NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STANLEY FINNEY, No. 14-17415
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02805-TLN-EFB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2017**
Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Stanley Finney appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) action. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Finney failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether, with the exception of the
subcategory of documents pertaining to Mr. Ortega and Mr. Polictzo’s social
security applications, defendant had not “conducted a search reasonably calculated
to uncover all relevant documents.” Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d
759, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (setting
forth requirements for demonstrating adequacy of search for documents).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to the documents
pertaining to Mr. Ortega and Mr. Polictzo because Finney failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendant did not establish the documents
were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of FOIA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6) (explaining that FOIA does “not apply to . . . personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); Cameranesi v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 856
F.3d 626, 637-39 (9th Cir. 2017) (in determining whether Exemption 6 applies,
courts first “evaluate the personal privacy interest at stake to ensure that disclosure
implicates a personal privacy interest that is nontrivial or more than de minimis,”
and then balance any such privacy interest with the “public interest in disclosure”
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(citation, internal quotation marks, and alternations omitted)). Contrary to
Finney’s contentions, Finney was not entitled to segregated records, a Vaughn
index, or in camera review of these documents. See Fiduccia v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 185 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[t]here is no
statutory requirement of a Vaughn index or affidavit,” and that the statute only
requires that “the agency provide enough information, presented with sufficient
detail, clarity, and verification, so that the requester can fairly determine what has
not been produced and why, and the court can decide whether the exemptions
claimed justify the nondisclosure”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Finney’s Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) motion because Finney failed to show how allowing
additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See Citizens
Comm’n on Human Rights v. Food & Drug Admin., 45 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir.
1995) (setting forth standard of review and concluding that district court did not
abuse discretion in granting summary judgment in FOIA action before allowing an
opportunity to conduct additional discovery).
We reject as meritless Finney’s contentions that the district court failed to
recognize his action was brought under FOIA rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to
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consider his newly discovered evidence, and that Finney was lured into filing suit
and incurring costs.
AFFIRMED.
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