FILED
Sep 30 2016, 8:30 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Randy M. Fisher Gregory F. Zoeller
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Fort Wayne, Indiana Karl Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason L. Bloomfield, September 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1601-CR-112
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Appellee-Plaintiff Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1407-F5-4
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Jason L. Bloomfield appeals his convictions for two counts of level 5 felony
battery of a public safety official resulting in bodily injury and one count of level
6 felony battery of a public safety official. He asserts that the evidence is
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insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of his insanity defense. We conclude
that there was conflicting expert evidence as to whether Bloomfield was able to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offenses and
whether his mental state at the time of the offenses was the result of a mental
disease or defect or voluntary intoxication. Thus, there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to find that Bloomfield was legally sane when he committed the
offenses. Accordingly, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The evidence most favorable to the verdicts shows that in 2014, Bloomfield was
regularly taking four to five Xanax pills and smoking Spice on a daily basis. On
July 2, 2014, he took four to five Xanax pills and smoked Spice. On July 3,
2014, Bloomfield was booked into the Allen County Jail on charges unrelated
to the current offenses. During the routine intake health screening, the nurse
observed that Bloomfield had a gash across his nose, which had been inflicted
by a nonlethal round or a bean bag earlier that day, and for which he had been
taken to the emergency room prior to being brought to jail. Bloomfield told the
intake nurse about his drug use and said that he was experiencing cold sweats.
He was placed on observation for drug withdrawal and delirium tremens, and
was housed in the jail block reserved for those who were being observed due to
medical issues, drug withdrawal, suicide watch, or other reasons requiring close
supervision.
[3] While incarcerated, Bloomfield was agitated, became progressively worse, and
exhibited many bizarre behaviors. He was observed naked in his cell,
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hallucinating, and trying to pick bugs off the wall. He drank out of the toilet.
On July 5, he was taken to the hospital for “hallucinations and anxiety and
spice withdrawal,” but was returned to jail. Tr. at 174. On July 6, a nurse
attempted to take his vital signs but was unable to because “he had erratic
behavior … he was banging and kicking on the door and it just wasn’t safe for
him to be let out of his cell.” Id. at 164.
[4] On July 7, Deputy Christopher Depew was conducting morning roll call. He
opened the door to Bloomfield’s cell, and Bloomfield rushed out, grabbed
Deputy Depew’s arm, and bit it. Bloomfield was completely naked. Deputy
Depew called for backup on his lapel mike. Bloomfield grabbed the
microphone and ripped it off. He began swinging the mike around by its cord
and advanced toward Deputy Depew. Deputy Depew pushed Bloomfield to
the ground, but Bloomfield got back up and came at the deputy. Deputy
Depew realized that Bloomfield was not going to stop, so he retreated into the
shower room and barricaded himself there until backup officers arrived.
[5] Deputies Chad Ray and Richard Wacasey responded to Deputy Depew’s call
for assistance. When they entered the block, Bloomfield was lying on the floor.
He immediately jumped when he saw them and took up a fighting stance.
Deputy Ray wrapped his arms around Bloomfield and took him to the ground.
Deputy Ray tried to handcuff Bloomfield, but Bloomfield tried to bite Deputy
Ray’s hand. Deputy Ray pushed Bloomfield’s head away, and Bloomfield
grabbed Deputy Ray’s testicles and began squeezing. Deputy Ray began yelling
at Bloomfield and punching him. Other officers grabbed Bloomfield’s hands,
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put his hands behind his back, and handcuffed him. The officers then pulled
him to his feet and carried him to a holding cell. Bloomfield continued to
thrash about and try to bite the officers. After a restraint chair was brought into
the holding cell, the officers began strapping Bloomfield in the chair. Deputy
Richard Wacasey was controlling Bloomfield’s head “to keep him from trying
to bite anyone,” when Bloomfield spit in his face. Id. at 120. Deputy Wacasey
moved his head back, and Bloomfield spit at him again. Officers then placed a
spit hood on Bloomfield.
