanity defense. See Bloomfield, 61 N.E.3d at 1238-1240 (holding,
where the defendant argued that his conduct was not the result of voluntary
intoxication but rather the result of mental degeneration caused by his long-
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term abuse of Xanax and Spice, that the defendant was clearly suffering from
the withdrawal of Xanax and Spice, it was for the jury to determine whether the
accused’s conduct was the result of a diseased mind regardless of the source of
the disease, and that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
reject the defendant’s argument that his conduct was the result of a mental
disease or defect), trans. denied; Lawson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1273, 1279-1283
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the jury was free to credit the opinion of one
expert over the other expert and that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s rejection of the defendant’s insanity defense), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[22] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Gorman’s conviction for resisting law
enforcement as a level 6 felony.
[23] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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