Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 5, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D13-2786, 3D13-2803
Lower Tribunal No. 09-13518A
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Linaker Charlemagne,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Nushin G. Sayfie,
Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before LAGOA, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
EMAS, J.
Linaker Charlemagne was convicted of one count of first-degree murder
with a firearm (discharging a firearm resulting in death) and one count of
attempted first-degree murder with a firearm (discharging a firearm resulting in
great bodily harm). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life
imprisonment. Pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes (2009) (the 10-
20-Life statute), each of the life sentences carried a mandatory minimum sentence
of twenty-five years in prison. The trial court ordered that the twenty-five year
mandatory minimum sentences be served concurrently.
On direct appeal, we affirmed the convictions. Charlemagne v. State, 185
So. 3d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (Mem). The State cross-appealed the twenty-five
year mandatory minimum sentences, contending that the trial court did not have
the discretion to direct that they be served concurrently. The State argued that the
language of the 10-20-Life statute required that the twenty-five year mandatory
minimum terms be imposed consecutively.
We agreed, reversed the sentences and remanded with directions that the
sentences be corrected to reflect that the twenty-five year mandatory minimum
terms shall be served consecutively. In doing so, we relied upon Williams v. State,
125 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) and Walton v. State, 106 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013), each of which was subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme
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Court.1 See Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2016); Williams v. State, 186 So.
3d 989 (Fla. 2016). In Williams, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether
and under what circumstances the 10-20-Life statute prohibited, permitted or
required consecutive mandatory minimum sentences. The Court held that, for
purposes of sentencing under the 10-20-Life statute:
Generally, consecutive sentencing of mandatory minimum
imprisonment terms for multiple firearm offenses is impermissible if
the offenses arose from the same criminal episode and a firearm was
merely possessed but not discharged. . . . It follows, therefore, that a
trial court must impose the mandatory minimum sentences
concurrently under such circumstances.
If, however, multiple firearm offenses are committed
contemporaneously, during which time multiple victims are shot at,
then consecutive sentencing is permissible but not mandatory. In other
words, a trial judge has discretion to order the mandatory minimum
sentences to run consecutively, but may impose the sentences
concurrently.
Id. at 993 (internal citations omitted).
Charlemagne petitioned for review in the Florida Supreme Court. The
Florida Supreme Court granted review, quashed our decision, and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of its decisions in Walton and Williams.
It is undisputed that Charlemagne was convicted of multiple firearm
offenses, committed contemporaneously, during which multiple victims were shot
1 We also relied upon our decision in Morgan v. State, 137 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2014). The Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed Morgan and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Walton and Williams. Morgan v.
State, SC14-757 (Fla. May 26, 2017).
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at. Therefore, under Williams, the imposition of consecutive mandatory minimum
sentences was permissible but not mandatory. The transcript of the sentencing
hearing establishes that the trial court exercised its discretion in ordering that the
mandatory minimum sentences be served concurrently rather than consecutively.
These sentences were consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in
Williams, and were within the trial court’s discretion.
We therefore affirm the convictions (direct appeal) and the sentences
imposed by the trial court (cross-appeal), including the twenty-five year mandatory
minimum sentences, which the trial court ordered to be served concurrently.
Affirmed.
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