[6] The State charged Bloomfield with two counts of level 5 felony battery of a
public safety official resulting in bodily injury and one count of level 6 felony
battery of a public safety official. Bloomfield filed his notice of intent to
interpose defense of temporary insanity. The trial court appointed three
doctors, Drs. David Lombard, Stephen Ross, and Kevin Wieland, to examine
Bloomfield and determine his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the
time he committed the offenses. All three doctors determined that Bloomfield
was competent to stand trial.
[7] A three-day jury trial was held. Dr. Lombard testified that when he examined
Bloomfield on September 2, 2014, he was “cognitively clear” and appeared to
“understand everything that was going on.” Id. at 353. Because Bloomfield
told Dr. Lombard that he did not remember the events of July 7, 2014, Dr.
Lombard testified that he was unable to form any opinion as to Bloomfield’s
state of mind during the attacks. However, Dr. Lombard testified that
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Bloomfield’s behaviors between July 3 and 7 were consistent with withdrawal
from Xanax and Spice.
[8] Dr. Ross testified that he examined Bloomfield on October 2, 2014. During the
examination, Bloomfield was “anxious” but “he wasn’t psychotic or
aggressive.” Id. at 423. Dr. Ross testified that Bloomfield’s withdrawal from
Xanax and Spice “precipitated the behaviors that led to these charges.” Id. at
415. Dr. Ross concluded that the effects of withdrawal that Bloomfield had
been suffering from on July 7 had been temporary. Id. at 423. Dr. Ross
explained that withdrawal from Xanax can include “hyperactivity, tremors of
the hand, insomnia, gastro and stomach problems, tactile hallucinations, …
arbitrary hallucinations, illusions, agitation and anxiety,” as well as seizures.
Id. at 417. Dr. Ross opined that Bloomfield’s “mental state or capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his behaviors was diminished principally due to
his voluntary ingestion of mind altering substances and subsequent
withdrawal.” Id. at 420-21, 427. Dr. Ross also testified that Bloomfield’s
actions on July 7 could have stemmed from a psychotic episode, but “also
could be in part volitional, something he’s choosing to do because he’s angry.”
Id. at 421-22. He testified that any psychosis would have been temporary. Id.
at 423. Dr. Ross explained that if Bloomfield was acting of his own volition on
July 7, it might indicate that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct. Id. at 422. Dr. Ross also opined that Bloomfield’s withdrawal
“compromised” his ability to control his anger. Id. Other than Bloomfield’s
substance abuse, Dr. Ross saw no indication of “an enduring or chronic
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psychological condition.” Id. Dr. Ross acknowledged that Bloomfield had
been previously prescribed Geodon, an antipsychotic that is used “for those
who are psychotic” and for those with “impulse control problems.” Id. at 426.
[9] Dr. Wieland examined Bloomfield on December 19, 2014. Dr. Wieland
testified that at the time of the attacks, Bloomfield was suffering from bipolar
disorder with psychotic episodes and that he was “not completely sane.” Id. at
389-90. However, Dr. Wieland testified that at the time of the examination,
Bloomfield was not suffering from a manic or psychotic episode. Id. at 396. In
addition, Dr. Wieland testified that withdrawal from “[il]licit drugs” could
result in psychoses. 1 Id. at 390. When the prosecutor presented a hypothetical
scenario reflecting Bloomfield’s specific circumstances, Dr. Wieland
acknowledged that such behaviors could have been caused by withdrawal from
drugs. Id. at 394. Also, Dr. Wieland testified that Bloomfield had not
accurately described his drug usage to him. Specifically, Dr. Wieland testified
that Bloomfield did not tell him about his Xanax use and that Bloomfield told
him that he had used marijuana occasionally but had not used it prior to being
arrested. Dr. Wieland further testified that his conclusion that Bloomfield was
“not completely sane” was based in part on the drug usage that Bloomfield had
self-reported to him. Id. at 395.
1
The State’s suggestion that Bloomfield reported using methamphetamine is not supported by the record.
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[10] The jury convicted Bloomfield as charged. The trial court sentenced
Bloomfield to an aggregate sentence of eight and one-half years’ incarceration,
with seven years executed and eighteen months suspended to probation. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Bloomfield argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
rejection of his insanity defense. The insanity defense is an affirmative defense
for which the defendant carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(b). A defendant may be found not responsible
by reason of insanity if the defendant establishes both that (1) he suffers from a
mental disease or defect and (2) the mental disease or defect rendered the
defendant unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of
the offense. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a); Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708
(Ind. 2010). “‘[M]ental disease or defect’ means a severely abnormal mental
condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the
term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or
antisocial conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(b). In addition, “[m]ental disease or
defect, for purposes of the insanity statute, does not include temporary mental
incapacity that results from voluntary intoxication.” Townsend v. State, 45
N.E.3d 821, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (2016). 2
2
On a related note, Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-5 states that “[i]ntoxication is not a defense in a
prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental
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[12] “‘A determination of insanity is a question for the trier of fact.’” Berry v. State,
969 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 672
(Ind. 1996)). A defendant who claims that his insanity defense should have
prevailed at trial appeals from a negative judgment, and “we will reverse only
when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the
defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Thompson v. State, 804
N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (emphasis added). We will neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess witness credibility but will consider “only the evidence most
favorable to the judgment and the reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Id.
[13] Our supreme court has stated that “[t]he strongest showing of an evidentiary
conflict occurs where the experts disagree as to whether the defendant was
insane at the time of the offense.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710. Therefore,
where a credible expert opines that a defendant was sane when committing an
offense, despite other expert opinions to the contrary, the evidence will support
the trier of fact’s rejection of a defendant’s insanity defense. See id.
(“[C]onflicting credible expert testimony is sufficiently probative of sanity.”).
Here, Bloomfield contends that the expert evidence is without conflict and leads
only to the conclusion that he suffers from a mental disease or defect and that
state that is an element of the offense unless the defendant meets the requirements of IC 35-41-3-5.” Indiana
Code Section 35-41-3-5 states that intoxication is a defense only if the intoxication resulted from a substance
being introduced (1) without the person’s consent or (2) without the person’s knowledge that the substance
might cause intoxication. See also Berry v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2012) (“‘Temporary mental
incapacity, when induced by voluntary intoxication, normally furnishes no legal excuse for, or defense to, a
crime.’”) (quoting Jackson v. State, 273 Ind. 49, 52, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980)).
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the mental disease or defect rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct at the time of the offenses. According to Bloomfield, (1) Dr.
Lombard did not give an opinion on his state of mind at the time of the
offenses, (2) Dr. Wieland opined that he was suffering from bipolar disorder
with psychotic episodes and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct at the time of the offenses, and (3) Dr. Ross satisfied both elements of
the insanity defense in that he testified that he was aware that Bloomfield was
previously prescribed Geodon (an antipsychotic drug) and that Bloomfield’s
ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was diminished at the time
of the offense.
[14] We disagree with Bloomfield’s characterization of Dr. Ross’s testimony. As for
Dr. Ross’s knowledge that Bloomfield had previously been prescribed Geodon,
we observe that Dr. Ross’s awareness of the prescription does not mean that he
agreed with the diagnosis made by the doctor who made the prescription.
Further, the evidence in the record before us shows that Geodon may be
prescribed for psychosis or impulse control, yet Bloomfield does not direct us to
any evidence indicating whether he was prescribed Geodon for psychosis or
impulse control. In addition, the fact that Bloomfield was previously prescribed
Geodon for a certain condition does not necessarily mean that he was suffering
from that condition at the time of the offenses. As for Dr. Ross’s testimony that
Bloomfield’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was diminished
at the time of the offenses, we observe that to prevail on an insanity defense, the
defendant must prove that he or she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
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of his or her conduct. A weakened ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of
one’s actions does not equate to an inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of
one’s actions. Simply put, Dr. Ross never testified that in his opinion
Bloomfield was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
[15] Significantly, Dr. Ross did not conclude that Bloomfield was suffering from
bipolar disorder with psychotic episodes on July 7, which is contrary to Dr.
Wieland’s opinion. Rather, Dr. Ross testified that Bloomfield’s withdrawal
from Xanax and Spice precipitated his conduct on July 7 and that, other than
Bloomfield’s substance abuse, Dr. Ross saw no indication of an enduring or
chronic psychological condition. Tr. at 414, 422. Also, Dr. Ross testified that
Bloomfield’s withdrawal compromised his ability to control his anger and he
may have acted on his own volition because he was angry. Id. at 421-22. And
Dr. Ross testified that if Bloomfield was acting volitionally, his conduct might
indicate that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. at
422.
[16] Even though Dr. Ross specifically opined that Bloomfield’s conduct was caused
by his withdrawal from Xanax and Spice, Bloomfield argues that his conduct
was not the result of voluntary intoxication but rather the result of “mental
degeneration” caused by his long-term abuse of Xanax and Spice. Appellant’s
Br. at 19. Essentially, his argument is that even though he voluntarily used
these drugs, his long-term use produced a mental disease for purposes of the
insanity defense. In support, he cites Berry, in which our supreme court
recognized that “‘[w]here the ingestion of intoxicants, though voluntary, has
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been abused to the point that it has produced mental disease such that the
accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct ... the law does
not hold him responsible for his acts.’” 969 N.E.2d at 38 (quoting Jackson v.
State, 273 Ind. 49, 52, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980). “This type of mental disease
is now commonly referred to as ‘settled’ or ‘fixed’ insanity.” Id. at 42 (quoting
State v. Sexton, 180 Vt. 34, 904 A.2d 1092, 1101-04 (2006)). One type of “settled
insanity” resulting from long-term alcohol abuse is delirium tremens, “a severe
mental disorder.” Id. at 41-42. In Berry, our supreme court considered whether
the psychotic symptoms exhibited by the defendant at the time of his offenses
were the result of bipolar disorder or intoxication from his voluntary use of
alcohol. The defendant had a long history of chronic alcohol and drug abuse,
but the court held that there was sufficient evidence that his behavior was the
result of voluntary intoxication rather than delirium tremens. Id. at 44. In
doing so, the court observed,
The intersection of voluntary intoxication and insanity is murky
at best. Certainly, not all chronic alcoholics have destroyed their
mental faculties to the point where they suffer from a mental
disease as defined in Indiana’s insanity statute. On the other
hand, consumption of alcohol prior to committing an offense
does not automatically rule out the insanity defense, as the
underlying cause of a defendant’s behavior could be a mental
disease. Ultimately, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether
the accused’s conduct was the result of a diseased mind–
regardless of the source of the disease–or was the result of
voluntary intoxication.
Id. at 43. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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[17] Here, Bloomfield was clearly suffering from the withdrawal of Xanax and
Spice. Many long-term drug users become addicted and will experience some
level of mental (and physical) anguish and/or incapacity during withdrawal
from the abused drug. The painful withdrawal does not necessarily indicate
that the long-term abuse of drugs caused a mental disease. The evidence shows
that Bloomfield’s last drug use was on July 2, 2014. He was incarcerated the
next day. He was taken to the hospital on July 5, but apparently the medical
staff believed that his withdrawal symptoms were not so severe as to require
him to remain in the hospital, and he was returned to jail. Bloomfield was
normal when he spoke to Dr. Lombard on September 2, 2014, to Dr. Wieland
on December 19, 2014 and to Dr. Ross on October 2, 2014. None of the
experts testified that Bloomfield’s long-term drug use resulted in a mental
disease. It is for the jury to determine whether the accused’s conduct was the
result of a diseased mind regardless of the source of the disease. See id. In this
case, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reject
Bloomfield’s argument that his conduct was the result of a mental disease or
defect. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Bloomfield’s argument that the evidence
is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Bloomfield was insane
at the time of the offenses, and we affirm his convictions.
[18] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
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